A

TREATISE

OF THE

BULK and SELVEDGE

OF THE

WORLD.

WHEREIN

The GREATNESS, LITTLENESS and LASTINGNESS of BODIES are freely Handled.

With an Answer to *Tentamine de Deo*, By *S. P.* D. D.

By *N. Fairfax*, M. D.

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TO THE
RIGHT WORSHIPFUL
Sir *William Blois*, Knight.

Such is that wonderful and moſt comely Chain of Beings, which winds up into World, *that if the ſmall and lowermoſt things therein make ſhift to ſhow themſelves, 'tis alwayes by the leave, or with the help of the Bigger and the Higher. That rotten wood may give its glimmerings, the Sun muſt take away its light: And if the Flowers will needs be riſing out of their colder beds, or the Fryes of Wrigglers and ſwarms of Quicklings or Inſects, peep out of their Graves and Dungeons, they*

must wait upon the Sun to bring about those beams of his that make the Spring; whence they may have their Prison doors unlockt, their fetters taken off, and be tickled into such a laughing briskness, and judged up into such a smirkish liveliness, as may last as long as the Summers warmth holds on to cocker them, and the days heat to frigge and chafe them. Now I reckon that I must bethink my self in this Address, how far I am taken in here, and be well aware how Woodbridge *stands so near to* Grundsborough Hall, *that if such an* underly Shrub *in* Knowledge, *and* unthrifty Sucker *in Philosophy as I am, shall strive to put forth this Spring time here, I can do no less than ask the good liking of such a* neighbouring Cedar, *under whose shade I must needs creep up, befann'd from next Dogs-day scorchings, and within the bosom of whose shrowdings I must be cloakt from wind and weather. Nor should I ever aim to blow up any Fire-light of*

useful

useful Knowlege in this place, were it not that you have thought meet to withhold those Sun-like beams of yours, that would soon bedim its fainter twinklings, and shine out all its dying glitter. Indeed you have purchased so fair a Lordship of Knowledge in these Parts, that I fear I should wrong your Freedoms, and encroach upon your Royalties, if I should put in any Claims but Under ones, or own any other Hamlet so near you, but what is a limb of your Township. Nor is it but meet that I should hold all my Natural knowledge of your Mannor, and become Tenant to so good a Landlord in Philosophy. So that paying this acknowledgment, should be nothing but doing my bounden Homage, and bringing in my Lady Rent-charge; while the Lord of the Soyl holds nextly of the King, and does his devoir *in a* Regi Sacrum.

Thus however it may be thought by others, I have miscarried in the Thing I

treat of; I am sure I have not mistook the Man I address to. And though it may seem but a wooden come off, and like that of the sorry numb-skull'd Russes, *who when they are pincht with a hardness beyond the learning of Horn-book, are wont to answer, that God and the* Great Duke *knows all things: Yet I being bound so far by the laws of Mine and Thine as I have been free in acknowledging it; must spring as much from a rightful mind in me, to deal out to the Greater Owner his Greater Share, as it does from a shotten brain in any of them, to tell another, I know not who can answer I know not what.*

Sure I am, if I ever felt my self at all, 'tis in my breast to woo Dame Kind *with as busie a warmth and hearty earnestness as any man; but 'tis not in my Chest to endow her with that* Fulness *that he can, whose mind is as Great and Wealthy as his Love can be strong and flaming, and whose endowments have made*

made him to be as much ſtared at by the Yeomen, as indeared to men of skill and breeding. And I cannot think I miſtook my ſelf in Courtſhip, while I waited upon the youngeſt and moſt Houſewifely Daughter of Philoſophy, named Workful, ſo long as I hapned of ſuch a Rival in the Parlor with her. I do believe, Sir, that your ſelf as well as I, had ſo much rather be a Well-willer to a Bricklayer, than a Philoſopher taking name from Ariſtotles *Phyſicks, by how much the more 'tis behoving Mankind, to have houſes on the earth for ſettled and eaſeful dwelling, than ſuch capering Caſtles in the Air, whoſe Groundſils are laid with Whims, their Overwayes with Dreams, and rooft with Cream of thinking. I muſt needs ſay, that I do think my ſelf ſo much more better'd by a* Philoſophical Tranſaction *of a Moneth, or* Journal des Scavans *of a Fortnight, than by a* Mercury Gallant *of half a Year, by how much the more I like my ſelf,*

self, when I am kindly and steadily knowing, above what I do, when I feel that I am Gay and Towring. And I think our Royal Society *at* London *is as much before that* Des belles Lettres *at* Paris, *as the* History *of that Body of Worthies outstrips the* Academy of Complements. *In that narrow Chat that I have had with Outlanders, it has been hugely to my liking, that hard upon the first greeting, I have been plyed with so many good words for our* R. S. *in the whole, and Mr.* Boyle *alone. Nor can I find, that either your self, or I, or any man else, that has kenn'd the drift and bounds of that undertaking, have made less reckonings of their growing worth and works already known, or abated our hopes for time to come; for all the* Tee hees *that have been broke by Men of* Droll, *or dirt that has been thrown from* Daring *spight. And it goes a great way with me, to mark, that the same-kidneyed men, who have either*

a ſharp flowt at the end of their tongue, or a bitter hate in the middle of their heart, for the wary Experimenter, *have another of the ſame in their Budget, for the* Book *that is named from its Holineſs, or indeed for any thing elſe, but what is fleſh on the one ſide, and air on the other. Nor can any man gheſs it ſhould be otherwiſe, but that he who had a ſneer or grudge for the Book of Gods Works; the Print that he has given us of his Almighty* Power *and boundleſs leſs Wiſdom: ſhould have no leſs for that other of his Word; the likeneſs he has drawn for us of his truth and holineſs.*

Whence I have ſomewhat the more wondred how it could ever get into the heads or hearts of Men of inſight or holineſs, that a right knowledge of the Works which God has done, ſhould lead from the knowledge of, or leſſen the love for, that boundleſs Wiſdom and Goodneſs who brought thoſe things about. As if ſhewing the Coats and garments

which

which *Dorcas* made, *before the holy Mourners, had been to wheadle off their thoughts from the Work-woman to the Works, and drown their sorrows for the jewel that was lost, in the floudings of of their joy for the Cabinet that was left. Can the same train of holy ends which God has fram'd for Mankinds bliss, be less indearing, for that they are known to be as skilfully rang'd as lovingly aim'd? How others may have been wrought upon by that* doing Knowledge, *which now spreads amongst us like love amongst the Youth, kindly and takingly, I cannot tell: But if I were now to die, and knew it so, I must speak it from within me, That I have found my self more warmly shined upon by the Father of Lights, and breathing into more becoming flames, from the reading of* Malpighius *about the hatching of an Egg, or* Dr. Grew *about the sprouting of a Bean, (a thing set at nought to a by-word;) than ever I could do from the*

the shelves full of those Books, that have struck fire for the Government of Churches and some other things, bearing their religious weight in their Names, and their light in their Newness, in the late dayes of Blame, and years of Topsieturvy. Wherein, when men had wrought up all the Woman within them that was feeble and glowing, into a fine-spun thread, they play'd the Men only, when they had done, in pelting on't with the distaff. I can easily tast the sweetness of God through the bitterness of wormwood; but could never feel the sweetness of the Christian through the bitterness of the Man. And I love the New Philosophy *so much the more; For why, It sets the hand a working not a striking, and answers the noise of Talking by the stilness of Doing, as the* Italians *clam rowt and tattle into nodding and beckning. Yet 'tis not to be lookt for, that the Bulk of men amongst us, should love that which they neither know nor care to know. It*

will

will be enough for those that have betrothed the Way, that many are the hands heads and hearts of such worthy and unwearied Gentlemen as are Going along with them. And I shall ever think with that Great part of the R. S. *the Great Mr.* Oldenburg, *that* Sound Philosophers are each to other sufficient Theaters. *The kindness and good greetting that is of one sort, is wont to be enfolded mainly within the rank or stock Guild or kinred of the same. And that man who can find what 'tis to love knowingly and beseemingly, will never feel himself less at ease for being wedlockt but to one. Which I do not speak as if I ghess'd you had your Philosophy to choose, any more than your Religion; or that you could shift the former with as much sleight as some others do the latter. I believe you deal in Holdfasts as well as Truths, and can foretel what you shall be, as well as tell what you are. But because there are a great many so much*

much upon the ſpur, that they cannot ſtay ſo long till the writing can be fetcht which is graven with the finger of God: but grow ſo hot on't, as to melt down their thoughts forthwith, and fall a graving of them into Calviſh likeneſſes, that may go blazing before them in the wilderneſs they are got into; that however they miſs wool they may have noiſe, ſomething loud, though nothing uſeful. I was ſo forward to chide ſuch a raſh piece of Will-worſhip, that I ſlipt into ſpeaking of *while I was ſpeaking* to. *But 'tis indeed time to remember, that I have ſpoken enough of one and other. I am ſure he whom I ſpeak to, is too much taken with things to be over fond of words; and 'tis a misbecomingneſs to have a* doing Philoſophy *ſet forth by a* talking Philoſopher. *That Manly knowledge that is now in the Chair, is to be trim'd ſilently. And 'tis well for me that neither Man nor Thing wants gilding. For I could never open my mouth Charmwiſe,*

nor

nor breath out Spells to bind down men. I never drew from, nor matcht to the House of Peacock. Gay and I are nothing a kin, nor like to be, but all that dwells at my home is homely. My brain is not wont to go big with flower. When ever I spy one 'tis aloof to be sure: So I leave both to shine for themselves, and outshine others. And I know whatever is a None-such, will draw enough as 'tis, without the Hogow of the stifling Haulers. To be joy'd of praise-worthiness, is more than to be lifted up by the Hoist of breath, or to be rung with a peal of Hum and Outcry. It will be more than enough for me, though I cannot raise nor greaten, the height and spreadingness of your Worth, by sayings that are big and lofty, if it may not be thought a lowning and lessening of it, to take into the List of your Menials

SIR,

Your most bounden Homager

Woodbridge, Mar. 25. 1678. *Natha. Fairfax.*

TO

IF I may measure others by my self, 'tis a more tickliſh thing to pen a Preface, than 'tis to write a Book. For when ever I lay hands on a New piece, as ſoon as I have once ſpell'd the Great letters of its Name, I am wont haſtily to take forth to the Foreſpeech for the Reader, as thinking that to be the handle, that I am to hold the Book by, which, according as I reliſh or miſlike, oftentimes ſo fares the whole with me. For if I find the man has it not in him to erect a Scheme in the *Say* that he has for me there, I am ſhrewdly given to miſtruſt, that he will never conjure much in the Book that comes after: or when the firſt Greeting me is ſowre or faint, I am ready to fear the after treat will be none of the ſweeteſt or the winningeſt. Whether others conne Books with theſe kind of reckonings, I can't tell; but while I can tell my ſelf that I do ſo, it ſtands me in hand to be a little wary of tripping upon ſuch ſlippery ground. Now to ſpeak truth, all the tale that I have to tell the Reader is but this: That finding in my ſelf a kind of forwardneſs towards Philoſophy, and mainly to that part of it which

takes knowledge of Bodies; as which, of all others, I found I could receive moſt helps and furtherance in, from thoſe ſpreading lights and wealthy ſtores, with which the *Royal Society* at home and others abroad, ſet into the way by their ſhowing and enheartned to go on by their works, had both embelliſht and enricht it, I let my mind alone to take its full ſwing in the Conning of Bodies, this and that; and forthwith or ere I could well help it, I fell a Roving, and plung'd out from what I was medling with and toſſing of, to another thing that was earlyer and Bulkier, and to ſomwhat ſtill that was more betimes and more of Boak; and being quite loſt in a wilde and a frightful on and on, I'een took back again where I was, and fell to unravel the thing that was too big to be fathom'd, that I might make it little enough for my mind to grapple with: but I was as unluckie at leſſening and narrowing as I had been before at widening and bigning. As the one had wrackt and limm'd my thoughts, with endleſs tenters and boundleſs retchings out; ſo had the other nipt in my ſoul and ſhrivell'd up my thoughts, with reſtleſs gripes and unwearyed parings off: ſo that I had both loſt and benothing'd my ſelf in the leſſenings made within

within my ſelf, as I had loſt and bewildred my ſelf in the ſcopes ſtill left without my ſelf. Nor could I be at reſt in my mind, till I had tryed, whether I could not cut off Boundleſsneſs and endleſsneſs, ſo as at length I might have eaſe, to find, that *Body*, which I had to do withal, had both beginning and end, an inmoſt part and an outmoſt whole, as I my ſelf had: and ſo the remarks and experiments that I was to make, were not upon Bodies that carried Boundleſsneſs in their bellies, & were themſelves a ſwimming in a boundleſs gulf, ſo that I muſt needs have my thoughts to dance after them in an endleſs round, or launch into a boundleſs width; but that I might ſettle here or pitch down there, and tell the firſt and ken the laſt, and cope with the *biggeſt* and the *leaſt*: and as ſoon as I got to the ſpring head of *Laſtingneſs*, I ſate me down and drank a health to ſweet reſt, and bliſt my ſelf that I was there; and when I came at the *Selvedge* of *Bulk*, I took heart afreſh to think with my ſelf, that there was all, and nothing at all beyond, and I need weary my ſelf with no more wandrings in a waſt, but might come home again fair and ſoft, and faſten on this or that, or little or great, as I thought beſt, to ſet a mark on or make a Tryal of. For then I ſaw that all was not wood within a

wood: but me-thought the world was a curious Frame of well ſet Bodies, the *beginning* of which the *leaſt* of which, and the *whole* of which, might all be come at.

Thus having ſhaken off the things I could never graſp, and taken Body by the right handle, I found I was freer to think, and better at eaſe to work: and deeming there were more in the world that were of my *make*, I did not know but they might think, and do ſo too; and it was but a friendly part to ſet any man into his way, that I thought was out of it: and therefore what I thought I writ, and what I writ, the Reader ſees is comen abroad.

Which if it takes, I ſhall not miſlike it, that another man has found that which he lookt for; and if it does not, the worſt on't is but this, that that which has not yet been made out by any man, nor has it been by me. And whatever ill luck betides it, I have no body elſe to blame for it; for I writ it all at home, and 'twas given at my ſelf. And to tell troth, I don't love to ask another man, whether my Child be not pretty or hopeful; for I think, that muſt needs be a crotchet piece of unluckyneſs, that is not fit to be Printed if a friend has it to read over for that end, or to be prais'd, if another man has it to make a New ſong upon.

But if any man ask me what I think on't my ſelf?

ſelf? I anſwer, The very ſame that I think of other mens writings, and that is, that they are the writings of Man and nothing more, writing and miſwriting mingled together. Only I can ſay the Writer indeed is neither Green nor Grey. So though the Reader may fear he ſhall find little that is full ripe, I hope he will find leſs that is altogether raw. As I think otherwiſe from what I did ſome years agoe, ſo happily I may think otherwiſe from what I do ſome years hence, even about ſome things here ſpoken to: and therefore I love to ſpeak ſoft for my own ſake as well as others. I do believe too if I had kept it longer I could have drawn it up better, but that bare no ſway with me to do ſo; for then the only day of its coming into the world muſt have been the day of my going out of it. Notwithſtanding though I don't believe 'tis the beſt that can be done, or the beſt that I could do my ſelf, yet 'tis rid of as many miſlikes as I could ſtrike out at twice reading, and I did not think it worth while to read it again to find more. As 'tis, I neither reckon it my God nor my Golden Calf, nor am I fond on't or aſhamd on't. Should I ſay I had ſlighty thoughts of it, I can't tell how it would be wit or good manners to put it into the hands of my Betters; and if I give out I ſet highly by it, I ſhould lacken it as much by making

ſuch a Fondling the Penman of it. However the management of it may ſeem weak or low, I am ſure the drift and ſcope was manly & lofty. There being no lower nor other aims in it, than that we might not think amiſs of that Almighty Being which has made us, nor of the ſundry Beings he has made, that we may neither dote nor dare, ſtragle nor be loſt: but may be led by ſuch a clue of underſtanding, & ſoftned by ſuch a baſhfulneſs of knowledge, that we may be wiſe and awful both in one; that the knowledg of things may be leſs a wearineſs to the fleſh, and that thoughts of things without us may leſs gall that Being within us; that, as God beholding what he had made, ſaid with himſelf that all was good, we may ſee it & ſay it too, & love the ſpring from whence they came, while we wonder at the wiſdom by which they are; worſhipping the ſame with a more becoming dread, a fuller enlightned mind, freer out-goings of heart, ſteddyer & cloſer thoughts about things that he has made more eaſeful to the mind, and better ſorted in it: that ſo giving to God his right, we may take to our ſelves our own reſt.

In the doing of which, the freedom that I have taken, I give too. *Think and let think*, are engraven upon my very ſoul. And I ſhall never think amiſs of the Reader for not being of my mind, any more than I do of thoſe Learned

Learned men which I thought meet ſomwhere to name. Which I did, not from any itching to thwart them: but I thought it would ſpeak nothing of Breeding, to look full on a Great man ſtanding in my way, and not to vouchſafe him worth Doffing to, or to write my ſelf of another mind from what ſome men of Name are, whoſe reaſons for what they hold have fallen into a many good hands, without I ſhould alſo ſay why I am not of their mind for their reaſon. But as for any leſſenings of them, who have done huge well, as I think, elſewhere, and may have done well enough, as others think, where I take them to be out; 'tis ſo much againſt my meaning and the very Grain of me to let any ſuch fall from my Pen, that if in any thing I ſo much as but ſeem to do it, 'tis all my unwarineſs, and nothing of my aim. And I do think my ſelf ſo much the more bound to take heed how I handle the good name of others, by how much the more I ſee, how an ill will'd and frampled waſpiſhneſs has broken forth, to the royling and firing of the age wherein we live, and for ought I can foretel, even thoſe too, that are coming after.

Indeed, when I read ſuch things as are ſpoken to, further on, in a late Writer, I can't for my life but think, *he* may miſtake a little, as you and I and all men do, and have done & ſhall do. And that thereupon he would not willingly be call'd *Names*, ſuch as can't be ſpoken without a ſtink-

ing breath, nor written but with a brazen pen, nor ſpell'd but with the letters of the Dog and the Gooſe, the grinning and the hiſſing. And remembring 'tis good Bible, *Do as you would be done by*, I can eaſily let go my ſelf in ſome forward wiſhes leading to ſelf love in behalf of ſuch a one, heartily beſpeaking him, for Gods ſake, for that of *ſelf*, & the Commonwealth of Learning, that hereafter we might read writings with other ſentences beſides thoſe of Condemnation, with other wit beſides that which lies in the forehead, and where all the Daſhes of the pen may not be ſtroaks upon men; as knowing that ſuch *Doomeſday Books*, may ſooneſt be burnt themſelves, which are readieſt to enflame others.

I believe no man wiſhes with more earneſtneſs than I do, that all men of Learning and knowledg were men of kindneſs and ſweetneſs, & that ſuch as can outdo others would outlove them too; eſpecially while *ſelf* bewhiſpers us, that it ſtands us all in hand to be forgiven as well as to forgive. The hardeſt things that I know, had their beginnings layd in the ſoftneſs and yieldingneſs of a kind of dew; and whoever would have all men ſtand up ſtiffly for what he holds, will find it beſt at length to lead them in thoſe eaſier paths of Nature. Sure I am, it would be more than a wonder to me, ſhould any ones ſight be better'd by *ſpitting fire* into clay & beſmearing eyes with it. For every mans mind is

his

his Caſtle; and if it can't be taken by ſtrength of reaſon, the throwing in Granadoes, will be nothing but a ſmutty, ſtinking token to the world, that ill will would have done more miſchief, but weak Gear could not. So long as he who has but a teeming brain, may have leave to lay his eggs in his own neſt, which is built beyond the reach of every mans puddering pole, why ſhould the ears of all the neighborhood be dinn'd & grated with the Cackle, as if the whole world beſides were all Weaſils and Poulcats, vermine and Lurchers? I do verily bear my ſelf in hand, that if the humor of huffing be but a little further cocker'd & more warmed, the *Leyden* gown muſt needs take place of the Long robe at *Cambridge* & *Oxford*, inſtead of the *ſide thing* the *thing by the ſide*, and ſnicking and ſneeing will be nothing elſe in the world but writing of Book *a la mode d' Angleterre*. For ſo long as men have but unlike thinkings, and that will be as long as they have unlike faces, they muſt look for no better fare from a world of Bears and Scratchers, than firſt to be gall'd in the tendereſt part of their good name, and then to fall under the rods and axes of a cutting hate, and ill will ſet on fire. Were I but to whiſper to him of whom ſo many talk aloud, I ſhould rown him thus much in the ear, with all the heartineſs of a friend, that the next time he has left to bleſs us with his Day breaks, he would chuſe a ſofter quill to make his pen of;

that

that the Reader at length might be as ready to have good thoughts for him, as he has been to have bad words for others.

As for the way of wording it, I know aforehand, 'tis not trim enough for theſe Gay days of ours; but dreſſing is none of my buſineſs. When I look at things, I can afford to overlook words, and I had rather ſpeak home than fair, nor do I care how blunt it be, ſo it be ſtrong. Every man has *his* way of writing and ſpeaking, and I have *mine*; which as I allow it to others, I may look it ſhould be allow'd me. Only tis like there is one thing which I may be blam'd for by many; and that is a kind of ſhineſs all along of thoſe borrowed words & gayneſſes, that Engliſhmen have pickt and cull d from other Tongues, under the name of Choyce words and Sparkling ſayings. To which, after I have markt, how a greater man than I, in the ſame buſineſs of *Bodies*, has gone a good way towards it already, I mean the Learned Sir *Kenhelm Digby*, I have but thus much more to ſay, That thinking with my ſelf, how I an Engliſh man would write a Book in Engliſh tongue, I made it now and than a little of my care, to bring in ſo many words of that ſpeech, that the Book might thence be call'd Engliſh, without miſ-calling it. And indeed however our ſmoother tongued Neighbours may put in a claim for thoſe bewitcheries of ſpeech that flow from Gloſs and Chimingneſs; yet I verily be-

lieve

lieve that there is no tongue under heaven, that goes beyond our Engliſh for ſpeaking manly ſtrong and full. And if words be more to teach than tickle, as I reckon they are, our Mother tongue will get as much by ſpeaking fit and after kind, as it can looſe by faring rough and taking up the tongue to utter, and more than any elſe can gain by kembing better and running glibber. Beſides where I thought an outlandiſh word would be better taken, I have often for the Readers ſake ſet it down, as for my own ſake ſet an Engliſh by it, as thinking it unmeet to force my *words* upon another, in ſuch a piece as where I was to leave all free, as to the *things* I ſpake about. Only I thought it not amiſs, after I was once in, for the taking off that charge that ſome have too heedleſly layd upon our ſpeech, of a patcht up Tongue from Lands and kinreds round about, to ſhew, that a Book of thus many ſheets, might be underſtandingly and roundly written, in hail and clear Engliſh, without taking in from abroad, ſo much as twice ſo many words (and he that writes it in the moſt unbroken tongue upon earth, ſhall go near to light upon ſo many), unleſs where the ſame thing is fuller and kindlyer ſpoken by thoſe we have at home, taking but out the Cant words or terms of art, as they are call'd, which are rather tallies or ſpells in the tongue, that is, no bodies, becauſe every bodies,

than

than the homebred vvords of any vvhatſoever; and are taken up and forged at will, by the whole ſtock of learned men in all Lands, wherewith to fiſh out one anothers meaning. And as for a tongue that borrows not nor ſpends, I believe 'tis no where to be found, or ever will be: all tongues through time being ſo far blended, that there are not any of thoſe now in the world in whole, that were at the great *Speech-break* at *Babel*, any more than there would be the ſame bodies crew of atoms to thoſe Speakers now that they had then, or the ſame kinreds of men unmingled with Out-ſetters that were among them then, ſhould they have liv'd and jugg'd together to this day. Yet that ſome tongues loſe more than others at home, and get from abroad, is eaſie to be ſeen, and our own is enough to bring any man to believe it. And in earneſt, if the knack of borrowing, or robbing and pilfering rather, gets but a little further ground amongſt us, at the ſcantling it has done hitherto, it will in time to come be harder for an Engliſh-man to ſpeak his own tongue without mingling others with it, than to ſpeak a medly of ſundry others without bringing in his own. But for my part, I am of the mind, that the larding of Latine with *High-Dutch*, in what is written to the whole world, as ſome *Germans* in their Motley Books have already done, is even as praiſe-worthy, as the haling in of Latine or other

ther tongues, when we are ſpeaking in Engliſh to *Engliſh*; and the rather, for that the words thus foiſted in, are of ſuch a ſort moſt an end, that if you look but to their riſts, and lay their betokenings to the things whoſe names they bear, I dare undertake twenty for one, that even the ſlighted and off-caſt words in the mouths of Handy-crafts-men and Earth-tillers ſhal be better drawn and more patly brought in. And inaſmuch as that *Fellowſhip* of *Worthies* in *London*, who are now embodied under the name of *Royal*, have given us already ſo many new things, and are daily ſtarting more, neither named nor known by thoſe before us; and for the enriching of the *Engliſh* tongue, as well as fulfilling of *Englands* ſtores, have thought fit their diſcoveries ſhould almoſt wholly come abroad in our own Speech, as they are happily made in our own Land: I think it will well become thoſe of us, who have a more hearty love for what is our own than wanton longings after what is others, to take light and life from ſuch happy beginnings, and either to fetch back ſome of our own words, that have been juſtled out in wrong that worſe from elſewhere might be hoiſted in, or elſe to call in from the fields and waters, ſhops and work-houſen, from the inbred ſtock of more homely women and leſs filching Thorps-men, that well-fraught world of words that anſwers works, by which all Learners are taught to do,

and

and not to make a Clatter; And perhaps if we ſlip this tide, we ſhall never come again at ſuch a nicking one. For inaſmuch as almoſt the whole of thoſe words, that we ſpeak in things or knowledges of things that are not body, are taken from things that are body, and ſpoken in a borrowed meaning from thence, either as they have Beings from God, or a Suchneſs of being from our handy-work: ſo all the words about body and hangers on to body that we have to do with, are either ſuch as flow from or mainly well fall in with thoſe that are utter'd by Workmen, for ſuch things as are done by hand-deed. Now the *Philoſophy* of our day and Land being ſo much workful as the world knows it to be, methinks this of all times ſhould be *the* time, wherein, if ever, we ſhould gather up thoſe ſcatter'd words of ours that ſpeak works, rather than to ſuck in thoſe of learned air from beyond Sea, which are as far off ſometimes from the things they ſpeak, as they are from us to whom they are ſpoken.

Beſides, it may well be doubted, whether Latine can now be made ſo fit to ſet forth the things of a *Working Philoſophy* by, as our own Speech, or thoſe other of our Neighbours, who are with us carrying on that way of *Doing*. For we muſt know, that almoſt all the old pieces of good Latine that we draw by, have been taken up by that ſort of learning that is wont to be worded

worded in the Schools, & ſpent in the ſetting to ſale of ſuch things as could beſt be glazed with the froth of ink, by the men of Cloſets. Whence he that is beſt skill'd in it, is ſo hard put to it, in the Kitchin, the Shop, and the Ship; and ever will be, though *Plautus* ſhould be as well underſtood as *Tully*. For the words that are every day running to and fro in the Chat of Workers, have not been gotten into Books and put aboard for other Lands, until this way of Knowing by Doing was ſtarted amongſt us. So that we and others of the *Handed Philoſophers* may either find better words among our own Yeomanry, for ſuch buſineſſes of workmanſhip as are already known by name, or at leaſt coin fitter for new ones in a likewiſeneſs to the old, than can be lent us from that Tongue wherein we know not how the Folks talkt in the Country, nor do any body elſe or ever ſhall do. Whereby too we ſhall not only vvith more eaſe and kindlineſs be underſtood by the *Pains-taking* men amongſt us, whoſe *Crafts* will be more helpful to an *hail* Philoſopher, than the *Bookiſhneſs* of others. But as Learnings being lockt up in the Tongues of the Schools, or Love's being lickt up in the more womanly ſimprings of the lips, and the ſmiling kiſſing ſpeeches of ſome others abroad, have been enough to enkindle in us a panting after, and fondneſs for ſome of thoſe Outlandiſh dynns: So if the works of our own men ſhall be

be ſhipt over by words of our own tongue, it may happily make others who have love enough for the things, to ſeek as much after our words, as we upon other ſcores have done after theirs; the firſt draught being *Engliſh*, name and thing, doing and ſpeaking. Which while we forbear to do, and ſnip here and ſnatch there from ſome of them, being as much beholden to them for new and handſom words, as they to us for freſh and uſeful things, the works are not more greatned by their ſpreading name, than the workers ſeem leſſened by the unluckineſs of the ſlur, That *Engliſh-men* can do by their own Hands, what they can't ſpeak in their own Tongues.

THE

THE HEADS OR CONTENTS Reckon'd up.

Chap. I. *THE Introduction or forerunner. The ground of miſtakes thought to be ill blendings, ſhewn in two or three things of another ſort, as much miſmingled and brought home to cloſe with, and ſet forth the buſineſs in hand.* Page 1.

Chap. II. *Way open'd for the minds eaſier graſping of Body, or world, by laying hold of room and time, & laying one to Gods immenſity, the other to his eternity; whereby 'tis found that Room is not widned out with the former, nor time lengthned out with the latter, but that they differ altogether. Gods eternity an Everlaſting* Now: *Time is on and on, paſt, at hand,*

and to come. [Am] *ſpeaks* [was] *and* [will be,] *in eternity. The words and Grammar that we ſpeak by, are matcht to time, and can't ſpeak forth eternity. We are at a loſs for words in ſome outgoings of the ſoul, and flight of thoughts, as we are for ſome other things that truckle beneath us. Doctor* Charleton's *taking in with eternal time, carried on and further ſtrengthned and dreſs't up by Doctor* S.P. *His arguments layd down and anſwer'd, by ſhewing there is no outward eternity at all, and if there were, it would be no better than none at all. The Doctors objection againſt the* Nowneſs *of eternity anſwer'd. The matching of it with the way of the ſouls being in the body. Eternity not ſuch a Now as that of time is, but is quite wide of it, all and ſome. Thinking is, and does, to Ghoſt, as bulk to body.* Second *argument anſwer'd, by ſhewing there would be no run of unmade time between two worlds, nor formerneſs nor afterneſs. The Doctors anſwer to the known Choak, Whether the parts of an infinite length be finite? found to be none at all.* Pag. 12.

Chap. III. *All Bulk a point to Gods immenſity, which is altogether; as all time a Now to his eternity, which is all at once. We ſhould never have thought of Room, had we not been body, (as we cannot now think beyond it, nor where*

where about ſouls are in it, or our own in the body). Many things are, which are no where. Whereneſs is too much a kin to place to ſuit Ghoſt, if we could but help it by a better word. The kind of ſome things, ſtands in their being or knot being according to *ſomwhat. Things coming into ſenſes, are ſuch only to thoſe that have them. Our underſtanding of things is nearer a kin to them, than our feeling of them. Senſe miſtakes, and misſhews, and thereby reaſon often miſled. What we feel, we know not, nor can help another to know: The new knowledge of Light from Maſter* Newton, *don't help the ſight of it. The world one thing to Gods Idea, another to our feeling.* Pag. 41.

Chap. IV. *The outmoſt reach of Body muſt needs be bounded. Roomth beyond the world can no more be boundleſs, than the world it ſelf. Outworldiſh emptineſs an idle thing. Gods Almightineſs would ask Room as well as his Allfillingneſs, one being as much roomthy as the other. Room is no where but where body is. Ghoſt is no more in Room than* thought *is. Doctor* More *for roomthyneſs of Ghoſt, and outworldiſh emptineſs taken off. God muſt as well be of ſome ſhape as of ſome Bulk. The world may be bounded without Emptyneſs beyond it. The foremoſt miſtake, a Dreaming firſt of emptyneſs,*

and then of world in the midſt of it: Whereas room is in the world and not the world in Room about it; nor ſhould we have thought of room, till 'twas made, and where 'twas made. Doctor More*'s arguments anſwer'd, by ſhewing an arrow can't be ſhot beyond the worlds Selvedge, nor arm born out of it; the* Frame of the world *hindring as much as the ſtiffeſt bodies waylaying: prov'd by the ſtop of falling Bodies at the Earths middle. The world no heap, but a ſet of Bodies lockt faſt together. Ghoſt can't carry Body beyond the world. The biggeſt Body can't be fathom'd by place, as the leaſt can't be cloven. Another world would be neither near this, nor far from it. To Ghoſt the biggeſt Body and the leaſt, all one. If nothing be between two worlds or Bodies the Rims would touch; Anſwer'd, That two Bodies touch, ſomthing muſt needs be between; elſe onlay'd bodies, and inlay'd would be all one.* Des Cartes *and Maſter* White *gotten over: they muſt either unſay, or make the world boundleſs. Doctor* More*'s cramp argument, brought off. The ſides of a veſſel emptyed of Body, would not only not touch, but be further aſunder, than when full. A body may ſtand ſtill and yet ſhift place. Things are ſo near each other, as they can come to be. Stirring of Bodies, or the room between them, comes all to a reckoning. If there were boundleſs*

leſs room beyond the world, its running would be ſtanding ſtill, and its ſtanding ſtill running. Maſter Barlow *anſwer'd. Body can't ſtir but in Body. All Bodies ſtart ſaw wiſe. Sirring of Ghoſt is like skipping of thought. God would be no more by halves in two worlds, than he is in the two halves of this.* Pag. 54.

Chap. V. *Whether Bulk holds of leaſtings.* Magnenus *layd aſide. An Atome has not this and that. 'Tis mated with a now of time. An Atome touches* ſecundum impenetrabilitatem, & longitudinem ſeminalem, *made out by the ſouls cloſing with the body, and ſome other leſs heeded touches. What is brought againſt it, anſwer'd, as to figure and motion. Slow pace is made of* Starts *and* Bearings. *Bearing is neither reſt nor ſtirring, but the keeper or ſpring of ſtirring, (the beginnings of things and the things themſelves being two), further open'd by the ſtirring of a watch, of thrown bodies, the ſpringineſs of an egge, of brooding, of boughed bodies. Of ſproutings, of Breathers. Begetting is ſhifting ſprings. Souls may be ſhifted in a Bloſom of Body, and not mov'd. Life and ſoul are two. Man the Son of Man. Swift motions, in likelyhood, outſtrip time. Motion a thing bodyleſs, not ghoſtly. Body as tis lodg'd may move it ſelf. All Body, as throwfareſom to Ghoſt as ſome. The nim-*

nimbleneſs of Ghoſts in their hurryings of Body. Of our Saviours Body. The Laws of motion enough to ſtop bodies running a tilt at the middle atome. Such laws bind the Soul to the Body, even againſt will. God holds us by laws of kind as we do others by thoſe of right. Birds curb'd by laws of kind, and all things elſe, the loweſt things, ſtee'rd by the higheſt wiſdom. Pag. 105.

Chap. VI. *Beginning the world ſooner and ſooner would nevermake it everlaſting, but to be ſo, it muſt be all at once. How the world is ſomwhat beſides God. Againſt Doctor* S. P. *holding the world might have been from eternity. No ſoonerneſs before world, nor time, nor ages. The world a Decreed world, the Decree never a decreeing. Gods eternity and the Souls two things infinitely aſunder. The ſoul ſhall never have lived an infinite number of minutes, nor reach half or any part of Gods everlaſtingneſs, any more than an half-way boundleſs Bulk, can reach half his alfillingneſs. God otherwiſe everlaſting than in the root againſt the Doctor. Whatever is in God is forthwith. The* Doctors *argument, If nothing to come of Gods eternity, 'tis at an end, Anſwer'd; and his* half *given him back again, to make the beſt he can of the ſcurvy recoil of his abſurdneſs and impoſſibility. Something of likeneſs hinted at.*

What

What an ill lookt, frightful train haunts the Doctors new Tool, of a growing Everlastingness. *Body as lasting in its kind as Soul. A time beyond which the world shall not hold out, may be fastned on, from the sureness of the bodies rising again.* Pag. 154.

Chap. VII. *A Moreness of worlds, and Earlyerness of this world, stand upon the same untrusty bottom. 'Tis rational to think the world could not have been sooner, nor bigger, nor more. More, or bigger or earlier worlds, would not better set out Gods power, eternity, or immensity, than this does. Doctor* More *for a boundless tale of worlds taken off. The saying of* worlds framed, or made, *in Holy Writ; and* world without end, *or* before all worlds, *in the Common Prayer, cleared from mistake.* Pag. 187.

The Bulke and Selvedge of the WORLD.

CHAP. I.

WHoever in good earneſt betakes himſelf to the ſcanning of bodies, one and other, as they lie in the whole bulky throng of this World, either as to their kinds of being or wonts of working, will find nothing that the mind at freedom is readier to faſten upon, likelier to be loſt in, or, as to the knowledg of other things, be checkt or ſtifled by, than thoſe two puzling things, the *maximum quantum* and the *minimum*; how far a body may be biggened by putting to it, or leſſened by taking from it: the one loſing it ſelf *in ſpatio imaginario*, the other *in puncto Mathematico*. Now I have been thinking, there is ſo much of kindred between the two riddles, that if but one of them were rightly made out to mans underſtanding, the other

would thence, as well gain somewhat of more light, as give back somewhat for further setling, and withal a fairer way would be made for the mind to busie it self about all those beings that lie far and wide between them.

Wherein to attach other mens reasonings of weakness, or to sing Mattins and Evensong to my own εὕρημα, by a sort of big and lofty strains, is none of my business, only I would beg leave to say, that what I have met with from the pens and tongues of learned men hereabout, have left me altogether in the dark, whatever light others may thence have gathered, and that what I have hit upon as to this affair, and am now about to set down, has set my own mind so far at freedom, that I was not altogether given to mistrust, but it might somewayes also be helpful, to the setting right the thoughts of some others. Methought then that the *answerings* or analogies of beings, have been hitherto but ill pitcht or adjusted, and that those things that right reason and a wisdom above us, had evened out into ranks and kindreds by themselves, have been unhappily hudled and broken by the mind of man; and that other things wide enough off as to their Births and seats in the world, have been unkindly brought together by our less wary way of thinking,

thinking, beſides a great many things which are either begotten by the underſtanding, working upon the draughts or idea's of things that ſenſe has to do with, or elſe do ariſe from the anſwerings or habitudes that the things of the World bear to the *make* of mankind, are haſtily forethought to have ſuch a kind of being *in analogia mundi*, as they ſeem to have *in analogia noſtri*. Whereupon things being either lodged in the mind, that have no dwellings in the world, or otherwiſe ſhaped, linkt, or laid, than they are in the world, it falls out that things that are not, are reckoned as if they were, or things that are, are reckoned otherwiſe than they are.

Thus a right underſtanding having bound up Moral beings, with their belongers, in one bundle, and Metaphyſical with theirs, in another, by the too forward working of the mind of man, the bond has been looſned and a medly made to the everlaſting ſhackling of that head or queſtion, *Præſtat non eſſe quam miſerum eſſe*, for although it be as clear, as that which is cleareſt, that, ſo laid down, 'tis a known truth, yet *Durandus's* Argument will ſtand unanſwered till Doomſday, to wit, that which takes away the greater good, is the greater evil; but *not being* does ſo, for it takes away the good of *well-being* and the good of *being* both. This Mr. *Barlow* grants but with

a *Suppositâ semper subjecti duratione.* But in my mind that answer is not of the same piece with the learnedness of the rest; for 'tis not askt, whether to *Peter* not being *Peter* it be evil to be endlesly wretched? but whether to *Peter*, being *Peter*, it be not worse to lose his good of *well-being* and his good of *being* too, than to lose but one of them? which is no worse way of speaking than what our blessed Lord spake of another of the twelve, * Better had it been for that man, if he had not been born. Now he that grants *bonum entis* or *essentiæ* to be the object of the will: that is, *bonum Metaphysicum* to be *bonum Morale*, has shut himself out from answering, even for evermore: but give but to each good its right, and the thing is at an end; for *bonum entis* not being *bonum Morale*, any more than *verum entis*, which a lie may have, is *verum Morale*, knit unto *malum Miseriæ* a moral evil, and so laid before the will, 'tis easie enough to foretel where the choice will be: And that these two goods are wide enough asunder, is clear, for why? *Non bonum*, that is, *non ens Metaphysicum*, may be as truly *bonum Morale*, and so the darling of the will, as what is most of all so. Thus the *not being* of the world it self, before all worlds, till it had a being, was as truly *good*, and so the object of the will of him that made it,

* καλὸν. comparativè.

it, as its ſelf ſame *being* when it began to be.

Thus again by the blending of *Ens Phyſicum* with *Ens Morale*, another queſtion about the thing that ſin is, has been as much rufled and darkned as any whatſoever; for though it has been made out, as heretofore, ſo moreover of late, by no mean hands, to be *Ens poſitivum*, yet moſt well-knowing men have been wary of ſpeaking it out, for fear they ſhould allot God Almighty a ſhare in it, he being the maker of every poſitive being; whereas, if I do not much miſ-think at leaſt, though God Almighty be the Maker of every being that is Phyſically ſo, it follows not that he is the ſame of each being that is Morally ſo: 'tis enough that God is the maker of the power to do evil, (which being good, may therefore ſpring from him) not of the things that are ſo done, ſo as from them he ſhould take name: thus 'tis moſt ſure, that a *non ens Phyſicum* may be a moral good; a Jews naked *not doing* buſineſs on his Reſt-day, had as truly *Being* in it, as the *doing* the other works of the day, for why? as truly *good*; and if God ſhould will me not to be, my *not being*, and willingneſs not to be *Phyſically*, would be as much *Being*, becauſe as much *good Morally*, as my very *being* alive and willingneſs to be ſo, worſhipping God whilſt ſo. A natural being leaves off to be ſo, when it no

longer abides in the World; but a moral being skills not the world, but is such only from its closing with, or swerving from the Law 'tis laid to; whilst 'tis, it is indeed nothing *in the World*, nor is any thing else of it self, rightly speaking, unless it takes up room there. Had there been as much of the will of God, as there might be of the will of man, in those two odd wishes, of two holy hearts, in the holiest of Books, blotting out of the Book of God would have been a good, and accursedness from Christ, a blessedness. For then a being grows up to its full ripe happiness, when it fully reaches all that bliss, which God aims at, for its utmost good; which whether it abides Physically or not, is neither here nor there, it being a weakness of understanding to say, that a made being is more happy in its natural life, which God wills not, than in its being nothing when God wills it so: for then either we could never have bin fully happy, unless we were as well from everlasting, as to it; or at least, those that go to heaven at the end of the World, would not be so blissful as those that went in the beginning, the former having an happy being, while the latter had neither happiness nor being; whereas both standing even in the love of God, they should do so too, in their own bliss. I think we do respect or look towards

Gods

Gods glory, and our own happineſs more, by what we have in us of *Ens morale*, than by what we have of *Ens Phyſicum*.

Notwithſtanding all which there would follow nothing to make us think that ſin ſhould be any whit long of God; for why, all that he does towards it, is, to leave us to our ſelves to bring it forth if we will; and inſtead of driving on to it as a fellow helper or procatarctick cauſe, he draws from it, and towards the good, with unſpeakable endearments of woing, and drives from it, by forbidding the evil, with all that earneſtneſs of threatning, that may beget in man the utmoſtneſs of dread; nor is he any nearer the Phyſical cauſe of it, than to give that good power, which is not the cauſe at all, as it looks towards him, for by giving this power he is at the ſame time the evil thing is done, as much the cauſe of the gainſtanding good that is not done; now if he be no more the cauſe of it, than he is of that which is not at all, then he is not the cauſe at all.

Beſides this power is not only good, but alſo needful, for though the fulfilledneſs or perfection of the will in the next life, will not be in a ſtanding at jar, and wavering alike towards good and evil, but only in a ſelf-willingneſs to good, yet in this life, I think it mainly does, and muſt; for this is a life of

doing, or believing, as it looks on to reward in that to come: that, a li e of rewarding, as it looks back to doing or believing here. Now if we do but allow God to deal with us, who are reasonable beings, in wayes bearing an evenlines with our kind, as he does with lower beings in wayes agreeable to theirs; then must he needs bestow upon us this freedom to sin that we are speaking of; for it seems not so much of right reason to reward that in man, which though he did willingly, yet he could not for his life do otherwise, least then a stock or a stone should put in too for reward, for its deeds of kind, which it does not unwillingly, but yet must needs do. In like manner Heaven being a life, not of earning wages, but of taking pay, 'tis enough there, for the freedom of the will to stand alone *in spontaneitate ad bonum*, or self-willingnes to good.

Hence likewise we are in a fair way to answer that thread-bare Question, which did so much gravel the ungospel'd world; to wit, πόθεν τὰ κακά; For inasmuch as sin is a moral thing, we are well enough on't if we can but track it up to a spring of its kind, without looking after any other riste: Now unbounded wisdom and goodnes having laid out endless happines as reward for obedience, and the same wisdom and rightwisenes

allotted

allotted endleſs wretchedneſs as puniſhment for ſin; without this obedience there could be no heaven, without ſin no Hell; and without a power not to do, in both, there could be neither. So then, that God may have leave to make man happy for holineſs, man muſt needs have power to make himſelf wretched for ſin. That evil ſhould alwayes flow from evil in a chain of breeders, is a great miſ-underſtanding; for as fire ariſes from that which is no fire, by a ſmart ſtroke upon a flint, ſo evil ſprings from that which is not evil, by a croſs blow given the Law.

If it be gainſaid, Then man may thank himſelf too for all the good he does, that being as much long of him as the other, while the thing done forbears to be denominated from God, at the freeneſs of the power in man: and ſo to make God not the ſpring or Author of good, would be much at one with the making of him the Author of evil.

I anſwer, it follows not; For in the firſt place, of all the good that man does, God is ſtill the Moral cauſe, egging on to it by all thoſe ſweetneſſes of entreaty, that the will can any way be wrought upon by; and though mans being free to it, makes it his deed (at ſecond hand at leaſt) both which, even holy writ and reaſon ſpeak aloud; yet inaſmuch as the ſtream of goodneſs, by the putting

putting forth of freeneſs, is not damm'd up, but left to run on to the thing done: and again the ſame Almighty hand that barely *upheld* while ſin was done, does over and above *further* the thing that good is, by enlightning the mind, renewing the will, healing the ſpring in man, of that ail which inbred ſin had brought upon it, and in a word making it every way more it ſelf; God muſt be more an owner there than man, and thence the thing done falls in with the divine will, becauſe it flow'd from divine goodneſs; all that which is good in man by way of offſpring, being ſo in God by way of well-ſpring.

Once more by the medly of *Ens Mathematicum* and *Phyſicum*, the Queſtion *De compoſitione continui*, or the making up of a bulky being, has been overwhelmed and loſt in the fineneſſes of words, and the airineſs of tattle, beyond all helps of freedom to a right underſtanding; whereas by dealing the dole evenly between both, we hope, further on, to make it likely at leaſt, that the doctrine of atoms is not wound up in thoſe darkneſſes that ſome mens underſtandings have may-hap over-weened.

And laſtly, whereas *Ens Phyſicum* or *naturale*, is either *materiale*, or *immateriale*, body and ghoſt or body and not body, by bewedding to body the things that belong to ghoſt,

or

or bringing over to ghoſt, or that which is not body, the things cleaving unto body, the bulkineſs of the world, the buſineſs of motion, the emptineſs beyond the world, the all-fillingneſs of God, the hereneſſes and thereneſſes of ghoſts, have been too much interwoven and twiſted together, even to the bewildring of our cloſeſt and beſt weighed thoughts about them.

Beſides our very way of thinking upon bodies, or drawing their likeneſſes upon our ſouls, from the unluckineſs of thoſe pipes and ſuckers, through which we have fetcht them, have drunk in ſuch a tang of maniſhneſs, or a mingle mangle of half man, half world together, that 'tis uneaſie to ſay, what things a body has from us, and what it has from him that made it.

Now by giving to the above-named what is their own of right, and taking from them, what we have given them in wrong, as far as is belonging to what we have before us, is that which we have undertaken, to the utmoſt of our ſcantling, at leaſt, to be all along moſt heedfull of, and whence alſo we look for more light and eaſe to betide the underſtanding, than from the giving way to ſuch unkindly minglings as we have blamed before.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

THus then in the first place, one of the readiest wayes for us to free the mind from mistakes about the knowledg of the world, is, for us to gather remarks of things, as much in a nearness to the Divine idea of them, or that of ghostly beings, as our more underly way of thinking will give us leave to reach to; and to uncloath them of, or make allowance for, all those answerings or analogies, that do arise to them upon the account of our animalities or beghosted bodyhood. For I reckon it will be a good step towards the knowledg of what the world ought to be to us, who are body and ghost both together, if we but know what 'tis to such Being or Beings as are ghost altogether.

Now the two first and most bewildring things that the mind is likest to fasten on, as the main belongers to the world, are the room that the world takes up, and the time that the world lasts: But if we come to lay these to the Divine Being, we shall find, that as Time is to Gods eternity or everlastingness, so Bulk is to Gods immensity or his all-fill-

fillingneſs. Our knowing then how the world behaves it ſelf to one of them, will help us ſtill to underſtand how 'tis to the other, as our knowing how 'tis unto both, will give us ſomewhat better to gueſs how 'tis to us who have neither.

Inaſmuch then as the known perfection of God is to be ſo everlaſting, as not to be ſucceſſive or jogging on and on, the idea or likeneſs that he frames of timeſome Beings that are ſo, muſt not be by ſhrinking up this his fulneſs, to the narrowneſs of thoſe Beings which muſt needs be creeping forwards while they are; for that would be to make himſelf like them; that is, not to be God: but he muſt take the ken of theſe beings, after wayes becomming his boundleſs or infinite being: if then it will not beſeem God to be at this time, and at that time, this after that, then neither will it become him to know things that are ſo, after that kind of way. Now becauſe all the things we can gripe in our minds are ſuch, and the likeneſſes that God has of them are not ſuch, the words by which we call them being anſwering to the things, we are as much at a loſs for words, as for thoughts, about things ſo vaſtly beyond us: all that we can do towards it is, to chooſe out ſuch vvords to ſet forth Gods ever-beingneſs by, as may be ſure to

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ſhut out formerneſs and afterneſs, which Gods everlaſtingneſs has not, though we cannot on the other hand make them take in what we believe it has. Thus the whole world almoſt of well enlightned, and right believing men, have hit upon the way of calling Gods everlaſtingneſs, a cleaveleſs or indiviſible *now*: not as if 'twere a moment of that time which we take up, (time being caſt out, as well in part as in whole) but only becauſe it cannot be brought to our bounded underſtandings, ſhrowded under any other word that can like that, cut off all formerneſs and latterneſs, which muſt by no means be taken in.

Which way of ſpeaking has as ſure footing too in holy Writ, as in well-guided reaſon. *I am hath ſent me, this day have I begotten thee, before* Abraham *was, I am*; being as much ſenſe ſpoken of God, as they would be nonſenſe of any one elſe. Had *Abraham* been at the beginning of the World he had not been ſooner, as to Gods everlaſtingneſs; or had he not been till the words ſpoken, he had not been later, becauſe there is neither ſooner nor later in the thing: that which would be [was] in Grammar to *Abraham*, is [am] to God, as that which would be [will be] to us, is ſtill [am] to him. Gods ſaying, *I am* before *Abraham* or the world, and *I am* after him

him or it, (anſwering to our *were* and *will be*) is as well the *fullneſs*, as *truth* of ſpeaking, for then we have ſpoken all that ought, when we have ſpoken all that can be; and then all that can, when there are no more words to ſpeak more with.

And that it may not ſeem ſo ſtrange to us that we are thus word-bound in ſuch kind of things, we may remember that we are enough put to it for words about things belonging to our own ſelves, when we would give forth thoſe raviſhments of love that we feel, but can not, (without giving Soul and all) give another to underſtand, our words, it ſeems, being moſt an end as little ſquared to unboundedneſs in the intention of degrees, or ſcrewing up high, as 'tis to that in the extenſion of parts, or letting out wide.

Beſides, if Gods everlaſtingneſs were to be ſet out by words, it muſt not ſurely be, by ſuch vvords as are fitted to the analogy that is betvveen us, and other timeſome and boundſome beings, as all thoſe vve yet have are, but is only to be ſet forth by vvords running even vvith the anſvverings betvveen them and the Divine Being, which we neither know, nor can tell whether ever we ſhall. Thus Logick and Philoſophy cannot be uttered by the neighing of Horſes, the barking and howling of Dogs, the hiſſing

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and gagling of Geese, the chirping or prating of other Birds, though they speak enough that, amongst themselves, which we cannot give them to know by our more full words; they, it seems, being as unfit for Beings beneath us, as above us.

Indeed the Philosophical Dr. *Charleton*, (from the Mighty *Gassendus* before him, as he from *Epicurus*) has taken up again, the opinion of *Vorstius*, so learnedly overthrown by Mr. *Barlow*, that Gods everlastingness is boundless time, and that his unmeetsomeness is boundless width: Both which to me, (whatever they are to others) seem no less then frightful notions: For if *we are existant in a small part of that duration*, or the world in a small part of that extension *in which God exists*, and Gods eternity not be an everlasting now, and his immensity an unbounded unextendedness; it will follow that some part of Gods everlastingness is yet to come, and not now; and some part of his all fillingness beyond the world, not in it, which would make such a medly of succession and division in the Attributes of God, which are God himself, as I can't now understand, or believe, I, or any man ever shall; being as sure, as I am of my own thinkfullness, that what is bounded or finite, cannot hold pace with that which is unbounded or infinite, neither in whole nor in part. But

But becauſe it has been undertaken ſince by a Reverend Divine, who has followed it as well more cloſely, as more fully, and that too with a goodly income of Learning, and a right handſome addreſs of words, and well air'd periods; it may happily ſeem to the Reader, that either we want a kindneſs for the buſineſs we have hitherto owned, while we let ſuch a rub lye in our way uncared for, or elſe that we want reſpect enough for the Author, to think that ſo, which he has wrought hard to make ſo; eſpecially too, having done ſo much to awaken us, as, to reckon all that think otherwiſe than himſelf does, to be no leſs than fools and laughing-ſtocks: notwithſtanding yet the whole throng of thoſe that have been of moſt name for learning, or of moſt worth for holineſs, have been of the ſide that he is not of, from the beginning of the World to this day.

In the doing of this he warns his Reader of *two kinds of abiding, inward or in groſs, and outward or by it ſelf: The inward is the very eſ-* Tentamina Phyſ. Theol. de Deo. P. 373. *ſence or exiſtence of the thing, which if, as to what 'tis made up of, it be daily throwing off and taking in, (as we and all body-ſome Beings do) is then ſucceſſive; but if it be alwayes the ſame, as 'tis with ghoſt and the ſubſtance of all bodies, then 'tis ſhut of ſucceſſion and diviſion,*

and is self-same or permanent, like as God is.

Page 376, 377. *The outward has so little reality in it, that the understanding cannot get a draught of it; it has nothing at all of positive reality (though it be not yet a sheer dream or figment) which is gathered, because it must alwaies needs be, both unmade by God, and unbeholden to, or independent on God; if God had never made any thing, it should for all that have been; and if he should unmake all things, it would still be.* Page 378. *The whole of this is eternity or everlastingness, the half is* ævum *or endlesness, that share of it that lackies it by the worlds side is time.*

Pag. 398. *Thus Gods inward everbeingness, or* æternitas concreta, *is the very existence of God, with an outward badge or denomination from time by-running; which is permanent and indivisible: and 'tis about this* æternitas, Boethius *and others should be understood, when speaking of its being* tota simul.

Gods outward or abstract is in an endless onwardness, and is unto Gods everlastingness, as spatium imaginarium *is to his allfillingness, which is not an attribute of God, but an unbounded retching out together with it.*

To bring off all this fairly, we have two things to do; First, to shew that there is no such thing at all as this same *æternitas externa.*

Secondly,

Secondly, that if there were, it would not yet do the job for which 'tis brought.

For the first, *A real outward eternity or eternal time that has nothing at all of positive reality*, is not; becauſe 'tis a contradiction *in adjecto*, that it ſhould be a right down ſelf-cut-throat, fordoing even its own being. Eternity, and nothing at all of poſitivity, can by no means ſtand together; for whatever is eternal, muſt needs be poſitive of eternity, as long as eternity is ſomewhat poſitive it ſelf: and whatever is big with or poſitive of eternity, cannot go farrow, or be privative of real entity; for a thing cannot *be everlaſting*, and *not be at all*: and that this is really ſo, is clear, in that *'tis not a figment* or whimſie; So 'tis yielded to have a *little reality* in it, and a little real, is real; eſpecially ſeeing that *little reality* is enough to make it really lengthen'd out with Gods moſt real inward everlaſtingneſs, and ſo that although God were not, that would be, and though God had never been, that ſhould be.

Beſides he that gives it a *little reality* or thingſomeneſs, cannot for his heart be ſo ſparing as to hold his hand there, and give it no more: for why, 'tis ſuch a craving Horſleech, it will ſuck in more whether a man will or not: Whilſt it muſt for truth's ſake be granted, that that little ſnip of everlaſting time,

which reaches from my Birth-day, or at leaſt, the Worlds raiſing day, till novv, has a *little reality* in it; For I have lived, and the World laſted *really* that *little* while; the *reality* of time being grafted in its timeiſhneſs, not in its boundleſneſs; ſo that every *little ſhare* of time muſt have a *little* of this *little reality*, and every *little* muſt make a *mickle*. Then ſay I, if the time that I have lived and the world laſted, has a *little reality* in it, then that of it, which is beyond, muſt have more; and that of it which reaches infinitely beyond it,) becauſe 'tis as *reall* as 'tis *infinite*, and as really *more* as 'tis *real*, (muſt have an *infinite deal of reality* beyond it; and that which has *more*, and *infinitely more* than a *little*, cannot ſurely be ſaid to have *but a little*, or leſs than a great deal, or any thing ſhort of *infinite reality*.

2. Its independency or looſneſs from God, lies as crotchet every whit, as its being; for if you ask about it the queſtion that is wont to be askt all the homeleſs Crew, Whence comes it? The anſwer muſt fare as if it were a God; for 'tis to be ſaid, God did not make it, nor did any thing elſe; and yet 'tis *indeed*, and was unbeginningly, and will be endleſly; and that is as much as can be ſaid of God himſelf, under that head. If it be ſaid that God has beſides an inward ever-beingneſs, that is neither cleaveſome, nor on and on; ſo has

has this too, by good luck; for the inward abiding is nothing but *the existence of a thing alwayes the same*: now this outward everlastingness has alwaies been the same, without getting or losing ought, but moments of existing, *which the everlasting God and all substances do.* If it be said that *in* God there is All-fillingness, as well as Everlastingness; so there is *out* of God too, a boundless roomthiness, such as would be though God were not, nor had been ever; and while he is, is retcht out together with him; and was, as he himself, without beginning, and without him too. So we have gotten somewhat to chew upon, that is as everlasting, and as much every where, as God is, and as unbeholden to God for being, as God is to any thing else for his; and yet in the upshot, 'tis such a kind of somewhatkin, as truckles beneath the very tinyness of an half nothing, and is forsooth a *fierdhalf* nothing; for after the full nice brattling out of *reality*, into muchnesses and littlenesses, there falls to the share of this, as *little* as may be, to keep it from dwindling into an altogether nothing, or a middlekin between something and nothing, that is neither of them. Whereas I have thought, that as time had not been if God had not made timesome beings, nor room if he had not made roomthy; so neither had eternity or immen-

ſity been, if there had not been a God everlaſting and every where, the maker of all things.

3. As this new Everlaſtingneſs breaks with it ſelf, upon the ſcore of being or entity, ſo it as much undoes it ſelf upon that, of its boundleſneſs or infinity; for as before we were told it was a real eternal, not real poſitive, ſo over and above, we are done to wit, that 'tis an infinite not infinite: for 'tis ſuch an infinite as is cut in a trice into two halves, one paſt and the other to come. Now it being impoſſible that I ſhould give thus much to be the half of a thing, without I knew the whole were as much again, it follows that if I know how much the whole is, (and that I cannot but do, becauſe I am told what the half is,) then is this infinite, finite; for I who am finite can fathom it, and by my bounded knowledg of it, bound it; and yet again this finite is the meaſure to an hair of Gods infinity in abiding, who is boundleſly far and wide of me, and of my utmoſt knowledg. All which being dainties of too high a ſeaſoning, for my more homely underſtanding, I muſt leave them, with their Miche-good-do't-ye to the elder ſons of reliſh and ſhrewd fetches.

But ſecondly, if this ſame cleaving of Eternity in two (that is, into inward and outward) were yielded, we ſhould be ne're the nearer

nearer fadging for all that; for the concrete or inward everlaſtingneſs is ſaid to be the *very exiſtence or eſſence* (which as they do not differ to ſpeak of, ſo our Author mingles) *of God himſelf, with the outward denomination taken from time gliding by.* Now, though it ſeems harſh (to me at leaſt) that an outward denomination, ſhould come into the definition of an inward being, yet that the inward eſſence or exiſtence of God muſt not be nakedly underſtood, is clear enough; for the naked eſſence of God is as much his all-knowingneſs, his all-fillingneſs, or his onefoldneſs, as his everlaſtingneſs; and that cannot be ſaid to be Gods everlaſtingneſs, which is as much ſomewhat elſe, as 'tis that. Gods everlaſtingneſs then is not Gods Being or Eſſence only, but Gods Eſſence everlaſting, or everlaſting God, or Gods Eſſence as 'tis to himſelf, or in himſelf endleſly abiding: as Gods knowledg is his Eſſence as to, or within himſelf all-knowing, his all-fillingneſs as to, or within himſelf filling all things. Now if all this be cleaveleſs or indiviſible, as is fairly yielded above; and of, and by it ſelf too, as, I think, may as fairly be hence gathered, to wit the *externa æternitas & immenſitas*, or the everlaſting time and boundleſs roomthineſs, being utterly of themſelves without God, it would be a fooliſh blaſphemy or dirtying of

God, not to yield that Gods inward everlastingness and boundlesness, may as well be without the outward, as they could be without the inward. Then, say I, after all this wheeling about, we are not a step further than where we were; for Gods whole eternity rightly taken, and as 'tis to himself, is not successive or growing on, but altogether, or one only everbeing now.

All that we have gotten by it is, a measure for it that is growing onward, as we have for his all-fillingness, another that may be sundred. Now surely 'tis as hard to imagine, how that which is successive and divisible, as the outward are, should be the measure of that which is permanent and indivisible, as the inward is; as 'tis that that which is all at once, should hold way with that which is on & on, or that that which is altogether should hold out with that which has part and part; which is the huge non-sence that is to be father'd upon the otherwise minded. And verily, for my share, I cannot see why we may not have a yard or an ell of good-Angell, or a pound or an ounce of the foul fiend, as well as a successive share of Gods unsuccessive everlastingness, or a divisible piece of Gods indivisible all-fillingness: but such it seems may be had, if you knock at the right door; for measures that have fore and aft, and part

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and part, are the things, and the only things, by which 'tis meted out.

Beſides it carries a train of things after it, that are as hard to anſwer as eaſie to light upon. To name one for all; there being as many things to be known, as there are dotts or points in the outward immenſity; and as many new things to be known, as new minutes to be lived in, in the outward eternity; it will follow that Gods knowledg as well as his everlaſtingneſs is both diviſible and ſucceſſive: without we ſhould anſwer that God knows all that ſcope of points without retching out that his eſſence which is his knowledg; and all that chain of minutes, without any lengthening out of that his being which is his everlaſtingneſs; but then the new knack is quite ſplit, and we are no wiſer, nor ſpeak no more wonders, than the grey bearded men, that have gone before us.

But it being likely that that which beſpoke a kindneſs for this more hazardous by-road, was, becauſe the open way was lookt upon as more encumbred and leſs enlightned; that the charge may be ſhown, as leſs groundedly taken up, we ſhall give anſwer as far as we can, unto what has been laid before us under that head.

Among the hard ſayings then that we meet with, theſe come in chief; to wit, Page 384,

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The underſtanding cannot take it, how one now *ſhould hold on with the whole runlong of all ages, any more than that one* point *ſhould be driven out to the utmoſt wideneſs of the whole World.*

Page 386. *Again, if everlaſtingneſs were cleaveleſs, nothing could be in any part of time, but it would be likewiſe whole everlaſtingneſs; the whole being in every leaſt of time.*

Page 388. *And further yet, it cannot be thought that two abidings or durations, to wit, time and everlaſtingneſs, ſhould be together and not be the ſame abiding; when inaſmuch as they are together they become one, as two rooms cannot be within one abutment, unleſs they be thereby clapt into one.*

All which being of ſo near a kindred, we ſhall cramp them with this one inſtance, and that ſhall be one too, no farther from home than we our ſelves are from our ſelves: I mean that oneneſs that is between ſoul and body, as it makes up the being that is called man.

The ſoul is as cleaveleſs or indiviſible as a point of roomthineſs, or a now of time; and yet 'tis as much in every roomthy part of the body, all at once and altogether, as in the very leaſt: and if another mans underſtanding cannot take it, how a thing that has no parts, ſhould be every where at once, in a thing that has, the blame lies at the man, not

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in the thing, for we are as ſure that 'tis, as he can be that he don't underſtand it. Thus again the bone is as hard to pick, how a limb of the body ſhould not be as big as the whole, it being as big as the whole of that, which is full as much as the whole body, and in the mean time, the whole of the ſame too, is even with that which is but a limb of it. And another of the ſame is, that two abidings, that is to ſay, time and eternity, may be together and not be the ſame abiding, as well as the ſoul may be every where, where the body is ſtretched out, and yet it ſelf not be ſtretched out at all. But now either all this is true, or elſe the ſoul is as bulkie as the body, and as full of parts as it; or elſe as little as an atome, and ſo takes up only the leaſt room in it; both which are ſo eaſie to take off, that a few words will be enough to diſpatch them.

Page 297, & 300. *Firſt then, That the ſoul is not a Subſtance, body-like extended, for cloſeneſs indiviſible, for thinneſs penetrable,* (which ſeems to be that draught of a ghoſt which our Author has ſome kindneſs for, and has both roundly helpt on and filled up) *is thus to be made out.*

'Tis given out that ghoſt, as well as the ſubſtance of body innerly, is ſuch a thing, as is alwaies the ſame, as much as God is; ſo that

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if you ſhift it, you quite and clean undo it. But now that ghoſtly being which enlivens the body of man, if it were ſtretched out with the body, would be as ſurely not the ſame, but ſhifted and changed, as the body it ſelf is: therefore we gather rightly it muſt not be co-extended with it at all. The reaſon of it in more words ſtands thus: the body is not only reeking out whole ſteams of little unſeen off-ſhoots, and taking to it as many more, but over and above 'tis taking in a daily minglement of bigger bodies, by what we eat and drink, which ſplicing in their little ſhives, within the croud of pieces that are clinging cloſe together, at once grow one with the body, and give further bigneſs to the body; and alſo, as it may happen, the body may be almoſt as much leſsned, by lopping off its branches, as 'twas bigned by the growing of its trunck. Now 'tis ask'd, does this extended ghoſt within the body biggen and leſſen with it, or does it not? The ſoul that I was quickned with at birth day, is the ſame that I am quickned with at this day, but the body that I have now is bigger than that which I had then: Is my ſoul bigned or is it not? If it be not, it reaches then only the leſſer ſhare of that body which I now have, the greater being ſoul-leſs; but if it be bigned, then 'tis not the ſame it was, any more than

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my body; nor to be ſure, is it ſo much the ſame, as God is, who is ſo the ſame as to be neither bigger nor leſs. Again, if I have an arm or a leg cut off, my body is leſsned; but I ask whether my ſoul be or not? If not, then have I forſooth ſome pieces of my ſoul jetting out of my body, ſome in it; and when I walk, that aſſignable, but indiviſible part of my ſoul, which was in my leg, comes ſhoveling after me, and that in my arm is ſwingling by me, in ſuch a ſhape of air, as takes up that room, that my leg and arm did, when limbs of my body; But if my ſoul does not thus featly ſtick out of my body, then it withdrew at the off-cut, and ſo my ſoul is not the ſame that 'twas before, but leſs. Beſides, when the ſoul draws back ſo, into what does it draw? Into it ſelf it cannot, for 'tis already ſo cloſe pack'd that it can be no cloſer; if it could be cloſer, it muſt be from ſome emptineſs within, but becauſe it muſt alwaies needs be brim full, there can be none, and if there were any ſuch, it might then be cut a pieces body-like; for, with thoſe that hold this, it ſeems the reaſon why an atome, as well as why a ghoſt, cannot be cloven, is nothing but becauſe it ſticks ſo cloſe together, that no emptineſs can come between; a thing being cleaveſome, not from its bulkineſs, but inward emptineſs mingled. Again, on the other

other hand, if the ſoul were as cloſe as it could be at firſt, (and ſo it muſt be, or elſe be out of kind,) then what it has put forth ſince of it ſelf, to keep even with the growth of the body, has left ſuch little emptineſſes within, (the body by waxing, having crack'd a many holes in it,) that 'tis now, at manhood, as like to be ſhorn in pieces as the body.

Secondly, If the Soul be not retched out with the body, but ſettles in ſome room whence it may beſt, by unknown reins, ſway the whole body; then 'tis ask'd, whether that room be cleaveleſs or not: If it be the Maw or Stomach, the whirl-pool of the ſpirits in the blood, the brain, the water of it, or the *Glandula pinealis* in it, (which ſome or other have ſet out for it,) they being all extended, the buſineſs would be the ſame as if 'twere in the whole body: If it be but in one atome or leaſting in the body, then a child would have more ſoul to its body than a man, and ſhould thence ſeem more a man, there being more atoms in the bigger than in the leſs body. Beſides the body being all over ſpending ſome and getting others, that atome in which the ſoul firſt lodg'd, may either ſhift rooms in the body, or quite ſlip out of it, as well as any others that do ſo; and ſo for ought I know, my ſoul was whilom in my head, and ſometime in my toe, and after at

my

my fingers end, according as that atome in which it dwelt, chanced to be bounced about for elbow-room: and I may have been I know not how many men ſince I was born, according as that atome hapned to leave me, and another popped into its ſtead; I being I, no longer than I have that in me, in which my ſoul is.

From the whole then look'd back upon but wiſtly, it ſeems that Gods everlaſtingneſs may be *all at once*, or a beginningleſs endleſs now, and time that is ſucceſſive be together with it, without making that ſo; as well as our ſouls which are *all together*, may be every where, where the body is, without having parts, as that has: which latter, while we are fain to yield, it ſeems but unhandſome we ſhould make a boggle at the former.

Withall, it were not perhaps amiſs to remark, that a main thing which has put a cheat upon the underſtanding herein is this; When eternity is ſaid to be an everlaſting now, and immenſity as an every where cleaveleſneſs, ſome have been ſo hard with it, as to ſtrain from it what belongs to a now of time, and a leaſt of body: whereas both of them ſtanding off in their *whole kind*, 'tis impoſſible they ſhould hold together in *ſome part*; and ſeeing they ſo differ as things infinite and finite, 'tis impoſſible, the agreement that we make between

between them in words, ſhould be by making that which is everlaſting, the leaſt part of that, which is but a while laſting, and that which is beyond all bounds the leaſt ſhare of that little thing, which has bounds. That eternity therefore is called a *now*, and immenſity a thing *indiviſible*, hence 'tis, and hence only: to wit, every part of laſtingneſs beſides a *now*, is *onwardly* as well as *bounded*, and every part of bulk beſides the *leaſt*, is *cleaveſome* as well as *bounded*; now 'tis better to call them by words ſpeaking *finite barely*, which *one* thing they are not; than by words ſpeaking *finite and ſucceſſive*, or *finite and diviſible*, which *two* things we are ſure they are not; and though a point be the leaſt of boak, and a now the ſhorteſt of time, yet they may ſpeak everlaſtingneſs, and allfillingneſs, upon another ſcore, (as much as we can, that is, not as much as they ſhould,) for all their ſhorteſtneſs and leaſtneſs, as well as the longeſt or the biggeſt, if they could be brought in without other unfitneſſes; for neither of them would come any nearer to everlaſtingneſs, or everywhereneſs, than the ſhorteſt and the leaſt do; but would, to be ſure, be further off from them, by taking in more things which they have not, nor can have.

Therefore when our Author tells us (page 384.) of a *now* longer than Ages, and a being unretcht

unretcht out, that ſhould be more than one that is, 'tis nothing to the buſineſs: for we only call Gods Everlaſtingneſs a *now*, to clear it of as many things as we can that would make it *on and on*, as things Time-laſting are; and Gods All-fillingneſs an *altogether*, to looſen it from any thing of *ſunderſhip*, which all extended Beings have: not but that one is boundleſly more than all the Nows of Time, and the other boundleſly more than all the Clefts of Body; but foraſmuch as we want words wherewith to name them what they are, we take thoſe that have leaſt to do with Time and Body, which they are not. In a word, Everlaſtingneſs is no more All at Once, as a Now of Time is, becauſe 'tis not *thing enough* to be a while, than it is it ſelf Timeſom; nor is All-fillingneſs any more unextended, as an Atome is, that is, becauſe 'tis not *thing enough* to be recht out, than it is it ſelf extended: but Everlaſtingneſs is quite another thing infinitely from what Time is, and the parts of Time are; and Every-whereneſs is quite another thing infinitely from what Bulk is, and the cleavings of Bulk are: But becauſe our mind gives us, that Time ſhould be liker to Eternity, and Bulk liker to Immenſity, than any other bounded things are, we chooſe the renableſt words belonging to the former, wherewith to ſet forth the latter.

Perhaps the underſtanding may draw ſomewhat nearer the thing as 'tis, by taking the next thing that ariſes from Soul, which is *thinking*, together with a next thing that ſtreams from Body, which is *roomthyneſs*; thoughtſomneſs ſetting full as cloſe to the very ſtamp or inmoſtneſs of a thinking Being, as boak or roomthyneſs does to the Being that is Bodyſom; ſo that if I would have bulk or roomthyneſs do any thing, it muſt be ſuch a thing for all the world as I would have Body do, *& vice verſa*, or heads and heels, ſo I may have it become big or little, ſhow of this or of that ſhape, ſtir or ſtand ſtill, becauſe theſe are things that I can have Body do: In like manner, if I would have Ghoſt do any thing, it muſt for all the world be ſuch another thing as I would have thought or thinking do, and on the other hand; for if every thing muſt *do* according as *'tis*, *thought* being as much an inmate in the very heart of the thinking Being, as *bulkineſs* is in the very inſide of Body, it cannot be, but that that which is ſo much of Ghoſt in its *Being*, ſhould be very much ſo too in its *doing*; as *outſtretchedneſs* which *is* ſo much *of* Body, *does* as much *like* Body. If then I would have *thought* to be here or there, in a great thing or in a little, it muſt do theſe things the neareſt that can be to what

what a *Ghoſt* would do about them; now I find my thoughts are here and there, without moving hither and thither Body-like, and in a great thing or a ſmall one, without being great or ſmall themſelves; and thence I think I may freely gather, that Ghoſt would do ſo too, which is of all things in the world the next to it, and the root of it: Inſomuch, that as there may dwell as many thoughts upon *Regiomontanuſes* Fly, or *Tredeskins* chain'd Flea, as upon a Firſt-rate Kings man of War, or the greateſt Hall-place of the greateſt *Keiſar*, (while thoughts being off in their whole kind from the works of Handy-crafts, they muſt needs be off too from what befalls them as ſuch); ſo there may be likewiſe as much Soul in the ſhaplings or tiny keeles of the great *Malpighinſes* eggs within the ſix hours ſetting, as was in the foul ſtalking lundging body of that *Og* of *Baſhan*, at the utmoſt bulk to which the Rabbins have beſwoln him: And, to end, as much of Gods Everlaſtingneſs in the ſhorteſt *now*, as in the longſomneſs of a thouſand years, and as much of his All-fillingneſs in the *leaſt* of bodies, as in the greateſt throng of them: for why, much and little, ſhort and long are no more akin to Ghoſt or what holds to it; than thinking is to Body or its belongers; it being as likely to take the ſcantling of a ſtone by a

chain made of thought after thought, which only haunt the ghost of a thinking Being, as to take the measure of Gods All-fillingness from bulk or extention, which sticks as close to Body.

But there comes up another Argument by the by, which may happily at first blush seem to have more view in it than all the stands we have met with hitherto, and that is in short thus.

P. 383. *Suppose God ten thousand years ago to have made a world, and then to have unmade it, and after to have made this, or (which is all one) suppose this to be benothing'd, and some ten thousands of years hence another to be made; Now if there were not time between them, there would be one upon the nick of another, when yet we have supposed a long while betwixt them; And if there would be time between them, then we are quite broke, inasmuch as time may then be unmade, and of it self, without timesom Beings.*

To which the answer is, first: If it were not easier to take up things upon trust, than to frame Arguments, we had never been surprized with this which hangs so ill together: For to suppose God before any thing else was made to make something, and then to unmake all that he had made, and leave nothing as he found nothing, and yet to leave ten thousand

thouſand years or ſome ten thouſands; is to ſuppoſe God to leave nothing, and yet to leave ſomething: for ten thouſand years, or ſome ten thouſands, are, in my mind, as much ſomething as the other were that were made nothing; and I believe it would hold any man as many thouſand years as there are years in the thouſands, to bring it but cleverly off, how ten thouſand years between ſhould not be time between, or how ten thouſand years ſhould not be ten thouſand years.

But taking it for granted that we ſhall be bated the ſuppoſition in this unweildy draught of words, and only be brought to this ſtreight or dead lift, whether if God ſhould make a world, and a while after annihilate or make it nothing, and again ſhould make another, and ſometime after be nothing that likewiſe, and laſtly, ſhould over and above make a third World, would there be Time between theſe made or unmade Worlds? and would one be before or after the other, or would they not?

To this we anſwer round-dealing-wiſe, There would be no Time at all between them, nor would one be before the other or after the other, nor, in any other meaning than as they are in Gods Everlaſtingneſs, would they be together. The reaſon of this

ſhort anſwer ſtands thus: There being nothing but everlaſting God beſides them, in whom there is nothing of timeſom onwardneſs, nor ground upon which to faſten fore and aft, there can be no ſuch thing as Time, or fore, or aft, at all. And we are withal to know, that the ground why we give afterneſs to ſome things in the World, is from the things that were former, ſo as until we come at a firſt; and formerneſs to other things, from the things that will be afterward, ſo as until we come to a laſt; inſomuch as ſome things, even in this World, may not be fore *and* aft, but only fore *or* aft: the firſt thing in the world that was made being *after* nothing, for why, nothing was before it; and the laſt thing in the world that ſhall be unmade, being *before* nothing, becauſe there ſhall be nothing after it: as what we gave anſwer about, and namely, the whole world now in being, is neither *before* nor *after*; becauſe there is nothing *beſides* but God, of whom it cannot be *rightly* ſaid, he was *before* or will be *after*, but that he alwayes *is*.

If this ſhould come unlookt for to the Readers underſtanding, it will may-hap ſeem more kindly further on, when we come to ſtrengthen it with an anſwer of the ſame ſort, about its twin-brother, outworldiſh emptineſs.

The

The little that is yet behind, is the anſwer that our Author would fain give to that moſt unanſwerable Argument againſt a ſucceſſive and diviſible everlaſtingneſs, and everywhereneſs; to wit, Whether the parts of it be finite or infinite?

Which with him is twofold, 1. Enough or abundantly, 2. More than enough, or ſuperabundantly: Enough, by acknowledging that *it cannot be anſwered at all*, (p.402.) And then over and above, to that hard ſaying, *Finite put to finite can't make infinite* he ſays, A ſet number cannot indeed, yet nothing with-holds, but that from an infinite tale of finites there may at length ariſe an infinite, as who ſhould ſay, from an infinite twenty or twenty one, there ſhould ſtart up an infinite: *what you will*; for every number being even or odd as thoſe are, there is not a pin to chooſe whether you take one of them or ſome other; that muſt be as even or as odd to the full as one of them is, and that at the laſt be ſuch a number as you may put one more to unto all Eternity, or be a numberleſs number, or a number which is not a number, which is the very pith, and marrow, and heart, and ſtrength of a fineneſs. And, as to the back door that belongs to this, which is, that The number by which we are to tell the finites that go to the making up of an infinite,

is *beyond the numbers of Arithmetick*, without all iffs & ands 'tis the very twin-trangham of a figure beyond all the figures in Geometry; both which are to be underſtood by no other thing in the world, but the own dear ſweet friend of them, ycleped reaſon beyond the reaſon of Logick.

But becauſe the main Caſtleward to ſhrowd theſe weaklings from blows and qualmes, is no other, but its fellow Fierdhalf nothing call'd ſpace or roomthineſs; which, that 'tis every way infinite, (though made up all of finites,) is ſaid to be *as clear as the cleareſt thing in the world*, (pag. 403): and it being as clear to us that 'tis not ſo, but bounded as well as Time, we are, when it comes in our way, to lay down reaſons; which, ſo much as they will make for that, ſo much will they make againſt this.

Now having thus far unbenighted our ſelvs, and clear'd our way in the foregoing from all that lumber that could hitherto be ſtumbled on, 'tis hoped we may have leave to ſettle Gods whole Everlaſtingneſs, as untimeſom, and altogether unbeclogg'd with onwardneſs; and as for any other of the name that ſhould be outward, that the ſame is altogether nothing but the airineſs of thinking: and withal, that Time and timeſom Beings, this time-laſting World, and every while-being

ing thing in it, is neither early nor late, as the ken is taken of it by God Almighty; but that earlineſs and lateneſs ſticks to the things made, as made and not being unbeginningly, and ſo is only a *tang*, that all timeſom things have among themſelves, and cannot be *reliſht* by that everlaſting Being that made them, any more than we can reliſh his Everlaſtingneſs; but all the things that are *early* or *late* to us, are alwayes *now* to him.

Which is the firſt undertaking, in the ſorting of things, ſo as our underſtandings might beſt come at them, that is, by laying them as near as we can to the underſtanding of that Being, who is ſo all Mind as to be nothing Body: whence we have ſeen how the laſtingneſs of the World and made things, bears it ſelf to ſuch a Being; which was the uppermoſt thing, the mind was like to ſtart, in its thoughts about them.

CHAP. III.

THe next to this, is the Room that the World takes up; which body-haunter of roomthineſs, that we may rightlieſt know, we ſhall do by it as we did by laſtingneſs; (time and Room being fellows,) which as we brought for that end before Gods Everlaſtingneſs,

laſtingneſs; ſo we ſhall ſearch what this will be, as it ſtands towards Gods All-fillingneſs.

As then the abiding of the World from firſt to laſt, was nothing but a *now* to Gods *ever-beingneſs*, ſo the bulk of the World from leaſt to greateſt, will, I think, fall out to be but a *cleavleſs thing* to his *All-fillingneſs*: For as Gods Eternity is not endleſs longſomneſs, ſo neither is his Immenſity unbounded outſtretchedneſs; but as his everneſs is all at once without before and after, ſo his unmeetſomneſs is altogether, without here and there: and ſo ſtill, as the Worlds abiding being long, makes no length in his Everlaſtingneſs, but 'tis yet as to that all at once, ſo its bulk being wide, makes no wideneſs in his All-fillingneſs, but 'tis nevertheleſs, as to that, altogether: For, 'tis as impoſſible that God ſhould be in Room, which is one of the hangers on to Body, as that he ſhould be in Time, which is another. When therefore we ſay that God is every where, it muſt have the ſame reſpect to Place, that his being paſt, at hand, and to come, has to Time. As then God does as *truly* abide, after the way of his everlaſting nowneſs, as other things do after the guiſe of their timeſom running on and on, without being himſelf timeſom, like them: So God is as *truly* every where, after wayes becoming his altogetherneſs, as other things

things are by the way of their bulkineſs, without being himſelf extended, like to them. And as to thoſe other ſtrainings of the word as 'tis given to Body, we are wholly to forewarn them in this buſineſs; for whereneſs is a word, which though the Schools have markt for another thing than locality, yet betokens too much *ex analogiâ noſtri*, and, as 'tis often made to ſpeak, is almoſt quite embrew'd in Body if not altogether, our ſouls in the meaning of it, can hardly be ſaid to be any where; and I believe, if we were all Ghoſt, and nothing elſe in the world were Body, we ſhould not readily know what to do with it, or ever well reach the meaning of it; for ſo much does it hang to motion, which I think is altogether befaſted to Body, that 'tis thought by thoſe that can beſt brook the word, that a thing may move from one *whereneſs* to another, as eaſily as Body may from one *place* to another. Although I can frame in my mind as eaſily as others, that ten thouſand Angels as well as one, may be altogether on a needles point, (they being all throwfareſom alike), yet it would crack my brain to find ſo many wherneſſes there, to ſtow each of them in. Had there never been any bodies, but only ſouls, made, I cannot yet think there would ever have been ſuch a queſtion, as

where

where are your thoughts? they being only ſaid there to have a *whereneſs* where bodies have a *room*.

Thus a Mathematical point or Geometrical figure are no where, good and evil are no where, this Treatiſe, before written here, was no where; yet it as truly was before the writing, (and ſo the others before the doing,) as 'tis now, whilſt written; the words are only here, the meaning's by them ſet forth, as much no where as before: ſo true is it, that whatever is, is ſomewhere, is untrue.

Now everywhereneſs, which is the word by which we ſet out Gods All-fillingneſs, ſounding as if it were a gathering together of all the rooms that may be taken up in the World, or in unbounded boak without the World, ſeems no more fit to mete out Gods Immenſity by, than a chain of the nows of Time are, by which to mete out Gods Eternity; the one ſpeaking as much diviſion, as the other does ſucceſſion. When therefore we ſay that God is every where, we muſt mean that he is not ſo ſomewhere, as not to be elſewhere; and that there is nothing *there*, but all things *here* to his unmeteſomneſs, as there is nothing paſt or to come, but all *now* to his everlaſtingneſs.

A thing is only *there*, to me, in behalf of my being *here*, and not *there*; for when I am

there,

there, the thing is clothed with *hereneſs*: ſo becauſe God cannot be now *here* and not *there*, or now *there* and not *here*, 'tis clear that the thereneſs or hereneſs was nothing belonging unto God, but grounded in the things here or there; for in cloſe ſpeaking whilſt God is every where, he cannot be *there*, becauſe *there* would be *here* to him, we are then ſpeaking of two things, by ſome ſuch words as are bounded by one of them. And indeed *whereneſs* is a word of ſo much narrowneſs, that it does not reach the *All* of thoſe things which it moſt cleaves to, that is, of bodies: foraſmuch as it may rightly be ſaid the *whole world* is no where; for becauſe we can't ſtep out of the world and becken it or point to it, as there; nor while we are in it, ſay, 'tis here, becauſe 'tis as much there or yonder as here; nor can we ſay 'tis every where, 'tis as much too little for that as too big for the other, and God alone is, or can be ſo; it muſt then be remarkably no where, if ſo be, that which is neither to be ſhown here nor there, nor to be underſtood every where, be aſſignably no where.

What we gather hence, is not that the words are not to be uſed, or that 'tis blameworthy in them that ſpeak ſo, but only that we remember when we do, that ſuch words don't anſwer the thing ſpoken of ſo as they do

do bodies, though we must not forsake them, only because we cannot frame others that will come nearer; though they be not the best that were to be wisht, they are for ought is known, as good as any we can come at. Thus, if I say I love such a thing at my heart, I do not mean you should understand me as if my love were seated any where in the middle belly, as my heart is; if you rend out my heart 'tis not to be found there, because it was a thing rooted in my manhood, not placed in my body: so do but unstring my soul and body, though you leave my heart in the same place, the thing is gone, and so gone as to be no where else too; and yet I cannot speak plainer English, nor be better understood.

And this way of speaking has so good footing, that in the Book of books it self, we find not only the same oftentimes, but even a step beyond it sometimes; whilst not only the things of body are given to things not body, but even bodyhood it self is. Thus we read of the body of sin, and the limbs of it, or members upon earth, as uncleanness and worldly-mindedness; which nevertheless are such moral beings, whose kind of existence is not a being any where in the world, but according to, or swerving from a Law, which when they do they only are, and when they

do

do not are not, vvhich fills up the whole of their Being, without any further being any vvhere.

Our ſouls are indeed ſo far ting'd with body, that as 'tis hard for us to think hovv there ſhould be an abiding ſo unlike to ours, as we are creatures, as not to be lengthned out after the rate that vve are; ſo 'tis hard to think there ſhould be a vvhereneſs ſo unlike to ours, as we are creatures vvith body, as not to be boakt out after the vvay that vve are. Time not being vvrought out into any outvvard ſhape or roomthineſs, vvherevvith to ſmite the ſenſe, vve can more eaſily think it ſvvallovved up in Gods Everlaſtingneſs, in vvhich vve alſo frame nothing of ſhape or bulk, than to have the vvorlds vvhole throng of hard, vvide, and off-ſtanding bodies, ingulfed in ſuch an immenſity as has nothing at all of bulkineſs in it.

Whereas now, vve ought to mend this thought, by remembring that the things that are hard, ſoft, vvide, off, ſtirr'd, and ſuch like, are only ſo among themſelves; as all things touching ſenſes, are only ſo to thoſe that have them: ſo that vvere all ſeeing things ſightleſs, there vvould be no colours nor ſhovvs; all hearers deaf, no ſounds nor dins; all feelers numb, nothing handleſom; all taſtleſs, nothing reliſhing; all unſmelling, nothing ſcented. Be-

Beſides, were they all Ghoſt who are now body and ghoſt, there would be to them nothing impenetrable, or that could not be drill'd through, nothing hard, ſoft, bulkie or ſtirr'd; as there are no ſuch things now either to God, Angels or Devils, how ſtrong ſoever it may be rooted in our minds, that a thick, hard, ſtirr'd Being is ſo in it ſelf, as well as to ſome other Beings.

To cloſe up this, we are to witt, that thoſe things that we get knowledge of by the help of our ſenſes, we know by ways more off from their kindly draughts or ideas, than thoſe we take in, by the workings of reaſon upon experiments wiſely made, and remarks heedfully laid: Thus the knowledge of heat that we have from the *feeling* of it, is far more off from the right knowledge of it, or ſuch as may likelieſt become God, than the notion of it according to the *great Lord Bacon*, in his *forma calidi*; inaſmuch as body, and the cleavers to it, are further off from the God-like nature, than the ſoul is, and its ways of working are.

Senſe has ſo much to do in the miſ-ſhewing or diſguiſing of things to us, that if there be but a great or little change in us, 'tis all one as if there were ſuch in them. Were we but ſo long clear of body, as to furniſh an idea or draught of all the laws of doing, ways, and

and powers of the Beings, to be ſet awork in the framing of a Watch, ſuch as we may beſt think a Ghoſt has; and upon embodying again ſhould find it of ſome hiew and bulk, with ſuch and ſuch motions, hard, cold, dry, ſmooth or rough, and the like; hear it beat, ſmell to it, and the like; the thing, though the ſame, would ſurely ſeem much another thing to us, thus chang'd at home: Or did we but ſo take in things with the naked eye only, as we do by the ſundry ground glaſſes, or Teleſcopes, Microſcopes, Multiplying-glaſſes, Priſms, or through died glaſſes, the late Empty Tubes, through the hollow of the hand, upon a piece of Perſpective, we muſt then hold, that which is now no bigger than a mite, to be as big as a ſpider; what is far off, to be at hand; what of one colour, to be of another; what is flat, to be hollow; what is one, to be two or ten; eſpecially if helpt on by ſuch a ſenſe of feeling as we have, when, laying one finger upon another, we roll a pea upon a board; and ſuch an hearing by ſome inward ſleight, as in an ecchō, by an hollow without: ſo that we muſt needs then reckon the world another thing from what 'tis, and as rightly too as we reckon it otherwiſe now, inaſmuch as we go upon the very ſame grounds.

Nor does reaſon miſtake only when it

builds upon ſenſe, but when it deals too with thoſe liſts and cravings that keep the lower houſe of the ſoul. Thus ſhe that is the darling of the Lovers heart, be ſhe what ſhe will, is the beſt in nature; the more he loves, the better ſhe is and does, and, as long as the fire burns, holds on to be and do: but as ſoon as ever it begins to be winter with the heat, 'tis ſpring with the faults, and as the one grows on to cold, the other grows up to great: and all this, not becauſe ſhe is another ſhe, but becauſe the love is another love. Now if we may be thus benighted in our petty likes and diſlikes, notwithſtanding we have the light of reaſon to ſhine within, and the whole World beſides to ſet us right without, who are we that we ſhould take upon us to ſay, This wide World is that very ſame thing that ſenſe ſayes 'tis?

And further, to beget warineſs about ſenſe; we may find that as 'tis too low and ſcant to give us the marks of Ghoſt, or becauſe its tools or organs are ſluggiſh, and, taking up room, can bring home no errands of moments or atoms, it asking time and place, it ſeems, for the doing every thing in, that it does: So on the other ſide, the ſoul is too high bred to give us any rational accounts of the awarings of ſenſe, as heat, cold, wetneſs, dryneſs, hardneſs, ſoftneſs; which had

had never been known by us, if we had only had that reaſon which makes us men, and not thoſe ſenſes that make us animals or earthly feelers.

Thoſe things we feel, we don't know, nor can we by the ſenſe we have of them, give another to know, unleſs we could alſo make another to feel them as we do: So that a blind man may talk as *knowingly* of colours, and be as well underſtood, as one that can ſee; for that which I talk of colour is quite another thing than that which I ſee. A world of men have ſeen colours ſince the beginning, but, for ought we know, no man could ever yet tell another what they were; till to the brightning of our Iſland, our happy wonder of ingenuity, and beſt broacher of *new light*, Mr. *Iſa. Newton*, hit upon the thing that 'tis indeed: and now we do know (which no man would ever have gheſſed before,) that white is a medly mingling of beams differently breaking or refrangible; we ſee it no better than we did before. I remember that I once asked a blind man, who had been ſo from his Infant-baptiſm (the ſame water that God in goodneſs allotted to waſh away ſin, hapning through cold and careleſneſs to waſh away his eye-ſight,) what kind of thing he thought whiteneſs to be? he anſwered warily, That ſure it muſt be a

bright lightſom colour: and what blackneſs was? he ſaid, That muſt be a dark colour; which two took in all that he had to ſay of colours, and that little too was utter'd from the glimmerings of ſight in him; he having ſo much of the Moles eye, that if he held his face to the South and lookt up, he would ſay whether it were day or night. And if all our eyes had been of that *make*, we ſhould have known no more than thoſe two, nor no more of them neither. And what we do feel of them as we are, ſets ſo cloſe to us as we are ſuch or ſuch, that whatever wants the tools that we have ſhall never feel the things that we feel, the things being wholly begotten between the organ and the object, the tool and that it works upon. Now God having no ſuch bodily organs by which to take in things *ſecundum habitudines noſtri*, and ſuch an have-likeneſs being as needful on the behalf of the organ and object both, for the begetting of a ſenſation or feeling, as the make of ſuch a ſcrew is, to wind in to ſuch another, or the mutual fitneſſes and yernings of kind are, to the begetting of the like in thoſe that do ſo, 'tis clear he can no more be brought down to do the one, than to that other. So that, that which to us is World (ſeen or unſeen,) to him is Being, life, might, ſpringſomneſs, ſelf-entwining, law of doing, ſeed,

ſeed, teemingneſs, and ſuch like. Thus day and night, light and darkneſs, are both alike to him; 1000 years as one day, 1000 years to come as yeſterday when it is paſt, paſt and to come as now, impenetrable or unthroughfareſom as penetrable, body as emptineſs, hot, cold, wet, dry, hard, ſoft, cleaveſom, and the like nothing at all (no more than they would be to our own ſouls out of the body), heaven and earth not far and wide aſunder (nor to our own thoughts that can be now in heaven and the next now on earth); laſtly, all bodiſhip, with thoſe its belongers which make it ſenſible unto us, coming not at all into that idea that God Almighty frames of them, any more than his idea of them comes into our feeling; and his idea or likeneſs of them being nearer to that analogy they would bear to us were we all ghoſt, inaſmuch as he is ſo; it follows that there are no ſuch things as we may think belonging to extended bodies, ſundred from our gheſſes at them *ſecundum analogiam hominis*, or the buſineſs they have to do one with another *ſecundum analogiam ſui*; bodies being one thing to us and themſelves, another thing to God and Ghoſt. So the wide, thick, all-to-be deckt heap of viſible beings may be ſwallowed up in the *altogetherneſs* of Gods All-fillingneſs, as well as the long chain

of ages from the worlds first to its last, in the only one *now* of his Everlastingness.

And this ends the second Head, wherein we were to shew, How the Worlds vastness behaves it self towards Gods Immensity. In both which, having seen what the Worlds lastingness and roomth is, as it concerns that boundless Being which is neither timesom nor roomthy, and vvhat its bulk is to the same being as immense, & to those ghostly beings vvhich though they are in time are not yet in any room; where 'tis found, that time has no length but as it looks to timesom beings, nor has bulk vvideness or thickness but as it stands to body: we have perhaps open'd a fair gap, for the better knovving vvhat the World is unto our selves, vvho as vve are men and made up of ghost and body both, are even a part of it, and take up time and room in it.

CHAP. IV.

THe dealing or business that is betvveen body and body, being as real as that betvveen body and ghost, and body and us vvho are body and ghost mingled; it being as sure that one body cannot penetrate another, as 'tis that a ghost can, that the vvhole throng

throng of bodies and each one in it is extended, as that a ghoſt is not ſo, and that a piece of body may be cloven aſunder or ſtirred ſo and ſo, as 'tis that a ghoſt can be neither, like it: having ſeen vvhat body is to God and Ghoſt, it ſeems novv as much behoving us to ſift out, vvhat body is to body and us. In the doing of vvhich, vve ſhall endeavour to ſhevv, Hovv far body or the vvorld of bodies may be ſtretched out, hovv ſmall a piece of body may be crumbled, hovv ſvvift or hovv ſlovv either may be moved? And alſo, becauſe vve find the ſtuff of body of a more flitting kind than the ground-vvork or ſubſtance of ghoſt, Hovv long it has or might have already been, and hovv long it does or may laſt? And foraſmuch as body may happily ſhift its being as vvell as its ſeat, Whether there may not have been ſome bodies or vvorlds heretofore, vvhich novv are not? And laſt of all, vvhilſt one may be a great vvay off from another, Whether ſome are not ſo far from our place, as to be far alſo from the vvorld in vvhich vve are placed? Of each of theſe, as they vvill beſt fall in vvith that train of thoughts vvhich vve have framed about them, vvithout aiming at any better rangement for them.

The firſt Head about extenſion in the

whole or the utmoſt reach of bodies, will fall into theſe things; to wit, Whether the world be boundleſs or bounded? And if bounded, what 'tis that bounds it; whether body or emptineſs? And if either, Whether they be bounded or not? which ſhall be likewiſe ſet down in ſomewhat a mingled way, as they may lucken moſt readily to come into mind.

Having erewhile ſaid, That manifold lengths of time coming one after other, could never make out an Eternity, or a being boundleſs in abiding, ſo here we ſay, That the cleaveſom bitlings of body heapt one upon another, can never make up an Immenſity, or a being boundleſs in its bulkſomneſs: but now the world is all heapt up of ſuch little bits: therefore we gather thence, that it cannot be boundleſs in its bulk. The reaſon of the thing to me is clear thus. Every thing that may be riven apieces may have its pieces told, and every tally by which we tell things muſt be either even or odd: every one that is even may have one put to it to make it odd, every one that is odd may have one put to it to make it even, and every one that may have one put to it is not infinite: It follows then, that if there be no parts but may be numbred, and no number but muſt be finite; that whatever

is

is made up of parts is finite too, its parts being told by a finite tally.

Now as to a number beyond the numbers of Arithmetick, I must be so bold with it, for once, as to ask, Whether it be even or odd? if it be either, we have the same choaks for it that we had before; and if it be neither, then 'tis no number: for *every* number (whether Arithmetical or Hyperarithmetical,) is even or odd, though you take leave to eke it out beyond the bounds of Arithmetick, and make it a greater number; 'tis to be understood you must not pull out the pluck of it, and make it quite another thing from number: for that would not be a *number beyond* Arithmetick, but *a thing besides* it; not an *eking out* in *tale*, but a *change* in *kind*: and so you may as well call it a *shooinghorn beyond* the numbers of Arithmetick, as a *number beyond* them.

That the world which is made up of parts finite should be infinite, is to me as great a wonder, as that God should be finite: for I think 'tis as impossible that that being which has nothing in it but parts finite should be infinite, as 'tis that that being which has nothing in it but what is infinite should be finite. I cannot see why there may not as well be finite things in the infinite Being of God, as an infinite All from the finite parts of bulk,

bulk; finite ſtanding off no further from infinite than infinite does from finite: 'tis even as broad as 'tis long.

But becauſe moſt men are willing to wave the boundleſneſs of the world, ſo be it, they may but give it, name and thing, to that ſame emptineſs that is thought to be beyond it; we ſhall therefore to our power rumage in it with our wonted freeneſs, that we may underſtand a little, whether it be ſo boundleſs as 'tis thought to be, or whether there be any ſuch thing at all? for having already cut off its partner, eternal time, from the abiding of the world, we are not o'truſt, if we can, to pare this ſame immenſe emptineſs too from about its ſelvedge.

To me indeed 'tis as likely, that the world it ſelf ſhould be boundleſs, as that any outworldiſh emptineſs about it ſhould be ſo; that roomthineſs being as *really ſomething* beſides God as the world is. For what is really *extended* muſt be really *ſomething*, but that roomthineſs is as really extended as *'tis at all*; extenſion or ſpreadingneſs being the very inwards, and indeed the *very all* of it.

But the unluckineſs on't is, that if outworldiſh boak be yielded at all, it muſt needs be yielded infinite to boot; For why, there can be nothing thought on, ſleeping or waking, to bound it, but that ſame thought that

that pitches upon bounds, ſlides on to room-thineſs beyond the bounds, imaginary *in infinitum*, or bound and room, bound and room *in infinitum*.

To ſay the truth of it, Some have been ſo forward to yield the boundleſneſs of *ſpatium extramundanum*, that they have given it the right hand of fellowſhip with God Almighty; this roomthineſs forſooth being needful for the very exiſtence of an immenſe God: thereby making it at once ſomething, boundleſs, and before God. *Something*, becauſe needful for God to dwell in, and ſuch needfulneſs cannot be ſpoken of nothing: *Boundleſs*, becauſe ſuch is that Being that muſt dwell in it: and *before God*, becauſe it was that God might have ſcope to be: and if God had made it, it muſt have been needleſly; for he might as well have liv'd without it a maker, as no maker: beſides, that a being ſhould make another that it ſelf might have room to be, is the very height and depth of nonſenſe.

And again, ſhould this dreamt or imaginary ſpace anſwer its name, and be no more *thing* than a dream is, 'tis worſe to think; how ſomewhat that is the fondling of our addle brains ſhould be needful to the exiſtence of the ever bleſſed God who made us, and the beſt brains we have to our heads too.

Now

Now I think, that as Gods Everlastingneſs is in time, and boundleſly before it as to imaginary years, without before and after, in an ever-being now; ſo Gods All-fillingneſs is in the world, and boundleſly beyond it as to imaginary worlds or roomthineſs, without any roomthy ſpreadingneſs, in an indiviſible altogetherneſs.

For I bethink my ſelf, that God is as boundleſs in his Almightineſs as in his All-fillingneſs. Now Gods Almightineſs is within the leaſt *punctum phyſicum*, or duſtling of body, ('twas made and is kept in being by Almightineſs). But Gods Almightineſs being God himſelf, himſelf is there altogether: and if the Almighty be there wholly, the All-filling is there too in like manner; for both is one, and leſs than *wholly* they cannot *be there*, becauſe leſs than wholly they cannot *be*. And we may as well dream of boundleſs imaginary ſtuff for Almightineſs to work upon, as boundleſs imaginary roomth for All-fillingneſs to dwell in; (if it be enough for his Almightineſs to work inwards upon his Eſſence, ſo 'tis too for his All-fillingneſs to dwell inwards in the ſame.) God then being as Almighty in the leaſt brack of the world as in the whole world, he is as all-filling in the ſame too as in the whole: and if that were gone too, he would be as all-filling

ling without it as with it; for he was as immenſe before there was an atome of body or room, as he is now when there are both: and ſo it follows, there needs neither real nor imaginary ſcope to make way for a boundleſs all-fillingneſs.

I remember the excellent Dr. *Hen. More*, whoſe ſoul may have roamed as far into theſe ſcopes and vaſtneſſes as moſt mens in the world, has not only (in his *Enchirid. Metaph.*) made Ghoſt, as ſuch, extended; but has ſtarted ſuch a boundleſs roomthineſs, and as needful as God is (if I underſtand him) as is a kind of ghoſt inwardly drilling through the *All* of body, and ſuch a one too as is ſo far a likeneſs of God himſelf, that it wants nothing of him but only his life and working; and ſomewhere elſe finds in his heart to ſay, *That there is a ſpace wherever God is or any ſelf-ſubſiſtent Being, is as plain to him as the* Κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι: but, for my ſhare, laying aſide all humour of thwarting my betters, I do as verily believe, as I do any thing I have not a word of God for, that there is roomth no where but where body is, and that ghoſt is ſo far from needing ſpace to be in, that when 'tis in a world where room is, 'tis as far from taking up room as 'tis from putting on body: nor can I but wonder, that one who lives ſo much in the ſoul, and

ſo

ſo little in the body as he ſeems to do, ſhould find it quite otherwiſe. That worthy Gentleman, I do think, had his reaſons for ſo ſteady a belief, and of that weight to him, that his own are wont to be to others; the ſlighting of which would not ſtrengthen, nor the valuing of them weaken, thoſe of ours on the other behalf, which are mainly the following.

Firſt, I ſee this roomthineſs in the whole, muſt as well have unaſſignable parts or ſuch as cannot be laid out, as body has aſſignable or ſuch as can; and though they be unlaid out in themſelves, they may be laid out by body laid in, as all the parts of that room in which the world is may now be. Now I cannot underſtand, how that which is made up of parts, laid out or unlaid out, which are *all* finite, ſhould it ſelf be infinite: and that all are ſo I am ſure, becauſe thoſe I know, which are altogether like the reſt which I do not know, are ſo: and as for parts *more* than *all* thoſe that are all thus finite, they cannot be: and if *all* that a thing be made up of be finite, I cannot for my heart think how the whole, which is *no more than all*, ſhould be *infinite*; every thing being the ſame with all the parts of it taken together.

Secondly, That ſuch a kind of thing *muſt be*,

be, that God himſelf *may be*, ſtrikes me with too great an awe to ſpeak it. They who hold this wild emptineſs, hold alſo (as they muſt) its independency on, or unbeholdenneſs to, God himſelf: Now who would think that there were ſuch a thing that God ſhould be beholden to, for the Being which he has, and that not beholden to him for the being which it ſelf has? And to ſay, that both are eternal as well as boundleſs, and ſo, one was not before the other, becauſe neither did ever begin to be, will take off nothing of the hardneſs: For, (not to ſay, that if one could have been before the other, ſpace had been the eldeſt,) though one was not before the other in *ſtanding*, the one was *worthy* before the other in *cauſality*; though God was never the cauſe of room, yet room was ever the cauſe of God: for that was that God might have leave to be; and had not that *ever been*, God had *never been*, had not that ever been *without him*, he had never been *within that*; *its being* making way for *his being*, its *being room* making way for his *being God*; who could not be it ſeems, becauſe he wanted room to *be in*, though that could be room without his being in it, or would be if he were out of it.

Beſides, they that beſtow extenſion upon any thing elſe but body, as emptineſs, ghoſt, and

and thence upon God himself, are not, I fear me, very well aware of its ill-lookt followers. For whoever makes God a boundless extended being, may upon the same score make him a boundless extended triangle, (one figure being as much extension fashion'd as another, 'tis neither here nor there which:) some figure or other he must be (as to kind) because 'tis as much of the nature of extension to be of some shape; as to be of some roomth, unless we should here borrow a bucket somewhere and draw up a figure too beyond all the figures in Geometry, out of the same depth with the number beyond all the numbers in Arithmetick. Already, it seems, God must have as many shapes in his unassignable parts with us, as all the things of the world have in those that we have sense of; their shape being nothing but their bulk so cantled out: and what there is of God beyond the world, being of the same piece with that of him which is in it, must also put on shape as that does; inasmuch as roomthiness there, can no more be without it than roomthiness here. Whence would arise what I am not forward at all to speak of; an harshness in these things not being so harmless as the cutting of Cork, whereby, though you saw and wring the ears with the sharm, yet still 'tis but a light business you have to deal

deal with; and I am thinking the unhandsomneſs will loſe nothing of its diſtaſtfulneſs for not being named only out of dread.

But now one reaſon at leaſt why the underſtanding has been robletted in to theſe waſtes and wildneſſes is, the forefearing, that if emptineſs far and wide were not granted, the world would not be bounded; wherefore rather than make a boundleſs world, many have choſen to yield a boundleſs ſcope beyond it. But we are at no ſuch pend, as we ſhould be fain to fly to either the one or the other; for the world is not bounded by any thing beyond, nor ought any ſuch thing, or *kind of* thing to be imagined: but 'tis enough that 'tis bounded by it ſelf; its boundedneſs, where 'tis bounded, ariſing as unavoidably from its very kind, as its extenſion where 'tis extended.

The leading miſtake of all, I think, with freedom to others, is this: We firſt roved in our minds at an unbounded emptineſs, and then *thought* put the world in the midſt of it. Whereas we were alike miſtaken in the *middle* and in the *thing* too, both which may thank haſte; for before *any thing* was *made* there was *nothing*, and therefore we ſhould have ſtaid and thought of *nothing*, but only infinite power, wiſdom, goodneſs, truth, & what other things there are in God,

whereby he vouchſafes to make known himſelf to us. Now, for a Being whoſe very Eſſence is no other than theſe, roomth or ſpace is no more needful, than for the dwelling of the good things of the mind and ſoul under thoſe names, or than there is for Univerſal, or boak, as taken in the Mathematicks, ſtript out of body. You may as well be earneſt for a finite room for one, as an infinite for the other, (and perhaps better too, inaſmuch as one may be had, whatever the other may.) If it be ſaid theſe are other kind of beings, (as Moral, Metaphyſical or Mathematical.) I anſwer, So is God too, and *more other* than they are, becauſe *boundleſly other*. Beſides, I think a being, that is the term of Creation, or a piece of Gods handy-work, may live without any room, as do the Angels, and would do if world ſhould be no more. If we can but get thus far then, as to think there was no roomthineſs before the world, (If we think there was, we find at what peril we muſt;) 'tis eaſie enough to think further, that there is none beyond it. For 'tis but thinking the world was made and nothing elſe beſides it, which ſurely is true, and the thing is done: for if it *were not* before the world was *made*, nor *made with the world* when the world was made, it never *was made*, nor never *was*.

But

But we are not yet out of the mire, nor like to be, until we can fairly rid our ſelves of that load of objections with which the men of depth and quickneſs have even over-burden'd the thing we hold. All, or all the weightieſt of which, that we can feel for, ſhall be diſpatcht in manner following.

Obj. 1. *Suppoſe we then with the learned Dr.* More, *that an Archer were ſo ſeated at the rim of the world, as to level his arrow right through the ſelvedge of it outwards; there being full ſtrength and right aim given it, Would the arrow fly, or Would it not?*

Anſ. It would, and it would not, and either according as you make the ſelvedge. If you make it as round as a Mathematical circle, it would *not* fly: for the arrow ſtanding in a ſtreight line, from the innermoſt or centre to the ſelvedge; and there being no more reaſon why it ſhould warp to the right hand than to the left, why this way rather than that, it muſt needs ſtir no way; but ſtick with its head at the ſelvedge, though it has all the force given it that ſtrong-bow and arm-ſtrong can make together. But the ſhapes of nature being of another kind of make than thoſe of handy-works, 'tis very likely that the roundneſs of the world (if yet it be round) is ſomewhat otherwiſe than a true Geometrick circle. As we ſee the ring of

the Earth, a far leſs Ball, ends not in lines evenly drawn from the centre thither, but is bounded with hills and dales; and both earth and water with manifold unevenneſſes: much more then are we to gheſs ſuch in the bigger roundle of the world. Whence 'tis, that the arrow may have, by ſome lucky riſing or other, a Bias given it this way or that way, as a Coach may be ſo tickly ſet upon the ſurface of the earth, as to give it ſelf a trundling, one way or other. So then, the motion would be, as touching the world, in a bow or arch of a circle, upon the very ſelvedge of it; but, as touching the Marks-man, in a line ſtreight enough on to the eye. For it flying in a line as far off as it can, according to the ſteering that was given it, it would be ſeemingly as ſtreight as it can be at all; for the nearer the eye comes to a great thing that is bowing, the leſs bowing it ſeems. When we firſt make a Neſs at Land too, it ſeems more a Neſs than when we are leſs off at Sea; but when we are juſt at ſhore, it ſeems to lye in a ſtreight line with the reſt of the Coaſt. And as we are not aware of that bow, which is made by all things darted or ſhot in the air, ſuppoſing the whirle of the earth; becauſe we our ſelves are running the ſame round (as the great *Galileo* has altogether made out): ſo neither do we ken that bow that is made by the

the wheeling of a Chariot onwards upon the round ſurface of the earth (whether it ſtirs or ſtands ſtill); but we ſee it run as much flatwiſe or in *plano*, ſetting aſide the little riſings and fallings of uneven ground, as if the outſide of the earth were a ſhire flat or level. Nor could Sir *Fra. Drake* have ever gather'd from the eye, that he ſail'd otherwiſe than in a level; when yet he ſail'd in a circle round about the earth. As then, whatſoever moves as much in a flat as it can for the earths rim, we reckon to have moved in a flat altogether: ſo whatever flies in as ſtreight a path as the bow of the worlds bigger rim will give leave, we, if there, would count wholly ſtreight.

And that ſuch ſeeming ſtreightneſs would not ſhow ſidewiſe but forwards, may be gather'd from hence. If I were to look through the earth at an enlightned hole or Well, reaching from me to him that ſets foot to foot with me on the other ſide, the hole would ſeem *all downwards* to me, although in it ſelf it were half downwards half upwards: As well then may an arrow gliding on the ſelvedge of the world, ſeem to me, there ſtanding, *all upwards* and nothing at all ſidewiſe.

But to give the objection all the lifts we can, Suppoſe we inſtead of this Shooter, a man

ing his ſide againſt the ſelvedge of the world, with his arm down by it, Could he ſpread forth his arm or could he not? If he could, then he did it in that emptineſs which is gainſay'd: For we will think him to bear it that way, and for the nonce to hinder all other wayes: and if it ſhould but upon the ſhove flie upwards or downwards, or otherwiſe than he aims it, he would quickly be aware of it, by the change of that poſture which it would then have to the reſt of his body. And if it could not, when thus hem'd in, be put forth into the emptineſs at all, What hinders it?

To this we anſwer in the firſt place, 'Tis hugely queſtionable to me, Whether ſuch a poſture may be allow'd as ſtanding with the loadſtoneſhips or magnetiſms of the world, and the ballancings of a body, ſuch as that of mans is. For as we ſee 'tis impoſſible to have the earth, (in this our roundle) otherwiſe than beneath us; ſo 'tis agreeable, that we cannot otherwiſe have the heaven, in the world, than as to ſence above us. The thing taken up then, grates as much upon the face of Dame Nature, as to ſuppoſe a man lying along in the open air at level, or in a line parallel to the plane of the Horizon.

But ſecondly, Bating the Objection all this ſeeming roughneſs, We anſwer: If the man

man were ſo laid at the worlds ſelvedge, as to have it on the ſide of him, not above his head, his arm hanging by the ſame ſide; if by a ſudden ruſh of the ſpirits into it, he ſhould give it an heave outwards, and from the ſame inward free ſpring of motion ſhould keep it from ſlipping awry: then would not the arm ſtir at all, there being no place left for it to ſtir into, it being all one as if he ſhould thruſt it againſt ſome hard body at reſt, of too ſtout a withſtanding to yield way or give back. If it be further ſaid, it muſt ſure flie outwards, becauſe 'tis lifted that way, and there's *nothing* to forbid its coming there: 'tis further anſwered, The knack or contrivance of the *Frame* of the world forbids it; and that is *ſomething*, and ſomething too as powerful to check or bind motion, as the way-laying of a groſs unweildy body, or any thing elſe that we, by ſence and trial, find enough to ſtop the career of a body in its ſwifteſt hurry.

If this anſwer ſeems harſh or ſtretched, we ſhall eaſily ſlacken and ſoften it by a clearer Inſtance nearer home. Suppoſe we then a bore through the heart or centre of the earth from outſide to outſide, into which let a man be thought falling down: when he comes at the centre he falls no further, but

is as ſurely ſtopt there, as if the hole were bored no further, but had the whole pillar of the earths half-thwart line, or ſemidiameter of even bore to withſtand it. Now in this Inſtance it may as well be ſaid, there being *nothing* in the Tube to hinder, Why ſhould not the man fall further, the air of the Well being all of a make? What could not ſtop him in one place could not in another. And indeed, if the air upon any ſcore could check the downfal, it vvould ſooner do it at the top of the earth, vvhere the ſpring of the air belovv vvas ſtronger, though its vveight aloft lighter; than in the middlemoſt, vvhere the pent or bear of it beneath vvas nothing at all, (there being no *beneath* at all,) though the vveight above much more, the ſpring of the earth overballancing the vveight of it as to povver: vvhich perhaps is one reaſon vvhy all dovvnfals haſten their ſpeed, by how much the nearer they come to the earth. Novv the anſvver to the *Phœnomenon* is this, That the reaſon vvhy it ſtops there, is, not the meeting vvith any body there of force enough to ſtand againſt the ſhock of its motion, but only the nice contrivance of the vvorlds Frame: and more eſpecially the magnetiſms and poyſes of the earthly *Vortex*, vvhich vvill not allovv an heavy body left to it ſelf vvith-

vvithin a flovvſom one that is lighter, to buoy up.

Which buſineſs of deadning the motion of a ſtirr'd body, not from body, but the law of body, puts me in mind of bodies or a mans being ſtirr'd up from reſt, without any jog from body that we are aware of, but mainly from ſome of theſe hidden working laws that round the world. Our ſleep is call'd reſt, and a waking out of it, a being ſtirring: now 'tis eaſie to mark that we are thus ſtirr'd by thoſe wide and unſeen laws that wield the day, while we for little dream of it. Thus our time of waking or ſtirring is the morning, from that even ſhare of refreſhing ſleep, as one would think, that we are wont to take the night before: But 'tis ſhrewdly to be miſtruſted, that ſomething a great deal further off, and broader ſpread, has ſome kind of tamperings here. For if you mind it, you will find, an hundred to one elſe, That whether you go to bed at 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 a clock at night, you ſhall wake at your wonted hour next morning; (little otherwiſe whether it begin to rain late in the evening, at midnight, early or late in the morning, it does likely hold up, as we ſay, by that time the Shrews have dined): which cannot be from that meaſure of reſt, and new breed of quickners that have befallen the body in the

the night; for why, there has been ſo much odds in the hours of ſleep. It ſeems then, that the thing that calls us up is *Morningneſs*, or that woof and plight that the whole tickliſh frame of worldly beings are wheel'd into at ſuch a tide of day. Which we ſhould never have ſprung by hunting for, had we not thus been made aware of it, in that we find there is ſomewhat in it, that firks us more at ſuch a nick of time to wake and ſtir, than the wont that we have got of reſting ſo many hours, can bind us down to bed and ſleep.

And here indeed 'tis mainly to be heeded, That we are by no means to look upon the world as a great heap of faſt and looſe bodies hudled up together at ſixes and ſevens by haſt and careleſneſs, or an hugger-mugger of meddleſom beings all at jars: but a curious frame of well-ranged bulks ſo featly ſet together by a boundleſs cunning, that ſhould but any one pin of it be miſdriven, or the running of its leaſt wheel ſlipt or joſtled, you hazard the cracking and ſplitting of the whole. Whence 'tis, that the leaſt bitling of it will ſo far club and fall in with the laws that bind the whole *Set*, that we can ſometimes force bodies to cloſe with the woof or tenor of the whole, though it lyes croſs to thoſe little buſineſſes which they ſeem to have

have been ſet about in their narrow homes: as may be made out by inſtances, enough to fill up a book of bulk, beſtowed upon us from that wealthy and yet growing ſtore-houſe wherewith the *Royal Society* have enricht the world, and ſingly from that of the Noble Mr. *Boyle* the glory of it, and *Englands* too as well as the great wiſh of the whole world beſides us. He that will but weigh & ponder in his mind what at firſt ſight puts forth it ſelf, when looking on a Watch, where the ſingle ſhove or heave of the ſpring, which if the pieces of the Watch were unhing'd and born upon by it would only be puſht forwards or by-wards, puts the Watch thus fadg'd together and in tilter into motions round, right on, level, ſwingling, forwards, backwards, upwards, downwards, and otherwayes, all becauſe 'tis a knack or engine: and ſhall further mark, (the Watch-wrights craft being not only the Ape of Nature, but the very Tool, ſtill in her hand,) that if Nature ſhould but flinch back her hand, or the world that is round about it ſhould but be pluckt away from it, our Watch would without more ado be utterly unwatcht; its being in the world being as needful to its being a Watch, as its being made by the skill of a Watch-maker: the whole Watch being nothing elſe but a cunning

ning and clever way of laying bodies to the wheels and ſprings or ballancings of Nature, as its pieces are put to the ſpring that is ſo craftily lodg'd in it by the Workman. Nothing leſs than a world being able to ſtand upon its own legs, or do any thing after 'tis made; all our knicknacks are but engines within an engine, engines of the Craftſman within the *machina mundi*, or a Cog put into Natures wheel, which if one did not ſtir the other vvould not, any more than a mill vvould be that 'tis made for, if the vvorld did not help it to vvind or vvater to ſet it a vvorking, as vvell as ſtuff of vvhich to make it. He, I ſay, vvho vvill but vveigh and ſcan theſe things, vvill at length have ſome lovv and underly rovings at, or at leaſt admirings of that height and depth of vvorkmanſhip, that this curious vvorld is vvrought up to.

But 'tis further objected from the ſame learned hand, *Though the arrow ſhoved by body, or the arm yerkt by ſpirit enlivening body, will not be gotten into this* vacuum extramundanum, *yet an Angel unencumbred with body may be there, and help either thither. For if Angels were before the world, and the firſt of* Gen. *ſhould mean only the works that are ſeen not thoſe too that are not ſeen or were the firſt dayes work, and ſo exiſting before the world*

world was such as 'tis as they shall after the breaking up of the world by fire, or being no wayes beclam'd with body as to ubiety or whereness, or may be wherever God is, who must be in outworldish wasts, then may we imagine them there now, and carrying the arm or arrow thither?

Answ. This Objection as fast as it comes, comes yet too late: For we have already bereav'd Ghosts of place, and tyed up that attribute or belonger to bodies only. So that 'tis as impossible to seat an Angel in outworldish emptiness, as in the world it self; and as impossible to seat or stow it in this world, as to seat moral virtue or a Mathematical point here. 'Tis indeed such a great bellied truth that body only can be in a room, that it has another truth in the womb of it, which is, That no body but such as is lodg'd by with or among other bodies is in a room: For to be in a room is to be in *such* a room, or in a *room* that may be *shown*, and such a shown room as that wherein another body is not. So that if there were but one body, it could not rightly be said to *be in a room*, but only to be. And in truth of speaking, the *whole* world is in no place or room, as bearing no stowsomness to any other body about it; for want therefore of another body, near to or far from which it should be placed,

placed, it loſes its ſtowſomneſs or location. Every place of it the mean-while being in a place, as having nearneſſes or farneſſes betwen each other within the great verge; while the whole muſt needs have them from without, or elſe can have none at all. Inaſmuch as it cannot be ſaid of the world, 'tis in *this* place, or *that*, or *ſome* other place beſides, becauſe this and that, and ſome other, would be all one, the world taking up no leſs than *all* that is; nor that 'tis here or there or ſomewhere elſe, becauſe *there* would be *here*, *here there*, and ſomewhere elſe no where elſe, the world filling up *all* whereneſſes; all which would be an ill kind of medly: Therefore it ſhould ſeem that it cannot but harſhly be ſaid, that the world has a placeneſs or whereneſs at all. In ſhort, Room is rather in the world than the world in room, as thinking is in the ſoul, not the ſoul in thinking. So that I believe we ſhould never have dreamt of ſtowing any thing in a room, if our minds had not firſt given us that the room was bigger than the thing to be beſtow'd; any more than we ſhould have thought of putting a thing into a box, without we had firſt thought the box was ſo much bigger as to hold it.

The ſame likewiſe, as to another thing befals the *Minimum quantum*, or the Leaſt ſhare of the world. Cleaveſomneſs we know

is

is the great hanger on to body; but yet the leaſt brack of body cannot be broken a pieces, becauſe 'tis already the leaſt: yet 'tis as really body as that piece which can, and no whit nearer ghoſt than it was when knit to more. So place is another thing that haunts body as much; the whole world in the mean time not being in a place, and yet 'tis never the nearer being ghoſt: for that the one has too little bulk to loſe any and yet be, the other too much to have any thing bigger wherein to take up room, or beſides whereby to be plac'd. Yet theſe belongers to body are helpful enough, wherewith to ſet forth the nature of the things to which we bequeath them: For we are to underſtand, that the ends and bounds of natural beings have things ſpoken of them much otherwiſe than what becomes their whole, or the bigger parts to which they belong. Thus ſuppoſing, that as time had a beginning ſo it ſhould have an end, and only God himſelf to be after this world as he was before it, then the kindlieſt attribute of time, which is ſucceſſiveneſs in abiding, would not be true of the beginning and the end of it. For if the firſt *now* were ſucceſſive, it was not the firſt: for why, it follow'd a former; and the laſt now could not abide, for if it did, it was not the laſt. When therefore we ſay, All

time

time has fore and aft, we must bar the beginning which had not *fore*, and the end which had not *aft*: in the mean time it still holding good enough, that time is a successive or lengthning kind of abiding. The beginning or end of time being no more time (as we call it) than the least part is the whole, and the definition or whatness of a thing ought to to be of a thing as a *thing*, not of the least or greatest, first or last part of a thing, as such *part*.

But to strain this yet a little further: Suppose God Almighty to have made another world beyond, or which is better, besides this; which being a gathering of bodies, may be said to be somewhere, and somewhere too where this world is not: and there being our world also, it may stand so or so unto ours, and ours so or so unto that, and thereupon both of them be in a place, and either near to or far from eachother: and all this farness or nearness, or way of standing off, by the bare making of a world over and above this, vvithout the making any thing of scope or roomth betvveen. Therefore vvhatever there vvould be of such scope or roomth betvveen tvvo such vvorlds, must needs be before the vvorlds so made: and, as it followvs, must be the same vvith that *spatium imaginarium* vvhich vve have been so shie of ovvning all along. *Answ.*

Anſ. To overlook the uncouthneſs of the thing, We will be ſo kind to the ſuppoſition of more vvorlds, by Almighty power, as to let it go for a thing that may be, though it be a great deal more likely, as we may happily ſhew beneath, that it may not be than that it may: And in plain Engliſh anſvver, That ſuch a vvorld beſides this, vvould neither be far from it, nor near to it, or any vvays meddle or make vvith it, any more than if this vvere the only vvorld, or if inſtead of tvvo vvorlds you ſhould there ſuppoſe two Angels. For the clearing up of vvhich vve are to underſtand, That unto a ſtovvſomneſs or local reſpect betvveen tvvo ſtovved beings, 'tis not only needful they ſhould be both bulky; upon vvhich foot vve have taken avvay all ſtovvſom medlings betvveen the vvorld and God, betvveen the vvorld and ghoſts, or between God and the vvorld, and ghoſt and the world, becauſe but one of them is bulky: but 'tis alſo behoveful there ſhould be ſomething beſides the things which are ſtowed, to which roomthineſs ſhould as much belong; two roomthy beings bearing no ſtowſomneſs to each other, upon the account of their being two or two roomthy beings, any more than two ghoſts: but alſo upon the ſcore of roomthineſs put between them. Now room between theſe two worlds

being that which is denied, the argument brought to prove it muſt by no means be allowed to ſuppoſe it. Imagine we now two Angels point blank over againſt each other, in the hem or rim of the world, there is room between, but no roomthy or ſtowſom reſpect; becauſe the two things that are there, are ſuch as cannot be put into a place there, and all local habitude or behaviour muſt be between two things or more, in a place ſo or ſo. Then let us ſuppoſe in the ſtead of an Angel, ſome remarkable body; there is *one* of the terms, *body plac'd*, and there is roomthineſs between that and the other boundary or term: but becauſe *that other* is not alſo body, nor can, for want of being ſo, take up room, the local reſpect is ſhier loſt, for nothing but becauſe the third thing is no roomthy being. A ghoſt being in it ſelf not roomthy, it cannot bear any roomthy behaviour towards bodies that are ſo, any more than bodies that are bulky, can bear immaterial reſpects or thoughtſom behaviours towards ghoſts that are ſo; roomthineſs being as much nothing to a ghoſt, as thinking is to a body. Think any what they will, the world is what it is and bodies do what they do: ſo let roomth be, a ghoſt thinks and does the ſame as if roomth were not. They are things that are off in their whole kind, and one does nothing

nothing like the other: So that you may as well threap one down, that a ghoſt is heavier or lighter, colder or hotter, wetter or dryer, harder or ſofter, whiter or blacker than a body, as to ſay 'tis further or nearer to it, above it or beneath it, a furlong on the right hand, or a furlong on the left in any other than in a borrowed meaning. As we cannot ſay that a body has an inch or an ell of thinking, an ounce or a pound of underſtanding or willing: for though body and inch, or ounce agree well enough, yet the third thing in the bunch, that is thinking, will not be brought to ſtick to either, (without it be in ſuch borrowed meanings as when we ſay, The love of the world is near the heart, or the fear of God far from it, thoughts heavy in grief, light in gladneſs, ſoftneſs of mind, hard thoughts, and the like.) As in our former Inſtance, body at one ſide of the world, and room from thence to the other ſide, did cloſe well enough; but then ghoſt at the end of it will ſtick no more to it, than birdlime will to a thought.

Moreover yet, That it cannot be ſaid of a Ghoſt 'tis further or nearer to a body given, may hence, I think, be ſeen. The reaſon why we ſay this is further off than that from another, is not only becauſe I can lay a *longer line* between them while ſo far aſunder, but

that it will alſo take a *longer time* to bring them cloſe together. Now the motions (if we may call them ſo) of ghoſts being all in an inſtant, (as the darting of our thoughts are through the world,) they can both come home in the ſame time. If then they come home neither *ſooner* nor *later*, nor did they lye off either *nearer* or *further*. If their *coming together* muſt be meaſured by the *ſame time*, their *lying aſunder* muſt be meted by the ſame *metwand*. So that which is nearer, muſt be as far off as that which is further, and that which was further, as nigh as that which was nearer; which ſpeaks aloud that nearneſs and farneſs had nothing to do with their being what they were. To a ghoſt the whole world and the leaſt bit of it are all one. A ghoſt at one ſide of the world is as near the other ſide as if it were in the middle, and in the middle as near as if it were at the edge. Now the whole world bearing no *cleaveſom* behaviour to a ghoſt, 'tis impoſſible the whole or any part of it ſhould bear a *local*. If we our ſelves were not body as well as ſoul, our underſtandings would never have coped with ſuch a thing as placeneſs or ſtowage at all. If then we ſuppoſe a being that is bulkie, and nothing about it that is ſo, or two beings that are bulky and nothing between them that is ſo; though

both

both theſe taken in themſelves are, after a ſort, and like nothing but themſelves, in a place, yet they have no local reſpect to one another: that being in a place wch they have, ſpeaking nothing which belongs to them beyond their own bounds or outſides, and is nothing in the world but their own roomthineſs, and all the unlikeneſs between them and ghoſt as to ſtowage is, that as to *within* they are roomthy, and ſo in place, or rather place it ſelf; but as to *without*, there belongs nothing ſuch to *them* any more than to *ghoſt*.

If beſides the two worlds we ſhould ſuppoſe manifold ghoſts laid between them (vvhich may as vvell be as our thoughts are vvhile vve make the ſuppoſal) ſtill they vvould bear no place-like reſpect. For as the placing of body betvveen tvvo ghoſtly beings, vvould not give them a placely behaviour; ſo the ſtovving of a ghoſtly being as a middle thing betvveen tvvo bodies, vvould not give them any ſuch behaviour neither. If then ghoſts betvveen the tvvo vvorlds vvould not give it, ſurely nothing at all betvveen them could not. That cannot do this *one thing*, that can do *nothing* at all.

But vve may further be tvvitted vvith this, If there be nothing betvveen the tvvo vvorlds as vve have anſvvered, then the rims

of them vvould touch.

To this vve have tvvo or three things to give in. And in the firſt place, We ſay, The catch is ſo unphiloſophical, that that vvhich gainſays it moſt, is moſt true. If *nothing* were between them, the ſide of one would *not butt* upon the other, but be *inlaid* in the other. That one body ſhould *touch* another, 'tis altogether needful that *ſomething* ſhould be *betwixt* them. For we are to mark, that the ſmootheſt body in being has more or fewer unevenneſſes, or ridges and furrows, in its outerneſs or ſurface. The utmoſt ſmoothneſs we can come at by tools or otherwiſe, is full of ſuch little ruggedneſſes, between which lye as many little holes of air; which holes if they could be filled up, or the little ridges and knolls brought down to a level with them, ſo as the ſurface might not be ſome airſom body, but all ſuch thick or faſt body, then this body laid to another, would be ſo far from touching it, that it would be no other than one with it, and the nearer any body comes to this plight, the nearer it comes to inlaying or oneneſs. The pieces of a body do not pierce one another, but are only clapt together at their little ſmoothneſſes as cloſe as they can ſnug, and held there by the poyſings of the world. Thus we ſee two pieces of flat poliſht marble laid one upon another,

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are either *inlaid ſecundum quid* or after a ſort, that is, as to ſuch parting as may be made by drawing them aſunder upwards or downward, or elſe they are in a middle between onlaid and inlaid, which is a thing for which we want a word; for the hundredth part of that power that is but enough to ſunder two ſuch flat *abutting* marbles, is more than enough to break up the very *inlaying* of a ſpunge.

That ſtounding and ſurprizing *Eſſex Writer* in his *Dialogues de Mundo*, roundly bears us down, That two ſuch worlds would touch without any more ado; there being no off-ſtanding betwixt them, becauſe nothing at all between them. And all bodies ſtanding off from each other do ſo, by reaſon of off-ſtanding or roomth put between them. And as it follows, Two ſuch worlds muſt club together and become one; and upon that ground he ſhews A moreneſs of worlds would be impoſſible.

But now we are to ſhew, That that which makes two ſides of two bodies touch, is not the not having roomthineſs betwixt them. There lies no roomthineſs between the ſoul and the body, nor between God and the world, and yet they do not touch, any more than two bodies would do that are off from each other. But 'tis alſo needful there

be no poſſibility of putting a *quantum* or roomth between them, where indeed they do touch; as only thoſe things may *touch* that have a *mayneſs* or poſſibility of having roomth put between them. To make one body butt upon another, 'tis not enough that nothing ſenſible be between them; but it behoves them alſo, that they be the neareſt together, that they can be and not be one. But we have already taken away all ſhew of nearneſs and farneſs from the two bulks, by ſhutting out the middleneſs in which ſuch nearneſs or farneſs muſt needs be pitcht. Thoſe bodies or beings that cannot have a *placely* reſpect, cannot have an *abutting* or touching *reſpect*.

Thus on the other hand, the putting of a bulky middleneſs between two ghoſts, 'tis not enough to ſet them at ſuch a farneſs from each other. Suppoſe two Angels to have been before the world in their agreeable whereneſſes, after the making of the world, without any change in their unbody-like way of being ſomewhere, one to be found in the roundle of the Moon, another in that of the earth; extended body is now between them, without the leaſt diſtance or off-ſtanding ariſen between them. For before the world there was no off-ſtanding betwixt them, all extenſion being then unmade,

made, and they holding the ſelf-ſame whereneſſes, muſt alſo have the ſame non-diſtance after the world made. Every thing while it holds the ſame whereneſs, keeps alſo the ſame things to be ſpoken of it as to whereneſs.

If thoſe ſides between which nothing is, do touch and become one, Then if all the world were unmade but Sun and Moon, they two ſhould forthwith jump into one; and it would be hard enough to ſay what it were, Whether a Sun, or a Moon, or neither? ſuppoſing that by Almighty power their Sunſhip and Moonſhip might be kept by them, without worldſhip.

Again, If *between which* nothing is put, the ſides would touch, according to ſound and right ſpeaking, Then *beyond which* nothing is put, the ſelvedge is infinite. So it falls as hard upon the *Carteſians* and the *Whitings*, for an infinite world, which neither of them dare ſpeak in words, but ſhuffle it indeed: emptineſs or *ſpatium imaginarium* with them, being as verily *nothing*, as that which is imagin'd between the two ſides of the veſſel emptied of all its body between them.

And now by driving thus far, We have gain'd ground for the anſwering that puzling argument of the foreſaid Doctor, for diſtance

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in vacuo, in his ingenious *Canto of Infinity of worlds. Suppoſe the skie all ſwept away from Saturn to the Sun, the Planets ſtill holding their rooms, and holding on their roundings as they did before, let then an Aſtronomer take their heights: The Queſtion is, Whether their Parallaxes would be the ſame, or other, or none at all?*

I anſwer upon the Suppoſition, (which is wide enough from what is natural, and perhaps from what may be too againſt nature: for that which claws away world from about them, would, 'tis like, wring out their Planethood from within them.) There would be no Parallaxes at all, no beams of light to take Parallaxes by, no throughfarings of the leaſt ſteams or reekings of bodies, from one globe to another or from our earth to any of the globes, nor any power to ſhoot forth any body from one to the other, by any *impetus* or darting whatſoever. Though the *kinred* between theſe things ſhould be ſtill left, yet the *goſſipred* would be quite taken away. Though all ſhould jump in this one thing, to wit, in being Planets as before, yet they could neither *ſpeak with*, nor *make* one another, (if I may word it ſo much Yeoman-wiſe,) nor have any more to do with one another than if there had never been dealings between them; that by which

which they medled and made each with other being taken away. As on the other ſide, we find ſome bodies amongſt us hold up a Goſſipred, that ſeem to have little or nothing of kinred; as may be ſeen between jet and ſtraw, loadſtone and iron, with ſome others of that hooking kind: where, ſetting aſide their angling and groping one for another, there are as few things cleaving to one, to be met with in the other, as in moſt twoes in the whole world. In a word, the buſineſs here would be much at one with that of two worlds ſpoken of before; one being as free from fellowſhip and dealing with the other as they were, or as would be between our earth and ſo many Angels, having ſuppoſed dwellings there, where thoſe Planets have ſuch place. But as for their motion in ring or circular, that muſt not be yielded; for that ſeems as hard to be in *vacuo*, as for a ghoſt to ſtand ſtill in *pleno*.

But once more to take off all ſhew of ſtrength from that way-layer, to wit, the ſides of the veſſel muſt needs touch between which nothing is: We will but lay it down thus. Take we a ſquare body in the world unevenly ſided, out of the hollow of this take we then (in our minds) all body whatſoever, leaving nothing at all. The ingenious *Des Cartes* and others tells us, The ſides for

for that trick alone would touch. But now we ſay ſtifly, and will ſtand to it ſo, That the ſides would not only not touch, but be ſo far, in part, from touching, that they would, to rights, be further aſunder. For the off-ſtand-ſtanding or diſtance between them being to be met with only in the body that lyes between them, and the body ſpace and diſtance which lay neareſt between them being taken away, they can only be meted by that which lyes furtheſt off; thoſe bodies being further off that are by all meaſure found to be ſo. Thus the middle point in one of the ſides, for that it cannot be meted by a ſtreight line drawn from it to its overthwart, but only by a crooked line of three ſides and two corners tracing along the ſurface of the hollow, muſt as needs be further from it than before, as this crooked line that goes thus far about to mete it now, is longer than the overthwart ſtreight one by which it might have been meted before.

But it being eaſie for me here to Object it to my ſelf, I may think 'tis as eaſie for another to do it, That then two bodies keeping the ſame place in the world, or ſtanding ſtark ſtill, may yet change place as if they ſtirr'd out of it: which ſeems to thwart at an high rate.

To which I anſwer. If the world in which they

are, be changed, 'tis no wonder if their place in it be changed also; or if that by which their distance be meted, be taken away, is it, that their distance should be so too: a distance that cannot be measured being none at all. But by supposing this emptiness, the world is not what it was, but by so much less as our mind took away: as, if the body made nothing should again be made there, it would be by so much bigger as that was big; the nearness taken away by one deed, would be brought again by the other; and to take away place, or to take away the body plac'd, comes all to a reckoning. I am in the room where I now stand, about sixty miles from *Westminster Abby*, If you start that sixty miles further, though I stand still, I am so much further from it as if both had started three miles apiece: but if both it and I stand still, and a square cut of earth be digged between us, from the Eastern shore as far as to the Westward, I am as near still by water, but so much further by land as I am fain to go about for the sake of that cut betwixt: but if you empty it as well of water as you did of earth, I am just so far from it by water as I was by land, and am only as near to it as ever I was by air. So if I were of the winged kind, I might flie to it through the Skie, as well as I could walk to it by land or row and sail by water:

water: but if you empty out the air too, and leave nothing, I am then ſo much further from it all three wayes: and if I would come nearer to it, I muſt either have a bridge of body laid between, or elſe muſt walk, or row, or flie about. So near one thing is to another as it can *come to be*, and no nearer: If then I can *come* no nearer to it, but by the ways ſpoken of, I think I rightly gather I *am* no nearer to it. That which is as near to a thing as ever it can *come*, is as near as it can *be*, without iffs and ands, or to all intents and purpoſes. That I be further from another thing, 'tis all one whether you hitch me off from it while that ſtand ſtill, or whether you put that back from me while I ſtand ſtill, or vvhether you make that betvvixt us further from both vvhile both ſtand ſtill. As you ſee 'tis the ſame in making me further off by land, vvater, or air, ſo I ſee nothing forbidding it to be the ſame by all other vvayes. While the taking *ſuch things* from betvveen makes me further off *as to ſuch things* or ſo far, the taking *all things* from betvveen ſhould make me further off *as to all things* or altogether. A change of the vvorld in the *ſuchneſs* of the betvveen-lyers, begetting a change in my nearneſs as anſvvering *that ſuchneſs*: ſo a change of the vvorld in the *whole* of the betvveen-lyers, muſt beget a change

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in the *whole* of my nearneſs. The more body there is between me and another body the neareſt way that can be gone, the further are we aſunder: and the more body is pared away from the neareſt path that can be gone, the more body is laid between, the neareſt way that can be gone: the more ſhort paths you cut away, the longer you leave behind: and if you cut away ſhort and long, the things are neither near nor far, but name and thing are utterly loſt.

Furthermore, that the anſwer may leſs ſeem to have any thing of trick in it, a like thing may be done, the world not thus chang'd, to make way for it. For as the world now is, a body may glide at full ſpeed, ſo ſhifting place as to the bodies it glides by, and yet ſtand ſtill as to the greateſt part of the world beſides; ſo keeping place, and ſhifting place as uncouthly as in the thing objected. Thus we will take upon truſt the whirling of the earth from Weſt to Eaſt, (which is held by all a thing that may be, by moſt a thing that is,) and a ſhip under ſail driving with the ſame ſpeed from Eaſt to Weſt, (not being checkt by the earths giving over its motion to it.) Now this would ſhift place as to the bodies making up the earths ball, and hold the ſame place as to all the reſt of the world beſides. So we reckon St.

Pauls

Pauls Church in *London* to ſtand ſo ſtone ſtill, that it never ſtirr'd ground ſince the days of *Sebert* King of the *Saxons*; yet ſuppoſing the earths motion, it only keeps its place in reſpect of the earth, or that ſteamſcope or atmoſphere that wheels the ſame round with it, and ſhifts room every day with all the world beſides, that by which its off-ſtanding thereto ſhould be taken, being ſo oft lengthned and ſhortned by the whirl of the earth. And in the thing before us, by taking all body out of the ſquare and leaving juſt nothing, ſuch pieces of the world would be further from others, whoſe neareſt roads for meaſure ſhould lie through ſuch room taken away, keeping ſtill the ſame off-ſtanding to all the reſt of the world beſides.

So true is it, that we name and bound things according to what they oftenеſt or eaſilieſt *do* ſeem to us to be, and not as to thoſe narrow and leſs heeded by-ways, wherein ſomtimes they *may* be.

At the foot of this we ſhall yet ſet one remark more, and that is this. That of all men, he that holds a boundleſs roomthineſs beyond the world, muſt beware how he hits us in the teeth with this, That we make a body ſtir and ſtand ſtill both together. For if the foreſtroke give us but a little tick, the backſtroke will be ſure to give him a knocker.

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We ſay, a body may keep place as to ſome things, and ſhift it as to ſome others: But he muſt ſay, a body muſt ſtand ſtill and run both together, and as to all things. For we will take but this o'truſt, That the world may have been ſinking down, or flying up, or ſtarting aſide ever ſince it was made; He that made it, could as eaſily make it ſtir as ſtand ſtill; and he that we are ſpeaking with, holds it as eaſie to ſtir in emptineſs as in fulneſs: Then ſay we, That this utmoſt ſpeed of about 5675 years, is no other than ſtark ſtanding ſtill. For while it ſtands ſtill, it has but boundleſs room evenly about it, ſo as to be, to our thinking, in the midſt of it: but for all it runs, and has done, thus much, and thus long, it has the very ſame boundleſs room every way about it (nor more, nor leſs) than it ſhould have had, if it had ſtood ſtill: therefore it has ſtood ſtill all the while it has run ſo faſt. For, if that body which is in the midſt of a bounded ring, ſo running 5675 years as to be ſtill as much in the midſt as ever, does ſo run as to ſtand ſtill all the while it runs, then in like manner, That body which has unbounded room ſo every way about it, that if by running never ſo long, and never ſo faſt one way, it would neither lengthen the room behind it, nor ſhorten the room before it, then it ſo runs as to ſtand

ſtill all the while it runs; and then if by making it ſtand ſtill, it can have no more than the ſame unbounded room round about it, that it would have had if ſcouring all the while one way or other, its ſtanding ſtill is as much running as its running was ſtanding ſtill, and each as much the other as it ſelf: Which falls ſo pat upon the head of him that owns an emptineſs beyond the world, that I dare be bold to ſay, 'Tis ſuch a flail as there can ne're be fence for.

The quick-ſighted Mr. *Barlow* coping with *Nazarius*, who had rightly laid down body and ſpace to be the ſame, and that the worlds being in room is being in its own ſelvedge, has thence rais'd this further Objection; to wit, *That the world being thus in its own ſelvedge, may by God Almighty be thruſt into another room; and, as it follows, the room in which now 'tis, is another thing from it; and that room into which it is thruſt, muſt be the ſame outworldiſh ſcope that we have been all this while falling out with.*

What anſwer *Nazarius* would give to it, I cannot tell; but from the grounds laid down by us, 'tis as eaſie to anſwer as to name. For as the Argument ſays, the world *may be* thruſt out of the room in which 'tis into another, our Anſwer ſays it *may not be*: that is, without God ſhould alſo make another room for

for

it to be thruſt into. And though the *may be* in the Argument came ſtarveling alone without any thing of proof to back it, yet the *may not be* in the Anſwer ſhall be thus ſhoulder'd up. Unto motion 'tis not only behooving that the thing ſtirr'd be *bulkie*, but that the thing through which 'tis ſtirr'd be alſo *roomthy*. Thus as a ghoſt, becauſe no bulky Being, cannot move through the world, though a bulky throughfare or *medium*: ſo the world or whole clutter of bodies, though a bulky Being, cannot ſtir any way; for why, it has no bulky throughfare to ſtir in: Whatever ſtirs muſt ſtir in ſomewhat. And if it ſeems odd, that motion, which is an all-reaching affection or belonger to each bit of the world, ſhould yet be denied to the whole, 'tis full as odd, that cleaveſomneſs, which is as all-reaching a belonger to body, ſhould be with-held from a leaſt piece, which is as truly body as the greateſt. But as that would partake of *ſundering*, if it were not the *leaſt that can be*: ſo would the world of *ſtirring*, if it were not *the greateſt that could be*. From the *leaſtneſs* and *moſtneſs*, not from the *things themſelves*, it is, that this befals them. The world is made as much for ſtirring in its kind, as any ſhare of it, if it had but a *wherein* to ſtir: and a leaſt bitling is made as much for cleaving, if it had but a *wherewith* to be clo-

ven; its *leaſtneſs*, not its *bodineſs* forbidding it.

But it would not be out of the way, it may be, to put one thing more to this Anſwer before we go from it, and that is this, That when I ſay, God muſt alſo make another room for the world to be thruſt into, if it ſtarts at all, I would not be underſtood, as if I meant a room without body; which is the thing I have been ſo much blaming. For, to me, room and body are all one, that is, altogether; as ghoſt and thinking are: And I can no more underſtand how room can be by it ſelf without body, than I can how a thought may dwell by it ſelf without a thinking Being. But the room that I mean, is a roomthy yielding body, big enough to ſhift places with the world. For to me the very life and ſoul of motion is ſhuffle or ſawing, and all ſtirrings one and other are nothing but go-byes or ſhiftings of bodies. So that if one body had not another body to ſlide by and make a ſawing with, that it might be, out one, in another, that way one, this way t'other, it would ne're ſtir while 'tis a body. Whence, that one world may ſtir, another muſt be made for it to ſtir in. Whatever moves, muſt do it ſomewhere, or in ſomewhat, beſides it ſelf too. For nothing can ſtir its whole ſelf within it ſelf: All ſtirring

ring being out of, into. And 'tis eaſier to think, how, if this world were all marble, that piece in the middlemoſt might ſlide it ſelf to the outſide, than how a world, which has no room about it, ſhould ſtir any whither. 'Tis eaſier crowding into a full room, than into none at all. The middle piece here has body about it, but only 'tis too ſtiff and ſturdy to yield or ſhift rooms with it: but the world we ſpeak of, wants both *yielding body* and *body* too; and cannot ſtir into a *ſomewhere*, becauſe all beſides it ſelf is a *nowhere*.

Now becauſe ghoſt cannot hand the ſaw thus with body ſo as its ſliding into the room of body, ſhould make body ſlip into the room of it, Thence 'tis, as I make reckoning, that ghoſt cannot rightly be ſaid to move. For it cannot be, out body, in ghoſt, as 'tis in motion, out one body, in another; but body in, or body out, 'tis all one to ghoſt. A bodies ſtanding in the way, cannot ſlacken its ſpeed; nor a bodies making way, quicken it. And all motion, being either ſpeedier or ſlower, that which ſtirs neither the one way nor the other, ſtirs not at all. We find that all ſtirring is as the thing ſtirr'd is withſtood; if more, 'tis eaſily, if leſs, 'tis faſt. But becauſe a ghoſt can't be withſtood at all by body, (every body, but where 'tis enſouled, being

alike throughfaresom to it,) it does that in one now, at once, that body does in some time, by steps. For want of which stepping or gradation, it cannot well be call'd motion, (any more than its being out of this plight, can be call'd placing in some room, or standing still.) But 'tis somewhat else that we have no right name for, (unless skipping or canting may in a low sort speak it;) as we have none neither for those odd wights, (to name one of a thousand more,) that ran down a steep place into the Sea, with our Lords good leave. For they were neither Hogs nor Devils, no devillish Hogs, nor hoggish Devils; but a melling of two, that we have no more name for than we had of yore for that medly of three which we now call Gun-powder: their being call'd Swine, is such a vouchsafement for the Folks sake, as calling the Devil in a Crawler, a Serpent.

The last Argument we shall need to name, for width or room beyond the world, is from the same worthy Gentleman, and stands thus. *If God be in very deed in it, then such a thing is: But, that God is indeed in it, may thus be made out; that is to say, Because he may frame another world standing off from this, and then be in both of them as in this, otherwise he should not be every-where. And if he be in both, he must be in the room al-*

so

ſo that lyes between both, otherwiſe he ſhould be two in both, not one, this croſſing his one-foldneſs as much as the other did his all-fillingneſs.

Anſw. Had theſe Bugbears comen in the Van, they migh: have put on the ſhew of a forlorn of Bravoes: But having grapled already with ſo many Battalioes, and wrought our way through ſuch ſtrong faſtneſſes, we are not to be worſted by the reermoſt and very leavings. We ſay then in ſhort, That all this waſt ariſes from a miſtake, that God is every-where in the world ſo as to be coextended with the world: Whereas the truth is, Were there no ſpace at all, neither real nor counterfeit, (as none was, before he who made all things, made that,) God ſhould be as immenſe as he is for all that: As if there had never been any time, (nor was there, till God made timeſom Beings,) he had been as eternal as he is. As God by making of a body and real ſpace with it, every-where in which he really is, is thereby no more really in ſpace himſelf than he vvas before, or no more roomthily there than he vvas before; (What he really is, he vvas from everlaſting:) So by not making of a body, he is not leſs really in ſpace, or in imaginary ſcope: But let ſpace be vvhat it vvill, his every-vvayneſs or immenſity is the ſame, one not medling at all vvith the other.

I ſay then, That God vvould be in thoſe tvvo vvorlds as he is in this. As he is not here by halves, ſo neither vvould he be there. As he is not partly in one piece of this vvorld and partly in another; but vvholly in all, and vvholly in each, vvholly in Eaſt ſide, and vvholly in Weſt ſide, vvithout having any part of him in the parts betvveen: So he vvould not be partly in one vvorld and partly in another, but vvholly in both, and vvholly in each. And as for taking up the room betvveen them, either vvith vvhole or vvith part, the care is taken: for vve have already made it out, That there vvould be no room at all; and that vvhich *is not* at all, God *is not in* at all. While God is ſo in tvvo vvorlds, that though they do not touch or abut, yet there lyes nothing betvveen them; 'tis all one as to the one-foldneſs of his Being, as if they tvvo did touch, or vvere both made one: for there can be no more than nothing betvveen tvvo vvorlds that touch, or betvveen the very parts themſelves of one vvorld; in any of vvhich, and in every of vvhich, 'tis yet eaſily yielded God may *be*, and *be one* too.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

HAving hitherto treated of Bulk, How far it may be bigned? it follows next, that ſomewhat ſhould be ſpoken to the other hard Queſtion, How far it may be leſſened? And the rather, becauſe, if we have been lucky in making it out, That body by putting to it cannot be bigned beyond a certain bulk, it ſeems to follow by the laws of Analogies, That the ſame by taking from it cannot be leſſened beneath a certain ſmalneſs. And we have from thence this ground to ſet foot upon, That that which is not boundleſs one way, cannot be ſo another; or that that which is not infinite in its whole, cannot be ſo in its little part. We muſt then put an end to that puzling Queſtion, Whether a bulky Being be made up of a throng of cleaveleſs ſhreadlings? by bearing the Reader in hand, flatly, that ſo 'tis indeed. And that upon this ſcore too as well as any other; becauſe 'tis impoſſible to put ſo much as one jot or duſt unto bulk, beyond a ſet or bounded number: this finite world being the All of quantity, and nothing of outſtretchedneſs being beyond it or beſides it, ſo, at leaſt, as to have any thing to do with it: that it ſhould be likewiſe impoſſible to take from bulk,

bulk, ſo much as one jot or duſt beneath a bounded number.

Which while we are beginning to take in hand, it will well become us to ſhew firſt, what we mean by a Gr. Ἄτομος, Lat. *Punctum*, or *Indiviſibile*, and an Engliſh *Leaſting*. The crafty *Magnenus* new dreſſing his old *Democritus*, gives it to be *Materialis phyſicæq; extenſionis radix & initium*. Which may ſafely enough be owned as it ſtands, bating but its belongers bequeathed it by him, which are in no wiſe to be hearkned to, that is to ſay, Quantity under I cannot tell what Mathematical dimenſions or meaſures: For ſo he takes off the graveller, *Indiviſibile junctum indiviſibili non facit majus, quia tangit ſecundum ſe totum*, That His indiviſibles *ſuas habent dimenſiones ſecundum quas jungi cum extenſionis incremento poſſunt*: By which kind of Mathematical parts or meteneſſes in a Phyſical point, he does all his great feats in his whole row of Anſwers.

But 'tis to be wondred, that having ſhaken off *Ariaga*'s Mathematical points, and *Suarezes* way of making up bodies of parts and Mathematical points jumbled together, he could not feel himſelf, whilſt playing aloof off, to have wheeled about into the ſelf-ſame ſnare: For he ſays, *Neither by no means: but a natural body is made up of Phyſical points*,

points, made up of Mathematical measures. That is, 'tis not made of Mathematical points, but made of those things that are made of nothing but Mathematical points. A slie kind of body indeed, that is Mathematical at second hand, or linsey Physical woolsey Mathematical.

Wherefore we are about to say, That our atome *punctum* or leasting, is made only of body. And although it may be meteſom by Mathematical measures of the minds making, yet it is not made up thereof, any more than the greater parts are, or the whole is. But as to Physical measures, it has neither East side nor West side, North side nor South side, top nor bottom, this nor that, nor any thing that speaks twinship to any thing else, but is *it self* all that 'tis: and when you have said that, you have said all. So that if you ask, when it abuts upon another, Whether it touches *secundum se totum*, or not? Whether wholewise or piecewise? 'Tis answer'd, There is no such name belongs to it. For having maintain'd it to be a least part, 'tis impossible it should have parts in it; which, if any, must be less than least. And 'tis also impossible, that that Physical body which has not parts, should rightly be a whole, or a thing made up of that which it has not. Every Physical whole being made up of parts,

that

that which has no parts, but is it ſelf the leaſt of parts, can no more be an whole, than the whole nakedly taken can be a part. And every whole being greater than its parts, taken ſunderly, it would follow, that our leaſting were greater than ſomewhat elſe, or greater than it ſelf: Which would be a thwacker as unſpeakably big as that is little.

We are therefore in good ſooth to underſtand, That having pared off from body all its parts, we have alſo bereaved it of all thoſe bedightings or affections that belong to it, as having parts; of which the *wholeneſs*, laid in our diſh was one. And though we cannot thereby make it ghoſt or not body, becauſe we cannot tear from it pierceleſsneſs or impenetrability, which is the cloſeſt ſticker to a body, as a body leſſen'd; yet it comes ſo much the nearer to ghoſt, by how much the more it has thrown off the things belonging to a body, which ghoſt had not neither. As we found a now of time to ſpeak out Gods Eternity better than any other ſhare of laſtingneſs; becauſe it threw off more of thoſe things that time had, and that had not: ſo here, we can no more betemme wholeneſs to the one, than to the other: It being as good ſpeech to talk of the head or foot, right half or left half of a ghoſt, as of an atome. For

as

as in a ghost there are none of them, because there is *nothing of body* to fasten them to: So neither are they in a leasting: For why, there is *so little body*, that one would be the other.

What we have hitherto spoken, will seem to have less of auk in it, if we do but pattern our leasting of body with a now of time, which has no more fore and aft, than we say this has side and side; though it goes to the making up of that which has the former, as this does to the making up of that which has the latter.

And again, if we be but so good as to remember, That we have lifted our leasting out of the kingdom of the world, and seated it in the kingdom of the mind. For an atome by it self, unlinkt from the chain of all other bulks to which it hangs, is no where to be found but in that of our thoughts, any more than a now of time is, so singled out from time past and time to come.

But to speak more home or right down to the thing in hand, Whether a leasting touches another in its whole, or by its parts? Saying only in the first place, That the word *Touch* is none of the fittest that can be to come in here. For why, many things may close that do not touch, as the soul, for one, does with the body. We answer, That as we have said already, it touches according to

neither.

For why, 'tis not the one, nor has the other. So we ſay flatly, it touches according to its *pierceleſneſs*, *ſecundum impenetrabilitatem*; it ſo ſnugs *to* another, as not to be *in* another; and according to its *ſeedſom length*, *ſecundum longitudinem ſeminalem*, ſo as with another to make a line of two points. For not being a ſtretchling or *quid quantum*, any more than a now is an onwardling or *quid ſucceſſivum*, but only *quid impenetrabile*, ſomewhat unthroughfareſom; and having nothing in it ſaving the ſeed of bulkineſs, which, ſo as 'tis knit to more leaſtings, ſprings up; we muſt not look that it ſhould touch after what it has not, but after what it has. So put we but an atome to it, the ſeed of bulkſomneſs is ſo fat quickned, that length is begotten; cloſe but as many more ſidewiſe, up ſtarts breadth; ſo again, as many clapt to, upwards or downwards, and forth comes deepneſs. So that to the three meteings or dimenſions of a body, 'tis fit that eight leaſtings ſhould be clapt together: as it takes at leaſt two nows of time to make fore and aft, and three to make was, is, and is to come. Whence we gather, 'tis altogether from the buſineſs to hale any of theſe things in, when we are ſpeaking of one only: And nothing better is it, than pumping of two out of one, or taking the greater number out of the reſt, in Talecraft or Arithmetick. Not

Not much unlike is the cloſing or union between ſoul and body, which two together make up one man. The ſoul not being bulky, cannot be ſtretched out with the body; and not being unthroughfareſom, cannot cloſe ſo with it, as to be ſhut out from being in it. As it had not the latter by it ſelf, ſo neither had it the former in booty beme, or a power in ſeed, (or half ſeed,) to biggen the bulk of the body, or make it more as to any of the meaſures. The cloſe or oneneſs therefore between ghoſt and body, muſt be according to thoſe *powers* the ſoul or ghoſt *has*, whereby 'tis ſquar'd for the laying hold on or laying in with body, and not according to thoſe it *has not*. Now the ſoul has the trick or power in the ſeed to quicken body, when by ſuch and ſuch laws kept down to it, without flinching from it, neither taking up room it ſelf in the body, or eking out the body, by making over to it, ſeedwiſe, from it ſelf, any thing that is bulky or unthroughfareſom; and can withal beſtead it with a faſhioning or plaſtick ſpring of lifeſomneſs or animality, whence it grows, works, and begets its like from an inbred power; and has another feat to move the body: Which it does not by ſhoving or driving of it forwards, as a ſlouch does a crowd-barrow, ſtepping into the room which that leaves behind it; but, as the

the Ingenious *Monsieur de Cordemoy* has it, By having such stirrings of the body to answer such workings of the thoughts. Every thing must do as it self is, and as it tools are: And certain workings of thoughts are to a soul, what certain stirrings of parts are to a body, in the which the soul is hous'd: only the soul not agreeing with body, so much as in that one belonger of unthroughfarenes, when bewedded thereunto it cannot make it bigger; being lost in it, not lodg'd by it; but only better or nobler, as to its being or working. But now our leasting, being, while such, of a lower house, and made for the nonce to be knit unto more of its kind without piercing or being pierc'd, gathers thereby to it self a fresh train of hangers on in the body kind, or in *genere Physico*, which it would never reach to, but only in fellowship with them, as making up a bulk of such a name; no more than a part can take upon it those names or things which are suited to its whole, all together, as an whole: it self being an unthroughfaresom whatkin, having in it the seed of an half length, quarter breadth, and eighth of depth. Little otherwise, one sex, though compleat in it self taken, cannot by it self beget its like; but is, as to that, the half seed of it, and enkindles

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it

it as clubbing with another like power, from which two only that one muſt ſpring; each of which by themſelves have but the half or unlike ſeeds of quickning, as lock and key has of opening.

This kind of touching of things according to ſome one thing that is in them, and not according to others, puts me in mind of what is done of that ſort, not only between part and part barely taken *as abutting*, but between draught and draught or ſcheme and ſcheme as *medling*. Thus a certain gathering together of bracks or atoms, make that ſcheme in the ſtomack that we call hunger or thirſt; and another unlike one, makes that there, which we call a fulneſs, or loathing and ſpewing. Now wormwood has another draught in it, that touches or cloſes with thir latter, ſo as to make up the former; but it neither touches according to the draught of its root ſtalk, branches, leaves, flowrings, ſeed, juice, powder, water, maſh or conſerve, ſyrup, ſteepings, boylings, ſetlings or extract, ſalt, oyl or ſpirit: for each of theſe will do it, only becauſe this touching draught is more broken in ſome, and more tight in others; ſome do it more, ſome leſs. Now if it does not touch or meddle according to any of the fore-named, it muſt do it, as to that we have no name for, unleſs we call it a

Wormwoodneſs; it being a wormwoody ſtamp more or leſs printed upon each of them, and like wards for ſuch a lock, will perhaps clap in with nothing in the world elſe, but that *Set* of atoms which is ſometimes found in the maw of a feeder. On the other hand, *Aſarum* holds a ſcheme of an unlike make from wormwood, which ſhall put the ſtomack, when in good plight, into loathings and caſtings, as ſurely as wormwood ſhall ſtill and heal ſuch roilings; and this either in its raw juice or powder dryed in an oven: but do but boyl it, and then break up the ſcheme of it, and then if it changes or empties the body 'tis by ſweat, (ſayes *Rulandus*:) this then ſeems not ſo much to be done by its Rabaccaneſs, unleſs that of it may be boyl'd away, which cannot be bak'd away, as by ſome narrow draught that lies in juice and powder, made to lock with that other which lies in the juices of the ſtomack.

And now becauſe the reaſon why ſo many great underſtandings have leaned to the other ſide, holding the cleaveſomneſs of a body unboundedly, is from a willingneſs to be rid of thoſe gallers that twinge the brain of the ſtiff maintainer of this, it ſhall in the next place be tryed, Whether we can afford any reſt or good liking to the mind, by facing the Objections with ſuch Anſwers as the

the grounds we have laid down will allow us to build upon. And they will fall, not untowardly, under a threefold Head.

1. Such as hold to figure mainly.

2. Such as meddle with figure and motion together. And

3. Such as have to do with motion rather than figure.

Under the first of which, we are born in hand with this, That then a *Scalenum* and *Isosceles* would be all one: Thus.

A. B. C. is a *Scalenum*. The same must also, from the Doctrine of leastings, be an *Isosceles*, or even-sided Triangle: For fill but the Area with lines parallel to A. C. there must be then as many pricks or points in B. A. as in B. C. there being as many lines drawn from the one as to the other; and so B. A. would be equal to B. C. that is, the *Scalenum* would become an *Isosceles*.

Answ. It would not be so Physically, but only Mathematically: Thus namely, The lines drawn to the side B. C. do not touch it in *one* point, but the line B. C. bends so much

to a parallel with the lines drawn from B. A. to C. that they make the angles to be altogether in a parallel with at leaſt the *two laſt* points of the lines A. C. ſo that it may fairly hold as many points again, or be as long again.

The ſame Anſwer undoes the knot, That every triangle would be an *Iſopleuron*, That the diagonial lines of a *Rhomboides* would be equal, That the diameter of a Quadrangle would be equal to its ſides, That a Semicircle would not be greater than its diameter, As alſo, That of divers concentrick circles, the outermoſt would not be greater than the inmoſt; inaſmuch as all lines drawn from all points of it towards the Centre, muſt paſs through as many points of the other: With ſo many more of the ſame kind, as are not readily ſo much as to be named. All which, however done in Geometry, are much otherwiſe, or not at all done in Phyſicks.

Again, 'tis ſaid, A line of unequal atoms could not then be cut into halves; when yet 'tis as ſure as any thing in Geometry, that any line whatſoever may be ſo.

To which 'tis anſwered, That 'tis as untrue in Phyſicks, as 'tis true in Mathematicks. But becauſe a Phyſical leaſting comes not under the ken of ſenſe, according to the ſmarteſt reckoning that we can make with body,

body, Nevertheleſs, we may hold ſuch a body to be even with another, if ſenſe can find no unevenneſs between them, whether they be ſo indeed or not. That is to be reckon'd even, that cannot be found otherwiſe than even.

But thoſe which are harder to take off, are ſuch as come with figure and motion hand in hand, being a kind of mingled Mathematicks.

Thus it may be objected, That a wheel of manifold rims whirl'd upon its axletree, would make out uneven bows of circles, in even ſhares of time, the whole wheel being evenly turned, and the circles being ſome bigger than others: whence it would follow, That one atome in the inner rims, would be even to more than one in the outermore.

Now ſuppoſing the rims of the wheel to be brought from their bow into a ſtreight line, the ſame whirling force reſting in each, the Objection would fall in with the following (figure only changed;) to wit, That all bodies would then be moved with a like ſwiftneſs; the ſwifteſt running but through a leaſting of room in a now of time, and the ſloweſt creeping on even, ſo much in ſo much.

To this killing one, there have been a great many Anſwers forged by the men of

brains, and fine-ſpun thoughts. The cunning *Magnenus* takes his flight to Mathematical parts in a Phyſical leaſting, *Ariaga* to reſts intermingled with ſtirrings. But we having ſhut out Mathematical parts as to the making up of body, it cannot but be thought hugely miſdone, to tow them in here for the making out of motion; there being the ſame parts and no more in a body *mov'd*, that there are in the ſame *made*. And as for reſts, there being yet no reaſon ſhewn, why ſtirring ſhould begin after ſuch reſts, than why a body at full reſt altogether, ſhould of it ſelf ſtir, without a quickning joſtle from ſome other Being, or a freſh ſwing or poyſing from its lodging in the world; both the contrivances will even miſs of giving the mind that eaſe and reſt which the wittineſs of them might ſeem to have been worthy of.

The Anſwer then that we have been thinking of is this, That ſlower motions are made up of *ſtarts* and *bearings*, or ſpringſomneſs, (progreſſion and elaſticity): and that the ſwifteſt are either all *outſtart*, without bearings, or made up of ſpeed and *ſprightfulneſs*, (pernicity and *impetus*.)

For the better making out of which, we are to bethink our ſelves, That as the beginning of time had not fore and aft, nor the leaſt deal of body here a piece and there a piece,

piece, or *partem extra partem*: ſo neither has the *firſt ſpring* of motion any thing of *onwardneſs* or ſtirring, but only a pend or earneſt ſtrift fromwards, which we call *ſpring ſomneſs* or *bearing*. A thing though not motion, yet as much the beginning or ſeed of it and made for the nonce for it, as a now is of or for time, and a leaſting of or for body. And again, motion being *quid non materiale*, ſomewhat bodileſs, may-hap it ought not altogether to be ſcan'd and ſifted by the laws that ſway bulkineſs as ſuch alone: As time in which all motion is, and with which it began, has got ſome things belonging to it, that body cannot lay claim to.

Thus then, ſuppoſe a body ſlowly mov'd to begin at the bear or heave, and for one now of time to ſtart one leaſting of room, the next now neither to ſtart nor reſt, but to be in the bearing or elater, till the bearing be wrought up ſo high as to burſt forth into another ſtart of another atome, in another minute; ſo holding on bearing and ſtarting, till it comes to a full reſt, after the laſt ſtart and bear: For as motion begins in a bearing or *conatus*, ſo it ends in the ſame; and as the bearing took riſt from reſt, ſo it dies and falls into the ſame again.

Now although this Anſwer may at firſt ſeem chargeable, with the ſame hardneſſes

with that of girds and reſts; yet upon a narrower ſearch, it will be clearly found to be far and wide from it in the making out. For we having warily held, the ſtirr'd body not to be at reſt, or in a ſtound or pauſe at all, but alwayes to be either *ſtirring* or *bearing*, which *bearing* is no more *reſt* than 'tis *ſtirring*; as a leafting, though it be not *quantum*, yet 'tis far enough off from being *ghoſt*, and wants nothing but *more* of the *ſame* to make it *quantum*; or a now of time to make it fore and aft. We cannot then be charged with the uncouthneſs of bodies recovering motion of it ſelf, after the dying or breaking off of that vvhich ſtirred it. For how can that be ſaid to be *recovered* which was never *loſt*? Now motion is not *loſt*, but only *lockt up* in the *bearing* or elater: Foraſmuch as the *bear* is the *well-ſpring* of motion, as motion is the *off-ſpring* of bearing. As likewiſe the darting power in the hand or ſoul is not motion, but the riſt or ſpring of all that ſwiftneſs that is given to outcaſts. Now when motion is ſhifted or begotten in the thing mov'd or forthcaſt, this darting force or rally of ſtirring ſprings, is ſhotten or propagated alſo, and that firſtly and nextly too; it being the breeder, motion the child of it; the hand giving a kind of teemingneſs to the ſpring, which in its ſeaſon is brought

to

to bed of ſtartings. Whence 'tis, that until this loſes its enkindling or leavening ſtrength, the motion into which it breaks when ſwell'd up to an height, cannot be loſt neither; only it asks ſome time to heave or pend in, before it actually ſtarts; Whence 'tis that one body is ſlower than another in its motion.

Becauſe I find the meaning of the words do not ſquare ſo evenly with the notion, as I think that may do with the truth of the thing, (thoughts being eaſier to come by than words,) We ſhall ſtrive to imprint it on the Readers underſtanding, by ſuch likeneſſes as either Handicrafts or Nature it ſelf ſhall afford us.

Thus then the ſtirring of the hand or Index on the Dial-plate of a Watch, is as ſlow as any that we need to treat of; 'tis notwithſtanding, or ought to be, on and on, without ſtops or ſtands; and yet 'tis an hour creeping from hour-ſtroke to hour-ſtroke. Now when we ſee what a long thread of ſand paſſes the neck-hole of an hour-glaſs in that ſame time; four mile long, in likelihood at leaſt, ſuppoſing the running but as faſt again as the walk of a midling kind of foot-man, (when yet to the eye it ſeems far ſpeedier;) 'tis almoſt beyond the reach of thoughts, that the hand ſhould find ſo many atoms or leaſtings

of

of body to ſtep over one after other, without the leaſt ſtopping between the two ſtreaks, not above the ſixth or eighth part of an inch aſunder, as to be even with the time that the aforeſaid thread of ſand is poſting through the neck-plate of the hour-glaſs. But 'tis eaſie enough to underſtand, that the ſpring of the Watch, which is the ſpring alſo of the hands ſtirring, ſhould by its bear or elaſticity hitch it forwards, not ſo as to be alwayes ſtirring, or at any time reſting, but *creeper-like*, to be ſometimes *ſtarting* one point, and oftner *bearing* towards the next; the ſpring asking ſome minutes time to gather ſtrength enough, (as the arm does by fetching about) to give a ſtart or leaſt ſtirring, and ſome minute or minutes more to bear on towards a ſecond hitch: In the mean time that which bequeaths it this ſlow pace, and the wheels and ballance a pretty tight one, is a thing that is not ſo fitly ſaid to be ſtirr'd or in motion it ſelf, as lodg'd or lockt up in a bearing or preſſing poſture. So agreeable is the notion that we have been advancing, that the beſt key-keeper of motion is an elater or bear, where one would at firſt think it would likelieſt be loſt.

But it may indeed be ſaid, That this comes not home to the buſineſs of forthcaſt things; the ſpring or principle of motion being continued

tinued or close by the thing stirr'd, whereas the hand is sunder'd from that body which is thrown forth by it.

Answ. 'Tis but supposing that the spring of motion or an elater or elaters, as well as the motion flowing from thence, is also thrown off, (which ought in dartings forth to be supposed,) and then the business is much at one; unless it be that in things thrown, the stirring is swifter for the most part, and spends it self sooner: it being impossible to make over motion that may be lasting, without a spring of swiftness; and as impossible to hold on a swiftness, without the renewing of such a spring. So the greatest unlikeness between crowding and throwing is, That in the first it skills not whether there be above one spring, or few springs of motion, handed over at one time; for why, as soon as that one is, or those few are spent, another is, or more are hard by to follow, without any let to the going on: whence 'tis, that I can crowd a bigger body than I can throw, as I can give one or few springs, where I cannot give more or many: But as to the other, I cannot put a body off, without I bequeath it either such a spring as has another spring, or more springs in the belly of it, or else give it so many springs to keep at its breaking off from my hand, as it had

had when in it, and carried by it: otherwiſe it would fall down, as ſoon as the crowding or gird of the hand left it; or elſe go on but a little way, with a ſudden breaking off, from the nimbleneſs of ſtirring which it had before it parted from the arm that threw it.

A little further help may be gain'd, I think, by quoting a likeneſs of Natures own, wherein the ſtirring power is taken aſide from the thing ſtirr'd or quickned, and that ſtirring or ſprightfulneſs only lockt up in the *ſpring* or *ſtrift* to ſtir, which afterwards upon the taking off all clogs and ſtops, advances up to thoſe bounds that Dame Kind before had pitcht upon. The Inſtance is that of an egg, which we will take as a thing that ſprang from the *impetus* of the tread, the Harveyan tang, or contagion and egg-fry of Kerckring and *de Graaf*, to be what 'tis, after laid by the Hen. That which 'tis in motion towards as faſt as it can, (the little ſcar I mean, or *Cicatricula*) is a Chicken: But that there is no more of this ſtirring but what is hem'd and coopt up in the ſpring, while the body that imprinted it is broken from it, is clear from hence: For why, an egg that has been kept many dayes, and ſet under a breeding Hen, ſhall be hatcht no ſooner than one that has been laid fewer; and the oftner they cool by

by the Hens being long off her neſt, the longer are they in hatching; which is Argument enough that ſome ſtop or other was met with by the way; and yet upon a bare warmth or brooding ſhrowd, which only removes way-layers or bruſhes the paſſages, ſo giving ſcope for the ſprings of the ſcarr to leap forth into nimble freaks and briskneſſes, the *makings* towards animality are taken up a freſh, and carried on, after all rubs in the way, to that bulk and quickneſs, which Dame Nature had caſt with her ſelf to bring about.

That this is done, as I ſay, by only paring off encumbrances, and ſcouring the paſſages, or at leaſt not from any new ſprings or ſtirrings that are begotten, by the hoppings and friskings about of ſuch warm and lightſome ſteams, as may be thought to have ſwarm'd from the brooding hen, and crowden into the brooded egge; as a Watch or a Jack, by being only wown up, without thripping the balance or flyer, fall to work again: may, I think, even hence, ſeem more than a little likely.

In that a Snayl or Dodman, which is not only not warm, but to our feeling, very cold, is fain to brood its as cold ſweatty eggs, neſted upon a cold wet earth, beſpiewing them about with the fuzze of a cold

cold clammy froth, in coldish raughty weather, and all making way to a kind and timely hatching of them: And so needful is a kind of cold and sultryness to the doing of this, that as far as ever I could find by housing and turning of them, (when I have not only miss'd of the brood, but, for want of feeding their earth and froath, with cold and raughtiness, as it should be done, I have soon lost sight of the very eggs too;) that I say, I dare undertake to light sooner of that warmth and reek and air, that will hatch an hens egge, than that cold and dew and clamminess, that goes to the hatching of a snails.

And to say there may be warmth, though no body living could ever feel it, is as bad a put off as to say, that such a thing is sence, though all men in the world have ever taken it for non sence.

'Tis therefore somewhat likely, that a hens setting upon her eggs for hatching, is much what, with her brooding her chickens under her wings when they are hatcht; the one being to ward off quellers from the air, the other to shrowd them from those birds of prey that are scouting & sharking up and down in it. Whence a snail, whose eggs have other kind of foes, besets them with other kind of shield and buckler. Their set-

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ting being the caſing or houſing ſuch a tickleiſh piece of workmanſhip, that wind and weather may not ruffle and ſnarle it, or any ſtragling bodies clutter up its rooms and ſtifle it.

From which I think, without ſtraining, we may gather, that, if ſuch a ſpring as this is, may be tickled and rous'd up again, in which is bound up a whole ſet or draught of ſprings, ſome ſhaping or plaſtick, ſome bigning or growing, others barely ſtirring or twitching, and after all ſo long ſtinted and ſo often checkt; Well may one motion, of one ſort, after ſinking into its ſpring, or being wown up in it, be, by its inhidden power, when unfetter'd, brought on again to a kind of quickneſs.

Little otherwiſe a hoop brought to a ſtiff bough, and kept in it by ſuch a ſtrength as can cope with it, upon ſome after chance the hoop getting ground of its holdfaſt ſlips or ſtarts, by fits and girds, keeping ſtill its inward ſpringſomneſs, though in a leſſening way, that is in a ſcantling to what is ſpent or thrown off at every ſlip, until at length loſing all its ſpringineſs, it falls of it ſelf into the ſtillneſs of a reſt.

This to me alſo ſeems to be the main, if not the whole of Vegetative motion, or the waxings and ſproutings forth, which are found

found in all growers. For I take the ſeed (till ſome further experiment teach me better) to be a cluſter of bubbles wryed up ſnug, or a bottome of hoops or ſprings cloſely girt or knit together, which being a little looſned when ſown a while, by the bedewings of the raughty mold ſoaking in between its crevices, the ſprings ſwell and grow roomthy, and which follows thereupon, the boſomes or hollows are made wider, vvhence nevv moiſture or fogginеſs preſſes in, not at random, but moulded by the hollovvs into bovvs for the nonce, bedighted or impregnated alſo, vvith a ſpringſomneſs altogether fit, both to eke out that of the vvidned hoops, and alſo by a kind fermentation or buſtle of the vvorking or leavening particles, beget nevv ſprings, and then biggen the ſame, till the ſeed heaves up from a ſprouting or ſhrubble, to the ſcantling of height, bulk and grovvth, that nature has cut out for it, as a plant or as a tree.

But as in ſprings made by the hand of the vvorkman, if they lie too long bent, by reaſon of the ſvvarms of inſenſibles, drilling through their pores or ſpungholes, they may be ſo faſt ſtuck by ſuch as jump in die vviſe or cubically, as to have their ſprings choakt or benumm'd (as a piece of Iron by lying long

long in an odde posture, may by the same chance light upon a magnetism) : so the seeds of most or all growths, kept beyond their full time, upon the same score shed or loose their springinesses, and when sown become barren or unsproutful.

Only herein the motion that nature gives, is unlike to that which we bequeath to forthcasts. For why, she not only bedights them with many springs at first, but lays in spawn also for the begetting of more, and stuff for the greatning of one and other. Whereas when we give a dartingness to outcasts, we betemme them but one or a few springs, which by often spurts and flashes of motion, cracker-like, weaken themselves, till at length all ends in the calmness of a rest.

Again, if we go up to the stock of breathers, a step above these as they are a step beneath us, we shall find that *begetting the like*, is making over of springs ; and according as the begetter is hotter and smirker, or colder and listlesser, the bows are sooner or later bent and shot off. So while the lively eager Creatures do the business of their kind, in the while that we are speaking of it, a Toad (to name one of the cold and clammy kind) may-hap takes days to do the same. Thus I remember that towards the end

of *March* at high noon day, I was ſhewn a he and ſhe Toad engendring, which to be ſure had lyen ſo from noon the day before, how much ſoever longer they might or would have done, (unleſs the ſpring of the year being backward, and the mouth'd and vents of their bodies not yet opened, might happily lengthen out the time ſomewhat longer than otherwiſe.) And as it took ſo much time to ſet the *bowie frame*, ſo it ſeems he could not break off where he was very ſuddenly; for we had not only ſlit open the body of the ſhe, but were taking out the inwards before he could frame to get looſe of her, and yet, at that time, he hugg'd her only with his two forefeet, which he had thruſt ſo into the ſoft of her ſides, as to make two deep doaks there. So we ſee that man or beaſt fetching their runns with earneſtneſs, they can't ſtrike ſail, or notch the wheels, and crooſe the ſprings, at work within them, in a trice. And this alſo may be one cauſe why earthworms are limed ſo much to the headward, and hold ſo for an whole night. And why Slugs or Dodmans ingender in the neck, and are ſo many hours, if not days, in the limeing, to wit, that ſo the workhouſe for the ſprings may be nearer ſeated to the ſtorehouſe of the tools and ſtuff for that end, which is the brain and ſpirits. And why both of

of them too play the bees part in the deeds of their kind, each crowding into the other a roping, tough, silver-like thread of seed: (That both do the shees work also, I cannot yet find, but mistrust that Doctor *Swammerdam* might rather ghess so aforehand than know so.)

Because the quickening power of one, was not enough to rally together all those sparks of life, that lay asunder in a clammy dew, and were to be enkindled and hatcht up into a springiness of such a *set*, and so thrown off, but both of them must go hand in hand, in blowing of the bellows.

Nor is it altogether without remark, among those of our own kind, that the man, upon the account of his being stronger and springier does more, (as 'tis like will be found) towards the bequeathing of that hord of sprightfulness to the little one that is to be, than does the woman. (It seems not to be in the first blessing of growing manifold, for that was given *evenly* to both.) I know somebody, who knows a woman of understanding enough to make the remark, and of faithfulness enough to be believed about it, who took with child in the very fit of a Third Ague, (not to name many that have done so, out of the fit;) the latter being lost too, until brought to bed, for the former be-

ing got: when yet I have not found hitherto, (I know not what I may do, or others have done,) that a man under that diſeaſe, either in the fit or out of it, could be ſo much a man as at other times; though I have made the obſervation, where the man has had the bleſſing of off-ſpring all the years of wedlock, before and after, and the ground that was to be ſown that year in as good tilt as in the other, only the husbandman ſo much out of plight. Whence it ſhould ſeem that the life that is made over to the off-ſpring, is but a frame or draught of-ſprings, leavened into a breedingneſs, and ſtampt upon this or that which is beginning, and is either ſtronger or weaker, in more or in leſs time made over, as it happens that the Being which does it, can fetch them up, or ſlip them off. As unto the things thrown out by the hand, there is given forth a clue of ſprings, or ſtarts, and bearings, without any ſuch draught of them or breed in them, or plaſtick might in the thrower, ſo to frame or rank them.

But I would not here be underſtood ſo much at warfare with my ſelf, as if I took the ſoul of man to be a thing, that might body-like be ſome ways moy'd or thrown off; For having all along been driving at this, that motion or going on by ſteps, is ſuch a

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ſticker unto body, that it can no more belong to Ghoſt, than thinking can to that, I ſhould wonder at my ſelf, if I ſhould yield that to the ſoul as 'tis beginning to be from another, which it muſt by no means have to do with, when it is it ſelf and does like it ſelf.

That which I mean therefore is that The ſoul may be ſo one with a breeding frame or bud of body, as, for ought I know, to be *made over* together with it, when that is made over, and yet not be *mov'd* as that then is mov'd, any more than the thoughts of the heart walk when the body walks. And as a ſtrong breath'd and well ſet man for wayfaring, ſhall foot it with greater ſleight and more ſpeed, than one who is not ſo made; in like manner, another man whoſe plaſtick, ſhaping, or enkindling powers, are fraught with more of manhood, and quickned with a kindlyer ſprightfulneſs, may make over the beginnings of manlineſs to the beginning birth, with a livelineſs no ways unanſwerable. Life and Soul being two things with me, as are Spirits and Spirit; the firſt being the ſpringineſs of the body, in ſuch a well ſet frame, the other that which ſets all in man a going: both which as they are together in the *being* of man, ſo are they, I think, in the *beginning*

of man; *man* being the *ſon of man*, as *firſt-man* was *the Son of God*; the ſoul coming from God, nextly, to the firſt man, and from God through man, to every one elſe. Whole mans ſpringing from whole man, ſeeming, to me at leaſt, a main Doctrine in that Text, *Abraham begat Iſaac*. But, that the ſoul, which way ſoever we come by it, ſhould be any thing of that body which we are, I bleſs God, I never dreamt ſo much of Maſter *Hobbes* in all my life as to think it. And if any man elſe has had his brain ſo far blacken'd with that Writers Ink as to think, that body may be thoughtful too, and any ways aware, I believe he may have it pretty well wip'd off for him, with ſome papers from the hand of the Learned and Ingenious Maſter *Thomas Teniſon*, in a * Book, where 'tis hard to ſay, whether the arguments in the whole be more ſtrong, or the way of bringing them in more handſome, onely becauſe both of them are moſt of all ſo.

* The Creed of Maſter *Hobbes* examined.

Having thus far endeavour'd to reckon with the ſlow paced motion, and found, to our thinking, that 'tis a kind of thing that has got the fidget; and that bodies ſo ſtirr'd, do not gain for every minute of time, a point of room, but jogging on in a jiffling way, they

they lag behind at every bearing, as they come up more or leſs at every jetting: We ſhall go on to find out, whether there be not alſo ſomewhat of likelyhood, that in the ſwifteſt hurryes, and moſt glancing gobyes of the world, ſuch bodies do not glide through more than one leaſting of room, in one now of time.

That which has put me upon the gheſs is this, Time is ſuch a thing as neither mends its pace nor ſlacks it, but is always plodding on at the ſame rate, but motion is a thing that may be either hugely ſlow, or hugely ſwift, or elſe in the middle between both: Now 'tis but odde to think how ſuch a flicketing skipjackly thing as that is, which is always ſo much upon the ſnatches, that no body knows where to have it, ſhould be bound to the behaviour of ſuch a grave ſtayd thing as time is. Eſpecially having ſeen already that motion in its loyterings or ſluggiſhneſs cannot walk times pace, but is caſt back much or little as the ſtrifts are.

Now that the mind may cope with this ſo much the better, we muſt look back to ſome hints before treated of, to wit, That what is body and what is not body, ought not to be meaſured by the ſame laws of worldiſhneſs, or natural affections, any more than thoſe reaſonleſs breathers that live under us, are to

to be weilded by thoſe laws Divine or Moral, that are to ſway and bind the whole ſtock of mankind.

But now of things not-body there are two ſorts, Either ſuch as are bodileſs and no more, *non materialia*, or *non corporea*, ſuch as you may fancy time to be; or elſe ſuch as are not only bodileſs, but over and above ghoſtly, *immaterialia* or *ſpiritualia*; either of which may yet have to do with body, and in and through that, give tokens to us, of its being and power of doing.

Thus we find the ſoul of man to have buſineſs laid out for it in the body of man, by way of oneneſs with it. In which, beſides a ſort of mechanical or engine-like twitchings, and animal ſprightneſſes which are there ſet on foot, either by its power, or at its beck and good liking, it alſo cleaves to it in the advance to certain workings, of ſo lofty and refined an alloy, as to ſtamp man with the likeneſs and ſhew of him that made him, and withal trim up and faſhion him for the reliſhings of a world after this, where it ſhall be his bliſs to live with God, or his woe to be baniſht from him, world without end.

Then again, Motion, which is another unbodily thing, though it does not carry body into any ſuch lofts as ſhould raiſe it above its meanneſs when at reſt: yet in its med-

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dlings with it, 'tis whisking about riding and of the ſo manifold pieces of the world, that it gripes within the bounds of its wide verge all the reſtleſneſs that we are either juſtling with, or other things bang'd about by, within the whole ſcope which bodies have to play in.

Now this in its kind lying between ghoſt and body, partaking of neither, is rais'd up by both. Thus the ſoul of man and other ghoſts, holding upon the hand of the firſt Being, beget it daily; as he of himſelf, upheld by none, did at the firſt ſtir and impower other beings to do ſo and body alſo (if I miſtake not,) without ghoſt, give birth to it, in the rank of Beings next below man; or at leaſt beneath that of breathers; and this, according to the ticklenes of its lodging in the *machina mundi*, it does either in it ſelf or in another body. For I am ſo much of the mind, that matter or body moves it ſelf under God, as poys'd or poſtured in the frame of bulkineſs, that I wonder all or moſt men, that have lookt much into it, are not of the ſame mind too, there being (or may be) more bodies mov'd by body than by ghoſt, in the world. I ſee a body as ſluggiſh as iron, may be ſo clapt in with the knack of a Craftſman, as both to ſtir it ſelf, and conne its heavy neighbour a ſhare too.

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And I can't find in my heart to deny that skill to a World-maker, that I muſt needs give to a Watch-maker, not to ſay to that child, who has but ſtrength enough to wind that up, that he had skill enough to let ſo down.

And as it may be begotten by both, or bequeath'd another from both, ſo it may it ſelf belong unto both, though in a way ſo much unlike, that one word cannot well take in the meaning of it as it reaches both. For body being a ſtour unweildſom thing, or at leaſt a boaky unthroughfareſom thing, it cannot ſtir without asking another bodies leave to crowd by; whence 'tis, that this Motion, as ſuch, is ever onwardly or by degrees: But a ghoſt being never in the leaſt ſtinted in its way by body, is here, or there, or yonder, forthwith or in an inſtant. For if when 'tis here at *this now*, there be nothing to hinder it from being there or yonder, *next now*, it may be there or yonder then: And if there be nothing but body to hinder, there is nothing at all to hinder, all body being as throughfareſom to ghoſt, as 'tis ſtopping to body. But now this kind of leaping not being ſucceſſive, but all together, 'tis but even a leſſening and underly way of ſpeaking to call it *Motion*.

To apply this then, we are to lay down,

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That this hord of reſtleſneſs is evenly dealt out amongſt the ſundry Clubs and Cantreds of bodies, while time is one and the ſame to all and every one; inſomuch that it may fall to the ſhare of ſome body or other, to be more quickned or leavened with *degrees* of *motion*, than 'tis beſteaded with *pieces* of *bulk*; and thereupon behave it ſelf in the world, more after the laws of unbodily beings, than of thoſe that own body: things working according to that which they have moſt of within them. Now we having ſetled this, That ſpirits change their Beings here or there, in the *All* of bodies, far otherwiſe than bodies do when they flit places, as being now here, next now in the furtheſt corner of the world, without taking point by point the room that lyes between; and this power they have too, as being *not body*.

We ſay then again, That motion, a thing as truly *not body* as ghoſt is, may happily upon that ſcore be ſo far quickned, by ghoſt at leaſt, or ſo high wrought up in *its own kind*, as to hale the thing ſtirr'd in the utmoſt ſpeed, beyond the ſteppings of atome by atome, after its kind.

So a body having bequeath'd it one degree of ſturt or yerk, in one now of time, and hitching thereupon one atome of room may upon taking in ten or twenty degrees

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of the ſame, in the next, ſtart to many atoms in length. Now it being as eaſie for a body to take in ten or twenty degrees of ſtarting in one now, as to take in one, (Start or ſwiftneſs not being body in it ſelf, cannot be meaſured as intended in degrees, by that which meaſures body as extended in parts;) it ſeems not to bear very hard upon reaſon, that it ſhould alſo undergo the brunt of them as of one. As then the effect of one taken in in one now, was a ſtart of one atome of room in one now of time, the taking in of twenty ſuch degrees in ſuch one now, ſhould alſo beget a skip of twenty ſuch atoms in one ſuch now.

Though the ſoul ſeems to have much the better of it, as to the body, while in it, as doing things often againſt the grain of the body, and more like it ſelf, when the body cannot do many things againſt the ſouls will, nor any againſt its kind, though the things be never ſo friendly to body as body: Yet this ſway that the ſoul has over the body, will not help us out in the ſhewing, how body may be carried out to the doing beyond it ſelf, as ſuch, when rous'd up by a thing, not body, which has gotten the maſtery of it. For the ſouls buſineſs in the wagon or vehicle of the body, is not to ride it full ſpeed, but to breath it fair and ſoft, rather

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to ride in ſtate than to ride poſt, ennobling the body by its curious draughts and trails of enlivening ſprightlineſſes, not jading it in the great road of bare motion, which other ſtirr'd bodies are wayfaring in,

That therefore, whence I think a little light will dawn towards us in theſe miſts, is this, to wit, Some inſtance of Gods impowering ghoſt, either by bare leave, or by biding to boot, to run body ſo far off its legs, as to hurry it on nearer the pace of ghoſt, than that of it ſelf, yet without inſouling or inlivening of it. Thus, if any faith may be had to ſtory, we have tales enough to make a *Thomas* believe, that ſpirits have brought bodies into a room, in the twinkling of an eye, and by as clever a ſlight wafted them away in another; and that they have in a bodily ſhape told ſome, as at this *now*, what is done at a place, ſcores or hundreds of miles off, which upon ſearch have been found to have been *done there*, as near as could be driven, but the moment before it was *ſpoken yonder*: Of which, (to name one) the *Devil of Maſcon* falls not much ſhort, whether you look upon the feats done, or the witneſs of the ſtory that ſpeaks them ſo.

But to be ſure, one who could never miſtake himſelf, nor miſtel us, has ſaid flatly, that our Bleſſed Lord was ſo ſuddenly waft-

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ed into the midſt of his Diſciples, (*Luke* 24. 36.) that of above 22 eyes none could ſee him *coming thither*, till they beheld him *ſtanding there*. And though they might well believe their eyes, while he ſtood, that it was, a body by *ſtanding there*; yet 'tis ſaid they were frighted to think, that it muſt be a ſpirit in its *coming thither*: they being no more able to ken the body through the glancing of the ſpirit that brought it, than they could the ſpeed of a ſpirits glancing, even without body. And as his coming was thus over-quick, to be ſeen by thoſe eyes that can ſee from earth to heaven in a moment, ſo his going away from two, a little before, was of the ſame kind, (v. 31,) *He vaniſht out of their ſight*: not that the body turn'd to a nothingneſs, but to an unſeenneſs, (ἄφαντος ἐγένετο.) And ſuch, to end, was his farewel, *While he bleſſed them* he parted, and was carried up, ἐν τῷ εὐλογεῖν, αὐτὸν; *in* the very bleſſing he was carried. It was ſo ſoon upon it, that the Spirit of God did not think meet to ſay it was after it. Though indeed we read from one Goſpeller, That *after the Lord had ſpoken he was received up*; yet he does not ſay it was after theſe words of bleſſing, but might be only after what he was ſpeaking of foregoing: Or if he did take in this, he does not ſay *after* but μετὰ, which *may be at, among*, or *about*,

about, there, as well as it *muſt be elſewhere*, *Luk.* 24. 5. And if it be ſaid that our Lords Body was a ſpiritual body, we muſt alſo ſay, that if it was not *true body*, as well as *ſpiritual*, it could not be truly a *ſpiritual body*.

What we would gather hence is this, That if a body, whilſt a body, may be ſo over-ſway'd by ghoſt within it, as to bruſh through many atoms of room in fewer nows of time, it may happily be that that unbodily thing call'd motion without ghoſt, may be ſo far *intended* beyond what the body in which 'tis is *extended*, as to bring it to a like ſwiftneſs. So that if all the motion with which God at firſt quickned the world, were made over to one ſmall body, juſt holding way with time in its motion, and all the reſt at a dead ſtilneſs, time all the while holding on its even by-run, 'tis not methinks altogether unlikely, but that this body which ran even a breaſt with time, from the motion which it had before, ſhould now give time the go-by, with what it has gotten ſince, and is over-glutted with. But, to break off from this ſo great a ſtamme to the mind, rather wiſhing we could give more light in it, than bliſſing our ſelves in that already given, We go on to the following, which may ſeem to have beſet the mind as narrowly with wrack and night, as any of the foregoing.

We

We have it, with the former, father'd upon *Empiricus*, thus. Take a line of nine points, and imagine two least bodies pacing with even speed from the two ends to the middle, that they may meet there, 'tis needful that the fifth or middle point should be halv'd between them, there being no reason why one should engross the whole more than the other; when yet the places and bodies mov'd in them, are fore-taken to be altogether without parts.

To which by way of fore-runner, we an- answer, That if the Argument be of any force at all, it will hold as strongly against time's being made up of *nows*, as body's being made up of *leastings*. For suppose we these nine atoms of room to be run over by these leastings, in nine *nows* of time; each of them then must needs have run as well four instances and an half of time, as four atoms and an half of room, time being a thing to be halv'd as well as room: Notwithstanding which, we hold time to be made out of nows or instances, and so may likewise for all that, hold body to be made up of leastings or points; Only we have a divine witness to assure us, that time had a *first now*, but have only reason to bespeak us, that bulk has a *least part*: Whence we are not so ready to drive one *back* to infinity, as we are to drive the other *on* to it.

But

But then to ſpeak more home, we anſwer, That the middle point is not to be halv'd or ſhared between both, nor taken up by either; but the race of both ſhall end at the fourth leaſting. If it be askt, What ſtops them there, when there is another leaſting of room between them ere they can touch? I anſwer again, The laws of motion, in the round All of bodies ſtop them there, by virtue whereof 'tis impoſſible for a body to move through leſs than a leaſt of room, or to ſtrive to do it: Now the whole, or all that lyes between them being the leaſt that can be, if both ſhould crowd nearer, (and one muſt do it as well as the other) motion would be made in leſs than a leaſting of room: which is but a kind of more than the moſt of nonſenſe.

That they do not touch comes to nothing: for having taken them up as Indiviſibles, ſuch as can't be ſhread, we have thereupon made them Inviſibles, ſuch as can't be ſeen; and thoſe things that cannot be *ſeen at all*, cannot be ſeen *to touch* or *not to touch at all*.

But if you make two ſuch bodies as may be ſeen, ſo to run a tilt upon ſuch a line of odd leaſtings, we ſay they would meet and touch, and yet leave the odd atome of room between them too: For there are not two bodies in nature or handy-works ſo ſmooth-

ly outſided, but that being clapt together, would leave as many leaſtings of room between them, as thoſe they touch at indeed, and in the mean time ſhould ſeemingly touch or abutt at all, and by us be ſaid and thought ſo to do.

Beſides, we are to reckon here, That 'tis no unwonted thing in nature, for motions to be checkt, from a bare truckling to the laws of the world, or ſymbolizing with the ſcheme of the great All, without the leaſt hit or ſtop from other bodies that thwart them; as we have before ſhewn they would do, at the ſelvedge of the World, and centre of the Earth. Nor is this *Show* or *Phænomenon* harder to be underſtood, than that of two atoms falling from the two ends of the Earths throughfare line or diameter in even pace, and both ceaſing to ſtir further, with the central or *inmoſt* point between them, as here with the *middlemoſt*. It being demonſtrable, that neither of the two ſhould thruſt into it, and ſhut out the other, for this reaſon, Becauſe 'tis alike impoſſible, that both ſhould have the whole, (two leaſtings of body crowding into one of room;) or that each of them ſhould have half, the breaking that aſunder which is the leaſt that can be already, being only a breach of ſenſe, and nothing at all beſides.

Which

Which laws too, are ſo far ſpread as to take in ghoſt as well as body. For though we are ſure that body cannot ſtop the glancings of a ghoſt, the hardeſt or the ſtiffeſt matter being as throughfareſom unto that, as the ſofteſt or the yieldingeſt: Yet, to go no further than our own ſouls, we ſee them bound, by theſe wide reaching laws we are ſpeaking of, to the narrow cloſet of a mans body; which that the body do not lock up there for the ſake of its hardfaſtneſs or cloſeneſs, we are enſured. For why, the body is as faſt and unthroughfareſom when a carcaſe, as when enlivened: but when the body becomes a carcaſe by timely or untimely death, we ſee then the ſoul can do after the needings of its own kind, and fairly take leave of the body for all its cloggiſhneſs; not that it has ſprung any new leaks or ſtarting-holes to flie out at, but only that law which bad it ſtay till then, bids it go now. If you ask me then, What 'tis that keeps the ſoul ſo faſt within the quickned body? I anſwer, Becauſe the great law of its kind has ſet it no buſineſs to do any where elſe in the world; and for the ſoul to be, and be for nothing, or be againſt the law of its kind, which is as bad, would too ill tax, and too much ſhame the wiſdom of its maker. 'Tis a truth with a witneſs, That every thing in the world

is as much ſtakt down to its work (freedoms in free beings ſet aſide) by the law of its Maker, as the Groundſil of St. Paul's was by the tools of the Workmen. Yielding therefore but this, That the ſoul was once put into the body by God Almighty, to begin or carry on a ſhaping or plaſtick work of life, in ſuch bounds, of ſuch ſtuff, for ſuch a time; which muſt be ſo, or elſe, that the hairs of our head are told, or our time's in Gods hand, not ſo: It will as ſurely hold to that ſpot of the world, for that work, all that while, as all other ghoſts may do within the ſelvedge of it, or as the body would reſt where 'tis, if begirt in a mould of marble, to the bigneſs of the whole earths globe; the laws of the All of bodies taking like place in both. The reaſon of the latter being, not, that the body of man cannot drill through marble at all: For if God likes to impower it, it may, for ought I know, do ſo, as well as our Bleſſed Lord's could come in to ſuch a room, as where the doors were ſhut. But the main, if not the only thing in the way, is, That unleſs a narrower law be made for it, there is a wider already made againſt it. And ſure, to think of any other and thicker way of making the body the ſouls inholder, as if any ſtrings of it could bind it down there or the cloſeſt coat of it wrap it up there, would be

be all one with hedging in the Cuckoe, or laying of lime-twigs to catch the flying thoughts of it.

And that this law is not a law like that of right reaſon, and ſetled within, but ſome outward one, far above and wide of it, may be gather'd from hence; in that though we think it never ſo meet and wiſh it never ſo earneſtly, (if it be our mind and will only and not Gods) that we may go out of the body in life, or ſtay in it at death, neither will come to paſs, any more than willing to be rich will make ſo; our bounded wills not being of ſtrength enough to unhinge Gods unbounded power: Who hath withſtood his will, that is, of power or forecaſt?

If I agree with a Workman to build me on ſuch a plot of ground, an houſe of ſuch a ſize, in ſuch a time, with ſuch ſtuff as ſhall be laid him in, he not ſtirring out of it until he has ended it; though the doors or wayes be open, he cannot any wayes get out within that time, *morally* or *in right*: For why, I have ſo hem'd in that of him which is moral by the bargain, that that *cannot be done* by him that *cannot lawfully be done* by him, though he has ſtill the ſame *kindly* power of going out at doors or openings that other men have. And could I now as well bind him by laws of *nature*, as I have done by

those of *right* and *wrong*, (which God can do both alike,) I should then grasp *all of him*, as well as before I laid hold of *some of him*; and it would then be as well beyond his power to stir abroad *altogether*, as 'tis now to do it *lawfully*; and he would more surely, than with chains and bullwarks, be charm'd within that circle all that time. If God Almighty had said it with himself, That I shall ne're set foot in *Rome*; though my soul has the same power to do that for my body that another mans soul does for him going from hence thither, or that it should do for me if I went thither; yet I shall be as sure not to come there, as if I were way-laid with nothing but walls and sconces gulfs and quicksands. So much does each thing after its kind, bow to the laws of him that made it.

Much of this may be seen to in the Breathers below us, of which a bird, one of the most quick and flitting kind, is one. At a known time of the year, one of the laws we are speaking of, binds her to the sluggish trade of setting in a nest upon eggs, on which score alone it does it, in the open lightsom air too, and with more stilness than if tyed with strings, or born down with weights, and notwithstanding too, the kindly cravings of hunger and thirst, as seems from its leanness at that season, and all this from as certain

a cauſe as is that, by which the runner in a Mill does not ſink through the Lyingſtone, that is, a wide law of the Almighties. Afterwards the ſame law, that for the ſake of the eggs hatching, had tyed down the brisk and eager fowl ſo long, fore-caſting alſo for the young ones a coming, bids it ariſe; for though its fatneſs might be ſpared, yet its life cannot. And now, though the Coethy bird ſhould be as much bent upon ſetting and ſtarving, as it was before upon riſing and eating; yet, as then the ſtrength of the law overbound it to ſet ſtill and hatch, ſo now the force of the ſame overſwayes it to flie away and eat: All this while ſhe plotting no more, (without wiſer than we) than the ſhruff, moſs and hair, that the neſt was thwackt together of. In a word, 'tis ſo clear that the Shows or *Phænomena* of the world are weilded by unſeen laws, even the worſt of its ſhocks and jumbles, and not after thoſe thick roughneſſes that ſence beholds them with, that he cannot be any thing of a Chriſtian Philoſopher (nor can he be now adayes the latter, to ſpeak of, who is not the former,) that does not ſee, that even the Beings beneath us are led to do all their tricks, by a wiſdom far overtopping that by which we manage the moſt weighty and crafty of our own affairs.

The birds we have been ſpeaking of, build neſts with ſuch an auk tool, their beak varying too after the manifoldneſs of their ſorts and kinds, without either being ſhown or having tryed, more neatly than ſome men would do, holding the Apprenticeſhip to the craft of a Neſtwright and making it their daily work, with the meeteſt of tools. The Spider drives on the great buſineſs of catching flies, by netting in corners within doors, and darting in the open air abroad, from the beginning to the end, with far more layers of plots and traps than the cunningeſt Huntſman follows his game. If the Commonwealth of Bees were but as narrowly ſearcht into, as it has been curiouſly endeavour'd, happily it would ſhame the miſadventures of the cryed up Kingdoms amongſt the ſtock of mankind. To come more home, we find we could ſuck better at a week old, without ſhowing or trying, than we can do when grown up, by the help of reaſon and ſight of the thing done: for when we did it as ſucklings, we were ſteer'd by a wiſdom in its ripeneſs, too far outgoing what we laid claim to in the ſeeds and ſparklings to be named with it. Nay, to end, we may obſerve in our own elderly doings, and thoſe too of ſo low a rank as that of the bare ſtirring of the limbs, we are ſet on work after

higher

higher ſcantlings of wiſdom than when we put forth the loftieſt powers of will and underſtanding: elſe we can give no reaſon why a Fool ſhould riſe more Mathematically from a ſeat, than the wiſeſt man can fully reckon for; inaſmuch as the remark is as old as *Ariſtotle*, That no man can riſe off a ſeat without either bowing the body forwards, or drawing the legs backwards: but the ground of the thing has been ſo much in the dark, that it was but lately (that I know) hit upon by that great Light of *Cheſter* and the World, (now with the Father of Lights,) the excellent Biſhop *Wilkins*; who has brought it ſo to the lever of the thigh, as to make the middle of it the prop or thiller, the body the weight, and the leg the power; either of which being brought by a ſharp angle to a downright or perpendicular or more, with the thiller, will by ſo much leſſen the weight, from the yielded aſſumption in that mechanick power, That that point, which is toucht by a perpendicular from the centre of heavineſs, is one of the terms: Which kind of way made out to a fool, as an help to him to ſtand up from his ſeat, would ſooner fit the man that gives it to ſet down even ſuch another, than him any whit the more to riſe up, for being taught ſo, how he ſhould: but yet he can do the thing without ſhowing, and

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as moſt wiſe men do too, without ſo much as thinking how. So far do the laws we have hitherto been upon, bind and overſway the workings of all bodies, from the nobleſt beings in the world, to the tiny beſtirrings of the leaſt atoms, which led us into all theſe remarks.

CHAP. VI.

HAving thus ſeen how far body or the world of bodies may be bigned, how far a piece of it may be leſſen'd, and how ſlowly or how ſwiftly bodies may be ſtirr'd, The next thing to be handled is, Of what ſtanding the world may be, or might have been? Whether it might not have been ſo far of old, as to have had no beginning; or may not be ſuch a while to come, as to have no end?

To this we muſt ſay, That as we learn from holy Writ, that the world had a beginning, ſo from the grounds by us laid down, it could not chooſe but have ſo; It being as eaſie for God, who is without beginning, to have beginning, as for the world which had it, to have had none. God who is every way unbounded, may as well be brought down to the timeſomneſs of that which is bounded,

as

as that which is every way bounded, may be lifted up to the alwayneſs of him who is unbounded; the farneſs being the ſame, 'tis all one, for this to come to that or that to this, the Hill to come to *Mahomet* or *Mahomet* to the Hill. If it be ſaid, That Gods coming down to the world would ungod him, but not the worlds coming up to ſomewhat that he is. I ſay, the worlds driving up to any thing of Gods being, would as much ungod him, and over and above unworld it ſelf. For it does as much ungod him who is everlaſting, to make another ſo, as it does to make him not ſo; for why, if he be not only everlaſting, he is not everlaſting at all. Two times may as well drive on by each others ſide, and not be one, as two everlaſtingneſſes; and two things unbounded in bulk, may as well dwell together in the ſame unbounded room, and not be the ſame bulk, as two things unbounded in laſting, may dwell together in the ſame abiding, and not be the ſelf-ſame abiding.

If God has the *whole perfection* or fulneſs of everlaſtingneſs, then cannot the world go ſhares with him, without he ſhould ungod himſelf, by making himſelf leſs perfect; and if he has it ſo wholly, as that whole thing to be himſelf wholly, then cannot he make it over to another, without making

that

that to be no other but himself. Insomuch that I do think the begetting and forthstepping of the Son and Holy Ghost could nere have been, had they not been Very God of very God.

If any shall say as some have done already, that the world is somewhat *besides God* for all his boundlesness, and has a bounded fulness or perfection, over and above his boundless perfection, and so why may there not be *infinitely more* than gods infinite *whole perfection* as well as *finitely more*? I answer, Methinks whoever says it, speaks thick, in both meanings, as taken for hasty and gross too. For though the world be somewhat that is *not God*, yet 'tis not somewhat that is *not Gods*; 'tis not *he* but 'tis *his*; *'its* perfection is *his* perfection, and so his, as that it had never *been his* nor never *been*, if he had not *been Infinite* or Almighty. Had the world or any thing else perfection or being, though in never so low and scant a way, and not springing from God, I could not tell how to think God an infinite maker; something *being made*, or *being*, that he did *not make*: but that Gods making a boundedly perfect world, from his unboundedly perfect power, should be a taking up of, or lessening to, that his whole perfection, I no more conne, than that a mans doing a thing wisely

wiſely, ſhould make him not to have the whole of that wiſdom which he had. Indeed if God were ſuch a kind of Being, as ſome have made him, by ekeing him out with boundleſs ſcopes, nothing could then be roomthy beſides him, without carving a piece out of him. Which he that ſtickles ſo much for ſhould do well to mind a little the twitchings of; For ſure he muſt be ſtockt with forehead, as well as brains, to hold it.

As that Bayard muſt ever be as bold as blind, that comes hobling with his blundring houghs, on Hallowed be thy name. God is an infinite maker as well as an infinite God, infinite in doing, as well as in being; when therefore he does or makes, he does or makes *ſomewhat*: but that that *ſomewhat*, ſhould end in a thing that is not God, falls out by *luck*, and is not a thing that *muſt be*; for Gods making of ſomething *into nothing*, is as much an Almighty work, as making of ſomething *out of nothing*. Whence I think, that God by making any thing, does not make any *new perfection* beſides, or out of, his own, which is the whole infinitely; but gives a *new ſhow* of it, in that, which ſtill lives, or moves, or has its being *in him*, not *out of*, or *beſides* him, as when he benothings a thing that is, he does not benothing any per-

perfection, it being too hard to think how that can be an infinitely perfect deed, as all his are, but only ſhift the *ſhow* or *ſight* of his own infinite whole perfection, which is not more by doing this, nor leſs by doing that; (or gives the ſame in another dreſs).

The way to drive the world up to everlaſtingneſs, is not to give it a being ſooner and ſooner, on and on: For when you have driven it as far as you can that way, you are as far off from Gods everlaſtingneſs as when you firſt ſet out; and 'tis no better than if you ſhould go about to make a man as wiſe as God, by making him every day a little wiſer than other. We have ſaid it and muſt ſtand to it, that Gods everlaſtingneſs is a beginningleſs, endleſs *now*; and if you mean, to get the world to go ſhares in it, you muſt turn its way of being one *now* of time after another, into that of being all at once, or you do nothing; any more than you ſhall make it allfilling, unleſs you can put it out of its wont of having here a piece and there a piece, into the way of being altogether.

If otherwiſe, look for brain-breaks from ſuch kind of killing things as theſe; As an infinite tale of years to have run before the time in which the world, as 'tis, began; and that is ſuch a *cannot be*, that we need ſay no more

more againſt it, becauſe we have ſaid enough already: and then a more than infinite tale now, becauſe more have run by now, than had then: and a more than that more, becauſe more are to come to the end of the world, than have already been: and then a moſt behind that after more, for why there is to come an unknown tale of years after the worlds end: and after that after as endleſly as ever were before. Thus ſhall we ſort out eternity into as many kinds and lengths, as the *Darbyſhire* huſwife does her puddings, when ſhe makes whitings and blackings, and liverings and hackings: and 'tis pitty for fooling ſake that we cannot tye a ſtring at the ends of all alike. But ſtill that which kills after all this death is, that in this infinite tale of years, more than infinite, more than that more, and moſt at the end of it, there muſt yet have been a more infinite than all thoſe infinites of moneths, and in that a more than that infinite of weeks, and in that a more than that infinite of days; in that, a more of hours, in that, of halves quarters and moments: and yet the firſt infinite tale, as much as all of them together, neither more nor leſs.

Pag. 400. 402. And if any man think to come flouriſhing off with this, *That 'tis not the infinite ſucceſſion but the infinity of the ſuc-*

ſucceſſion that thus wracks the mind, and that it would bear as hard upon any other infinite but Gods, that is. I think ſo my ſelf and would have others think ſo too, that a things infinity in whole, which is finite in parts, is enough to crack all the ſtrings in the back-bone. Therefore all the hurt I wiſh men, is That as they love their eaſe, they would never crack their brains nor rend their ſouls, with thinking that there are any ſuch things, while they live, but only in the Mathematicks, where ſuch *are ſuppoſed*, but *are not*, nor ever were ſaid to be. And then, as for Gods ever bleſſed and only infinity, to a man who is as he ſhould be, it comes as full of good cheer and heart taking, as the other comes empty of it.

Pag. 413, 414. Our Author indeed is clearly of the mind, the world might have been from everlaſting, and that for ought I can ſee for theſe reaſons only.

'Tis clear, ſays he, the world might have been made ſooner than it was made; and if there never was a time in which the world could not be made, it follows that it might have been made from eternal ages?

Anſw. Before *world* was, there was no *ſoonerneſs* at all: and therefore the *world* could not have been *ſooner* made than it was. And the reaſon why there never was a time

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in which the world could not be made, is only this; Becauſe there never was any *time at all*, till the world that was the firſt time-ſom thing, was made, and by it time was. Nor does it follow from thence, That it might have been from eternal ages; For why, there were no ages at all, until that which began at the beginning of the world.

Secondly, Pag. 415. *Could not God* then *make the world*, when *he ſet with himſelf that he would do it? What bound him up, that he could not give ſhew of his power, together with his will?*

Anſw. The words having a twofold meaning, one true, the other untrue, I ſay he could, and he could not; he could in one meaning, and he could not in another. The *when* has two faces, one with which it looks *inwards* into the decree, the other with which it looks *onwards* unto the world. As to the firſt, 'tis not true; as to the latter, 'tis. God could bring forth the world at that *then*, *wherein* or *when* he had caſt with himſelf the world could afterwards be made, and that was *when* it was made: But God could not do it *then*, *when* he was ſetting with himſelf to do it *afterward*, (if I may word it ſo to be better underſtood;) and that *when* only was from everlaſting; for he had decreed from everlaſting, that he would do it in time,

and it could be done no otherwiſe.

That forecaſt or decree by the power of which the world was, was nothing but God forecaſting or decreeing; and if the world had been of as long ſtanding as that was, that had been God too. That everlaſtingneſs that made one to be God, would have made the other ſo. Inſomuch that the Argument is nothing but this, God was from everlaſting, therefore the world might have been ſo too. And that is indeed a pretty little brat, that has been ſo lovingly dandled by *old Father Hobbes*, that it will never call other man Daddy while the world laſts.

Methinks decreeing is ſo much *forecaſting* or *foredooming* that which is to be, and is not, till ſo foredoom'd, that do but once yield that the world was, becauſe God from everlaſting did decree it ſhould be, and for the ſake of that alone it cannot be from everlaſting. The world being *no world* but as it was a *decreed world*, and the decree by which it was ſuch, being from everlaſting *decreed*, and never a *decreeing*, then I ſay, The world muſt be after the decree, not in the *paſſing* of it; for it was ever *paſſed*, never *paſſing*. So the decree *paſſed*, was the cauſe of the world *made*. Now the decree which was *paſs'd* before it, being *from everlaſting*, it was thereupon *from everlaſting before it*. So that by making

making the world as much as you can of old, you can make it no more everlasting than 'tis; for it would always be alike *after* the decree, which was *from everlasting before it.*

If you say the world was just as everlasting as the decree, rather made in it than by it, or upon it: Not to say, How can that be made, that was never a making? I say then, The world must needs be before ever God was aware of it, or could ever decree it; and so as much the cause of the decree, as the decree of that; and the decree as much a *worlded decree*, as the world a *decreed world*; and that decree being God himself, he must be also a worlded God, or a begoded world.

'Tis still a truth, and owned such, That what binds up God from doing, binds him also from willing: But as God had not a power from everlasting, to make the world from everlasting; so neither did he ever will it should be so: but his will from everlasting was, That it should be in time. Accordingly his power holding an evenness with this his will, brought forth the world at that time and no other, than we read it took beginning.

Obj. There is yet another Argument much befriended by the same hand, as also to be met with good broadly somewhere in the

Morean Philoſophy, and that is, *Why could not God as well make the world everlaſting* a parte ante, *on the behalf of formerneſs, as he did the ſoul of man* a parte poſt, *on the behalf of latterneſs? Why could not the one as well have no beginning, as the other no end?*

Anſw. This all flows from a very great miſtake about the very being of that thing which we call *Everlaſtingneſs*. Gods everlaſtingneſs, and that of the ſoul, are two things under one name; and ſo wide aſunder too, that they lye infinitely off each other, as to their very kind. As Gods everlaſtingneſs was always without ſucceſſion, ſo 'tis now, and ever ſhall be. And as the everlaſting ſoul of *Adam* has liv'd as ſucceſſively ſince his death, as the world it ſelf, that we ſee holds on to do ſo ſtill; ſo ſhall it abide for what is to come, as it has for that which is paſt. it ſhall never wear otherwiſe than it has or does. And it ſhall never be ſaid, That his, or any mans ſoul, has liv'd to an infinite number of minutes; but whatever minute you pitch upon, in the boundleſs laſting of the ſoul, it will have a bounded tale of minutes behind it; and it ſhall never live in other to come, than ſuch as are already paſt; the ſoul being rather indefinite than infinite in its abiding, rather of an unmarkt laſting than everlaſting; and that everlaſtingneſs

or

or endleſneſs which it has, (ſo call'd,) ſhall come no nearer Gods everlaſtingneſs or endleſneſs, than if it laſted only for a while, and then ended: For ſtill it ſhall be rightly ſaid, That God is every way infinitely beyond the ſoul, in his way of abiding. Gods everlaſtingneſs is without beginning and without end; and theſe two are ſo together, and bound up in one, that you can no wayes halve them, and ſay, This half is unbeginningly, and that unendingly; this unlike the ſouls abiding, and that like it: For that is this, and this is that in God, and both are one, and one God too, and you can no more ſunder them than cut a *now* in two. From everlaſting to everlaſting is God's whole eternity, and nothing leſs can be it, or any thing of it; If it be otherwiſe dealt out, we muſt remember, 'tis for our ſakes only.

But now the alwayneſs of the ſoul is ſuch a thing, as of which it may be ſaid, it evermore was not, as well as it evermore will be. Now as that which evermore was, ſtands off infinitely from that which evermore was not, ſo does Gods everlaſtingneſs, which was the former, from that of the ſoul which is the latter. And as for that which is to come, the ſoul muſt creep on to it ſtep by ſtep, now after now: Whereas to Gods everlaſtingneſs, as there was nothing before it, ſo there is no-

thing to come after it; nothing to come, nor nothing past in respect of it; but all to him is *now*, and he is shier out of the length of our line, from everlasting before it, to everlasting beyond it.

Should it be otherwise than we have said, this unbecomingness would tread upon the heels of it, to wit, That the world might as well get up with Gods all-fillingness by growing bigger, as with his everlastingness by growing older. For let us but suppose the world every week it lasts, to wax as big again, (he that made this in six dayes, can make it as much more in six more,) and to have the same everlastingness the soul has, or might have had; if by its *ever* growing older it would reach or hold up with Gods everlastingness, then by its *ever* growing bigger it would reach or hold out with Gods all-fillingness: ever to ever, or infinite to infinite being the same.

Why could not God make the world boundless in its bigness one way, as the soul in its lasting another way? As suppose an infinite line to cut the infinite roomthiness in the midst, (as somebody will shew you how,) might not God have made in one half, a Being boundless in bulk one way, so as we might say, that God were infinitely beyond the bound of its infinity one way, as well as

say,

ſay, God was everlaſtingly before the beginning of our everlaſtingneſs one way. Its immenſity might as well have a firſt part as to outſtretchedneſs, and no laſt, as our everlaſtingneſs have a firſt now of its abiding, and no laſt. Extenſion that is infinite as to bulk one way, is no more uncouth than an abiding that is everlaſting as to length one way.

But now ſhould there ever be ſuch a thing as this, it muſt needs ſhare in the half of Gods all-fillingneſs; but ſeeing that Gods all-fillingneſs cannot be halv'd, but is what it is wholly, and this is what it is halfly, it follows, That becauſe this Being cannot reach half of it, or all of it, it can reach none at all of it. In like manner, Gods everlaſtingneſs not being to be halv'd, any more than his all-fillingneſs, the everlaſtingneſs that the ſoul has, muſt reach the whole of it, or none of it.

Beſides, the thing would be too ill matcht with it ſelf, ever to be at all. If that which is once infinite can never be finite, 'tis impoſſible, that even while 'tis infinite it ſhould be finite too, infinite one way and finite another, whether it be ſo in its laſting or in its roomthineſs. Finite one way and infinite another, is worſe than man one way and horſe another, or woman one way and fiſh another, which yet is that Centaur and Mere-

maid, that never were but in the wildeſt thoughts of him that ſometimes roved at them.

But indeed the ſelf-ſame Writer has told us roundly, (p. 399.) *That Gods being everlaſting, is nothing but his having the root of it ſo in him, as to be call'd everlaſting in the ſelf-ſame meaning that the ſoul of man is; not that it has been together with that which is to be, but that 'tis put into ſuch a way that it muſt needs ever abide, and be* together with *every* now, *when once it comes. But that God ſhould be* in actu, *or already, together with thoſe moments that are to come, is both* abſurd *and* impoſſible.

Now I muſt beg leave to ſay, That however this everlaſtingneſs may ſet well enough upon the thing that Mr. *Hobbes* has made a God of, that he might play with him: yet I am ſure it would full ill become that God who has made us, that we might worſhip him. For I will be bold to ſay, 'tis prov'd, the ſoul ſhall never have liv'd everlaſtingly, and that that everlaſtingneſs which the ſoul has in the root, and is to come, is of the ſame kind with that abiding which it has already grown up to, and is paſt: Nor is it any thing elſe but time eked out, now after now, a laſtingneſs that is indefinite, but not finite; for why, a thing that is finite backwards, cannot

be

be infinite forwards, any more than a thing may be boundleſs in bulk one way and bounded another. Now, that God Almighty ſhould have an everlaſtingneſs that is as much finite as infinite, growing as grown, or be only indefinite, is a thing that I will not call by its right name: but be it as it can be, it lights full upon the head of him that ſays, Gods everlaſtingneſs is ſo ſtrainedly ſuch as that of our ſouls is. If it be allayed with this, That only that part of Gods everlaſtingneſs which is to come, is akin to ours; he that ſhall do it, is himſelf more akin to *Waltham's* Calf, that was to ſuck part of that Bulls milk that had none at all. He that breaks aſunder Gods everlaſtingneſs, breaks the Godhead; for why, his everlaſtingneſs is no leſs than his very Being: and he that makes part of it like to ours, makes the whole ſo; for whatſoever part you pitch on fore or aft, it is the whole, and *now for evermore.*

The ground we go upon here is this, That whatſoever God is, or is in God, is *actualiter* or in a readineſs, and that he is not towards any thing which now he is not, or in *potentia ad aliquid.* That the bare Eſſence or Being of God is ſo in *actu* or forthwith, that 'tis as impoſſible he ſhould be in *potentia*, as that he ſhould be leſs perfect, is owned as well by our

our Author as any man. But I ſay then, That Gods everlaſtingneſs muſt needs be as much in a readineſs, becauſe Gods *Being*, as 'tis everlaſting, is as far from *not being*, and as every way *perfect* as his Being barely taken. And if that be reaſon enough to make one actually or forthwith, 'tis ſo too to make the other; the latter being bound in the former, and Gods *being alone* without *being everlaſting*, not being at all, but as we think it, by it ſelf. If then Gods Eſſence or Being, taken *only* as ſuch, cannot be made up of being and not being, neither can that his Being, *taken as everlaſting*; the *everlaſtingneſs* of it being as much of the Eſſence as the *nakedneſs*, and rather too, inaſmuch as one is, the other lonely, is but thought. If then Gods being as ſuch, ſhut out as well the may be, *poſſe eſſe*, as the may not be, the *poſſe non eſſe*, Gods Being as ever being, ſhuts out both too; elſe God ſhould be more perfect in the being which he has *ſunderly* in our thoughts, than in that being which he has *truly* in himſelf. If that of Gods *everlaſtingneſs* which is to come *may be*, but *is not*; then that of Gods *Eſſence* which *it* is, *may be* alſo, but as yet *is not*. He then that ſayes that Gods *bare Eſſence* muſt be *forthwith* or *actu*, but his *everlaſting Eſſence*, or his everlaſtingneſs which is all one, muſt be *forth-coming* or in *potentia*,

muſt

muſt either ſay he does not know what, or he does not care what; it being true blew *Gotham* or *Hobbes* ingrain'd, one of the two.

To make it yet out, that Gods everlaſtingneſs muſt be like that of the ſoul, growing ſtill more and more, our Author goes on, by ſhewing the aukneſs or great abſurdity on the other ſide, which is, *That all that which is to come ſhould already be.*

That that which is ſo unto us ſhould already be with us, I acknowledge is auk enough; but that that which is ſo to us, but not to God, (to whom nothing can be to come or paſt) ſhould be *now* together with him, is no more odd, than that that which is a great way off in place from us, ſhould be at hand to God-ward. As for what we read in Holy Writ, that God was, and is, and is to come, 'tis a coming down to our meanneſs: As when he ſaid, *Before* Abraham *was I am*, and *This day have I begotten thee*, who was begotten from everlaſting, he kept as near to the thing that he was, as he kept off from the Grammar that we ſpeak by. And if we ſhould but reaſon from the likeneſſes that God has given us of himſelf to other things, as 'tis here done from the likeneſs given to time, unto his being ſuch indeed, we might eaſily make as odd a thing of the Godhead. as ſomebody elſe has done of his everlaſtingneſs. Be-

Beſides, 'tis owned too, That all the moments which are to come ſhall never be, [p. 399.] and therefore God ſhall never be together with them. Not to ſay how hard 'tis, that that which is not at all, nor ever will be, nor can be at all, nor can come nearer at all, ſhould yet be a coming; I muſt yet mark, that this onward everlaſtingneſs which is faſtned upon God Almighty, is all along made up of things which before were not, afterwards are not, and leaves ſtill beyond it things that never ſhall be: So that Gods everlaſtingneſs, or everlaſting God, is made up of ſomething that now is, and ſomething that was and is not, and ſomething that neither is, nor ever was, nor ever will be: And that is a ſomething that never was ſomething, nor is now ſomething, nor ever will be ſomething: but a ſomething that is now nothing, and alwayes was nothing, and alwayes will be nothing; unleſs the Reader will let it be ſomething that is now awke, and alwayes was awke, and alwayes will be awke.

But we are not only to be burden'd with *awke*, but knockt down with a *Can't be* too. For ſo we read, *If there be nothing to come of Gods infinite ſucceſſion, then 'tis come to an end: but 'tis a Contradiction that what is unbounded ſhould ever be ended: 'tis there-*

fore

fore impoſſible *that God ſhould be* in actu *or at hand with that, which is not ſo yet, but will be.*

This indeed ſmells pretty ſtrong of quirk, but reliſhes as faintly as may be of reaſon. For it has no crutches to lean its crippled burden on, but what we have already pluckt from under it, to wit, a ſucceſſion in Gods everlaſtingneſs; whence 'tis thought becauſe things are to come to us, who are growing onwards, they muſt be ſo to God likewiſe, who is not, but calls the things that are not as though they were: and I think enough has been ſaid to ſhew, that neither is extendednes the meaſure of Gods immenſity, nor is ſucceſſive laſtingneſs the meaſure of his eternity. But if the man who is ſo all to benighted, will needs be ſetting up a *Will in the wiſp*, no wonder if the glare of it ſometimes roblet him into bogs and marlpits.

But if another gates anſwer muſt be given, I do ſay, that when ever any man dogs me with this, If there be *nothing to come* of Gods eternity *tis at an end?* Then will I ſay too, If there be nothing to come of *half* of it, that *half is at an end.* So at the very time of my writing this, *Half* Gods everlaſtingneſs ſhould be fairly tript off; and though God Almighty were *whole God* from everlaſting, yet he is to be but *half-God* to ever-

everlasting; his everlastingness being of his very Godhead, and this halving of it being a knack of our Authors owning long since. Again I must say, If there be no *part* of Gods immensity *beyond* the room where I now am, then tis wholly here, and if wholly here tis wholly finite; for such is the whole room that is here: But tis a Contradiction that boundless being should be bounded. For the rightning of all which there is nothing in the world to be brought forth but this, that He that talks of one or other, talks idle, and jumbles holy Ghost and body, lastingness and everlastingness both together, which should always be kept wide asunder. *Something to come*, and *part beyond*, have nothing to do, with Gods everlastingness or alfillingness, but are wholly taken up by body and time. And because we see that every body has a middle and that our lastingness has an onwardness, we are hasty to make over these to God and his everlastingness: Whereas nothing has a middle, that has not two ends, between which the middle must evenly be, nor is any thing growing older that was not sometimes young, or young that was not sometimes nothing: If then Gods Eternity has neither beginning or end, he must be hugely out, that talks of the middle of it; and if God were

were never younger than he is, he is but a brainſick wight that dreams of his growing older. If nothing of his everlaſtingneſs be paſt, nothing of it is to come, and if any be paſt then ſomething of Gods being, was, but is not; and if any be to come, then ſomething of Gods being is not yet, but forſooth ſhall be, and yet his own ſelf ſtiffly and rightly holds, that Gods being *as ſuch* is altogether in a readineſs or *actualiter*. Now do but put theſe two together, and ſee how huge luckily and unluckily they ſpell *abſurd* and *impoſsible*, which yet are the two hard things that are caſt into the Folks diſh for them to gnaw upon: Sometimes he that is buſie in hurling ſtones at random to pelt other mens Geeſe, may unluckily brain ſome of his own Swans.

Though the thing we are upon be ſo a *Noneſuch*, that there is no other thing in being, or can be, to which we may fully liken it, yet ſome things there are by our looking unto which, the underſtanding, I think, will a little the better cope with this. One is the way of the ſouls being in the body, or together with it. Let us then with *Michaelius* (a late *Hoorns* man) take eternity to be as it were the ſoul of time as then the ſoul takes in all the body, without being partable as that is, but being as cleaveleſs as if it were

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but the leaſt point of it; So eternity hems in all time, without creeping on & on as that does, but being as free from all ſucceſſion as the leaſt now of it. Little otherwiſe Gods working or knowing differs from ours, as ſealing or printing does from limning and drawing, one asking time, and the more done the more time; the other is done in a moment, and much may be done in that moment as eaſily as a little.

Another likeneſs may be that of the wheel, beſet with a row of cogs or pegs, in the whirling about of which, to an eye that is plac't within, the ſtirring of each cog comes into ſight, one after other, all on a row; ſo that the firſt look't on, muſt turn about to the point at which its ſtart began, before all of them can come to be ſeen; but to an eye that is ſeated without the wheel, the running of the wheel is taken in the twinkling of an eye. Now God is beyond the wheel or line of our time; for why, he is beyond the ſelvedge of this our timeſome world, by way of perfection, that is, not ſtowage, to him then the whole wheeling about or revolution of times, is as much in an inſtant, as the leaſt now of it is to us.

Nor is it right down trifling to mark how time has a great deal of its length or ſhortneſs, from the plight that our ſouls or bodies

are

are in: for when we are ill at eaſe, the ſhorter time is alwayes long, and the wheel thereof drives on heavily; but when we are blith and happy, the wheel is laid aſide for wings, and that which could ſcarce go of late, now flies, and overſwiftly too for us to mark its ſpeed. Now God who is infinitely more happy than we are, muſt needs drive on the ſpeed of this wheel to an infinite height, beyond what we can; ſo that it muſt do no leſs than wind up into it ſelf, even in a very moment. If it can take the *ſlowneſs* of one *now* after another, from us, why may it not take the *ſwiftneſs* of all its *nows together* from God? And though indeed many things *are to us* otherwiſe than they *are*, yet ſo as all things *are to him*, even ſo they *are indeed*.

But to make ſhort with our Author, to whom it ſeems the world might have been from everlaſting, we ſhall only mark what an ugly train this carries after it. His news is, That the world might have been as unbeginningly as God himſelf, and then to be ſure it may be as endleſly as he is; for the ſoul which is one thing that God has made, being ſo already, the world which is another, may be ſo too, if God will: So God may give away his whole everlaſtingneſs, to a world that is as much as he can be from everlaſting to everlaſting: And when he is thus on the gi-

ving hand, he may give away his immenſity too. And this indeed our Author is ſo forward to yield, that he has taken it up for a thing that all men elſe have done; for ſo he lanches out, (p. 391.) *Our laſtingneſs cannot be of another kind from Gods everlaſtingneſs; for then if God ſhould make a body of an all-filling outſtretchedneſs, it would not be all-filling, becauſe it would have dimenſions of another kind from what God has.* So he does not only take it for a truth, That ſuch a thing may be, but a more owned truth than that which this is brought to ſtrengthen. But indeed, whether *he will* hold ſo or not, *he muſt*, or elſe break with himſelf. For if the reaſon why the world might be from everlaſting, was, (as p. 414. is ſaid,) Becauſe there was no part of that laſtingneſs which was before the world, in which it began to have a power to be, but ſtill it might have been ſooner and ſooner unbeginningly, then the ſame gives the world leave to have been all-filling as to bulk: For why, there is no ſcantling of that roomthineſs beyond the world, beyond which the world had no power to be, but ſtill it might have been bigger and bigger boundleſly. Beſides, for fail, he has found out another way to make the world as immenſe as God is, though it were made bounded from everlaſting; and that is by growing

every

every day bigger and bigger endleſly: ſo having laſted an *infinite while*, it muſt needs have grown up to an *infinite bulk*, though made otherwiſe at firſt; for ſo he ſays, God is call'd *everlaſting*, not that he is gotten up to all the nows of time that are to come, but that he is hieing thither as faſt as he can, in the ſame road with our ſouls. Which is indeed a moſt curious, pretty, dainty thing if you mind it narrowly: For, in likeneſs, Gods immenſity may be call'd ſo, not that he has fill'd all roomthineſs from all eternity, or was everlaſtingly every where; but from his growing ever more and more in bulk, he may be ſaid to be immenſe, as from his growing ever older and older in time, he may be ſaid to be eternal: ſo have we gotten a world as everlaſting and as immenſe as God himſelf. Now he that will but cut out ſuch a God for me and make it thus far, I le undertake to make it up for him with ſtuff of the own; for now Gods Almightineſs, All-wiſdom, and whatever elſe comes under the name of *attributum incommunicabile* in the *Dutch Divinity*, ſetting no cloſer to the Godhead than his everlaſtingneſs and all-fillingneſs, he might from everlaſting have thrown them in too after the other: or however, if he gave them but a bounded mightineſs and wiſdom, yet inaſmuch as there might be a growing

every day more mighty and more wiſe from everlaſting, that Being muſt needs be as infinite in wiſdom and mightineſs as God himſelf, becauſe as infinite in thoſe two as he is in his everlaſtingneſs, in which he is no leſs infinite than in them.

All that we want now of making the world a God *Cap-a-pe*, or up to the Brim, is only this, That ſuch a world would be made by God ſtill, and not from everlaſting of it ſelf, as he is. But do but put it next into that ſame boundleſs roomthineſs and abiding, whereupon 'tis ſaid, *they would jump into one roomthineſs and abiding*; and, *which are as much of themſelves as God himſelf is, and were and will be for all him from everlaſting to everlaſting*; and then I think he will have ſet before us ſuch a *Hoghen moghen* Leviathan, that that of Holy *Job* would be but a kind of Spratkin to it ward, and the bigger one of Mr. *Hobbes* would never be enough to make Anchovy-ſauce for it. Though indeed I cannot think he meant no better, yet weighing theſe things, I muſt needs ſay, *He ſeems to be a ſetter forth of ſtrange gods*, and looks as if he had given us *Tentamina de Deo* for the nonce. And for my part, if I did but think there were or could be any ſuch thing as ſprings thus kindly from the ſeed which he has ſown, it would give me for ever frolick-

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ing on't again, and I ſhould go in fear of my life on't every day I riſe, and dream full dradly on't every night I went to bed. For I being at no agreement vvith this ſame *hideous Roomſter*, as to the vvay hovv I ſhould behave my ſelf tovvards it vvhile in it, hovv to beſpeak its forgiveneſs after doing amiſs, or how to know when I have done ſo; it may be, while I am thinking how all is well, and a coaks a coming, I may, for ought I know, be ramping on the ſnout of it, and ſo have my harmleſs miſtake paid home by a vile miſchance and a ſudden too, with nothing leſs than the dreadfulneſs of a grim nip, and a dead-doing gripe.

And this ſhall be enough to have ſpoken to the firſt part of our fourth Head, How far of old, the world or body, has or might have been: The other part is, How long it ſhall or may laſt. The Anſwer to which muſt be twofold, according to the twofold ſtate of the world; to wit, That in which 'tis, and that in which it ſhall be. As to the latter, There ſticks nothing with me, but that the world or body may be as everlaſting as the ſoul: For I think 'tis as impoſſible, that that which is ſomething ſhould make it ſelf nothing, as that that which is nothing ſhould make it ſelf ſomething. And when we ſay, the body is dying or timeſom, the ſoul death-

leſs or endleſs, we do not mean the body ſhould thereby loſe its bodyhood, but only its ſuchneſs: It ſhall be or may be alwayes body, but it never ſhall be, or at leaſt never was it body unſhifted; but after its kind, ſending forth and taking in of ſteams and reeks, even all along.

But as to that plight in which the world now is, the *May be* of its laſtingneſs is not to be gathered from the *inwardneſs* of the thing; for, for ought we know, body as now 'tis, may laſt as long as body renewed and cleanſed by fire, as hereafter it ſhall be: But we are altogether to look *outward* to the will of God, who, as he hath ſaid to the Sea, Thus far ſhalt thou go and no further *in room*, ſo has he ſaid to the World, Thus far ſhalt thou go and no further *in time*: The laſt day and hour of which, though no man knows, yet I think 'tis not much harder to pitch a time beyond which it ſhall not be, than 'tis to find out a ſcantling beyond which the roundle or globe of the earth is not, as now.

For whether we hold, That the ſame body which ſlept ſhall riſe again, that very fleſh, blood and bones which it lay down, as Holy Church ſeems all along to have believ'd; or whether we will have it, That the ſame body, becauſe the ſame Man with body beghoſted, riſes, as ſome of the uppermoſt ſeat

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of Philoſophers at this day have themſelves thought, and wonne upon others to think ſo too; Inaſmuch as both of them are acknowledged to be made of ſtuff already in being, it comes all to one: As ſure as we are that the body ſhall riſe again either way, ſo ſure are we that this world ſhall hold no longer, than till all the ſtuff that is now in the world be wrought up into bodies riſing again.

But then we are not only ſure that the body ſhall riſe again, but we have the ſame Word of God for it, That it ſhall do ſo in the world *in which* now 'tis, though not in the world as now 'tis, but chang'd in its kind of worldhood, as that ſhall be in its kind of bodyhood; the new heavens and the new earth being (as we think,) but old bodies new dreſt. So that we are ſure too, that at the ending of the world there muſt be ſtuff enough left, unmade up into Maniſh bodies, wherewith to frame a new heaven and new earth, without making more of nothing; and that this world ſhall hold no longer than till then.

Now though the heavens and the earth have dealings with one another, yet they do not make over to each other any thing that is bulky or weighty, that we can find ſo: whence we may make bold to ſay, over and

above, That all bodies that are to riſe again, are made of the ſame mold or ground that the firſt was; that is, taken out of the earthly world, not out of the heavenly bodies. Whence the world is to laſt no longer than till the *earthly ſtuff* for riſing bodies be ſpent, with leaving enough for an earthly world beſides.

If then we do but know how the earths globe, or that of it that lyes fleſhward, bears it ſelf to the throng of mens bodies made out of it, we may at length come at ſuch a bound of time or term of years, beyond which we may be ſure the world ſhall not hold out. And if we were but well aware, how much the innermoſt bodies enwomb'd in the earth, had to do with the making of ours, we might come a great deal nearer the buſineſs, than otherwiſe we are like to do. But, ſetting aſide the Excellent Mr. *Boyle* and *Kircher*, almoſt all men that have delved into the bowels of the earth to fetch us any tales of under-ground bodies, have done it rather to make themſelves more rich and wealthy, than either themſelves or any body elſe more wiſe or knowing. So that we are much at a loſs as to the kind of thoſe things that are hidden there, and whether according to the Laws that God has ſet to himſelf, in drawing one thing out of another, in thoſe Work-

Workhouſen which we find he has ſet up, the fleſhly body of man may at length be carved out of them, or Whether there be any little ſpungholes or crannies by wch one may ſoak through to the other? Again, What we do find at our utmoſt depths or bores, whequarries of ſtone, Mines of metal, or layers and veins of barren earths and ſapleſs medlies, we can't tell how far they may be tiew'd, and dreſt, and mingled, ſo as at length to be be made fit for the food of body, to make it wax when well, as we ſee they may for the health of the body, to make it well when ſick. And yet again, The ſundry unevenneſſes in the depth of thoſe layers, that are made of ſapful and growthſom earths, lead us into another Wilderneſs and leave us there. For like as ſometimes we find Gold (a thing that changes us much, but feeds us little) as fleet as the roots of ſhrubs in *Peru* or the *Weſt Indies*, ſometimes among the ſhallow waters that drill between the pebbles in the Falls of *Guiny* or *Africa*: whilſt the Gold Mine at *Chremnitz* is no leſs than 160 fathoms deep, (as we have it from a good Hand upon the place:) So in like manner, thoſe things that feed and biggen us, lye in the earths globe at full us uneven depths. For while ſalt, a thing that helps as much to live, and get life for others too, ſometimes floats on the top

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of the Sea, and is thickned in the open Beds, at the ſalt-making Marſhes of the *Iſle of Rhe* and *Xantoign*, *Provence* and *Meſſina*, or digg'd in the *Iſle of May*, and fetcht up at the Wiches in *England* from eaſie depths. We have it for truth, That near *Eperies* is a Salt-Mine 180 fathoms deep, and a *Sal gemma* Mine in *Poland* no leſs than 200. Though for the moſt part it will hold good, that you cannot dig many ſpades in mold or growth-ſom earth, before you come at a dead ſoyl. Suppoſing then (to make ſhort of a thing that may more eaſily be made long) That the wet and dry ſurface of the earths roundle, to the depth of mans height, one place with another, may be made up into the bodies of mankind, and with the well-skill'd *F. Taquet*, That at Dooms-day a leſs cantling of it than *England*, which we reckon above the thouſandth part of the Globe, will be enough to hold all the dwellers of it and their children, that ever have been, or in likelihood may be hereafter till then, though the world ſhould laſt 10000 years, Then are we ſure this world ſhall never laſt beyond a thouſand times ten thouſand years, how much ſoever it may be gueſt to fall ſhort of it. Which being the whole that we think needful to ſpeak, under an Head that has ſo much room to ſpread upon, and ſo little of boundedneſs to

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winde up in, we ſhall take forth to our laſt, which is,

CHAP. VII.

Whether there may not have been ſome other worlds or world before ours was; or Whether there may not yet be ſome ſuch a great way off, while this of ours is?

Anſw. A moreneſs of worlds, and a ſooner-neſs of this world, may alwayes be, and often are, grounded upon a like way of reaſoning; that is, the boundleſs and everlaſting power and goodneſs of the Almighty Maker: for ſo pleads the avoucher, God being all way boundleſs in power and goodneſs, and every where withal, wherever and whenever he is, he may give ſhew of his power and his good-neſs; there being nothing to hinder his making worlds elſewhere than where this was pitcht, or other-while than when this was begun, but only time and room imaginary which are nothing; and it being good in it ſelf for a world to be, the more of them there were, or the ſooner they began, ſo much the better. Now if all this makes any thing for a moreneſs or more earlineſs of worlds, by the ſelf-ſame Argument we may hold, That this world began ſooner than we are told it

did

did begin. Which is both impoſſible to be, and wicked to think: For the Maker Almighty being everlaſting as well as all-filling, and ever as well asthen, boundleſly powerful and good; and it being good in it ſelf for this world, as much as for any former or other world to be, Why might he not 10000 ages before the world was, give it its bidding to ſtep forth, whilſt the ſooner it was the better? But we muſt alſo note, That the Argument drawn from Gods unbounded power and goodneſs, as looking towards the behoof of the Creature will ever fall ſhort upon this ſcore: For why, there is not a full reckoning up of thoſe attributes of his that have to do in the work; boundleſs wiſdom and good liking being left out. For we are to know, That then only infinite power and goodneſs could make the world, when infinite wiſdom and good-liking thought it meet, that ſuch a being ſhould begin to be. Now that waswhen we read in *Moſes* it did begin to be. Whence I think it follows. That it could begin no ſooner. For infinite wiſdom pitching upon that time for its beginning, choſe out the very beſt time that could be lighted on for its beginning: Had it then begun ſooner, it had been better for it not to have begun ſo ſoon. But to miſtruſt boundleſs wiſdom, to contrive ſo, that it might have better been contrived,

trived, is to unmake its boundleſneſs. And to pitch upon two or more beſt times, for a thing to begin in, is to pitch upon one of the worſer kinds of awkwardneſs.

Hence then we gather thus much, That as boundleſs wiſdom took in with a moment, wherein it was deem'd moſt meet, that Creatures ſhould begin, ſo are we to think again it ſettled upon a certain number of Creatures, which it was beſt of all, ſhould ſometimes have beginning. For if there were no more reaſon, why God ſhould make the world, *then* when he did make it, than why he ſhould make it ſooner or later than he did, it had nere been made at all, any more than it was made ſooner or later than it was: and if there were no more reaſon why he made ſo many beings in the world, than why he ſhould make more or fewer, he had never made ſo many at all, any more than he made fewer or more than he did make. Now the ſame *moſt truſtful* witneſs that tells us when the world began, telling us alſo that it was, in the beginning; that is, (if I underſtand the firſt word in the Bible בראשית) in the beginning of thoſe things that were ever made, or before all worlds, or the firſt made bodies were the heaven and the earth which now are: and when he tells us what things were then made; tells us alſo

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that they were made up into a world that was *one*. And the ſame argument that makes for worlds more or ſooner, proves alſo with the ſame ſtrength that *our own* world was more or ſooner, or might have been. We have the ſame reaſon to deny its force for *more* or *earlier* worlds *at all*, that we have to deny it for the forebeing or morebeing of this.

Beſides, To gather that God has or may have, *more* or *earlyer* worlds, becauſe he can do the *moſt* that can be done, and the *ſooneſt* that could be done, is no leſs than the very ſcum of emptineſs. For God being as boundleſs in his goodneſs as he is in his mightineſs, at this rate, would be forc't to reach out that love to all mankind at leaſt, that we read he has bounded only to ſome choſen ones: ſo not only the *few names* in *Sardis* and the *remnant* of *Iſrael*, but the *All* of thoſe Churches and mankind too, ſhould at length arrive at everlaſting bliſs. But as we find his goodneſs as boundleſs in the making *ſome* happy for ever, as it would be in the making all ſo; and that God has thought meet that his infinite goodneſs ſhould have *enough* to do, to ſave ſome, without ſaving *all* or *moſt*: ſurely we are to think too, that his boundleſs power has *enough* to do, and begins *ſoon enough* to do, or did as much as it *needed* to do, and began as ſoon as it *need-*

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ed to begin, in making *one* world *as* he did, and beginning it, *when* he did. If then boundleſs good will and ruthfulneſs in ſparing ſome from everlaſting burnings, has ſpared as many as it *needs* to ſpare, for the ſake of *its* boundleſsneſs; in like manner boundleſs mightineſs in making the world or this whole Crowd of beings, as late as tis, and as little as tis, has made it as ſoon and as big, as a world or number of beings *needs* to be made, for the ſake of *its* boundleſsneſs, ſo as if more or ſooner worlds ſhould be made, it would not better become, or more fully ſpeak forth its boundleſſneſs. And if ſo, then had God made, ſooner or bigger or more worlds, he had done that which was altogether *needleſs* to be done, and what not ſo well done, as that which he has already done; becauſe what is done is the beſt that can be done: And that would be an unbeſeemingneſs, which would as much *take from* the boundleſsneſs of his *wiſdom*, as it would *put to* the boundleſsneſs of his *power*.

Again, This ill weighed reaſoning would put God upon the doing of things, with a meaner forecaſt than we do things our ſelves. For ſhould God have made worlds, before or beſides this, that ſo his works might hold ſome fuller proportion or meet-

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ſomneſs with his everlaſting and Almighty power; it would be a making of God to do things, for ſuch ends as he ſhould never be able to reach, nor in the leaſt draw nearer to. For ſhould God have made any worlds ſome thouſands of years before this, there would have been the ſame everlaſting power, before all ſuch worlds, as is before this, and no leſs: as there is now the ſame everlaſting power before our world, that would be before ſuch worlds, and no more. And ſhould God make other worlds together with, or wide off this world, there would be the ſame Almighty power beyond them, and taken up in the making of them, that is beyond, and in the making of this, and no more, as there is in this, and no leſs. Upon the ſame account that God may make or might have made, one world more than this, he may make or might have made 10000, and upon the ſame ſcore he may or might 10000, he may or might 100000, and when he has made all of them, be yet no nearer doing any thing like his boundleſs ſelf than he was in the making this one; for his whole boundleſs power was ſet a work or taken up, in the making of this, and no more than the whole could be, in the making of never ſo many more worlds, or never ſo many more early worlds.

God

God did not make the world or worldly beings, that the bigneſs or manifoldneſs of them ſhould ſet forth to us his alfillingneſs, or that the earlineſs of them ſhould give us the likeneſs of his everlaſtingneſs, but that the unutterable curiouſneſs of its frame and workmanſhip, the unthinkable care and forecaſt in all its evenneſſes and entwinings, ſhould beget in us as well an awfulneſs of, as wonder for, a greatneſs and wiſdom ſo unbounded. As alſo that the thoughts of thoſe manifold layers of hallowed drifts, and everlaſting well wiſhes for the happineſs of worthleſs ſinful man, ſhould enkindle in us the flames of holy love and hearty worſhippings, of a boundleſs goodneſs, ſo boundleſly endearing. All which are to be done well enough, without looking at the time before, the room beyond, or the while taken up, in the doing of the things we ſo much wonder at, and bow down while we think upon. Elſe ſhould we have lower thoughts of Almighty Power and Wiſdom making the world in ſix days, than if the ſame had been done in one, or leſs than one. *Iſaac Habrechtus* that cunning Handywright who made the Clock at *Straſburgh* is as much talkt of, and wondred at, far and wide, for the bare framing of it at ſuch a bigneſs, ſometime in his life, once, in

ſo long while as he thought fit, as if he had made it bigger or earlier, and had made more beſides it, and in a ſhorter time: for, for its *workmanſhip alone*, tis matchleſs, *as to mans skill*, and it would have been no more than ſo, by reaſon of *the reſt*.

God Almighty by making this one world in ſix days, beginning it when he did, and bounding it where he did, has made it a *Noneſuch altogether*; and had he by making it more, or quicker, or ſooner, or bigger, fulfill'd the mindes of ſuch as would have it ſo, it had been no more ſtill than a *Noneſuch altogether*. He that cannot enough praiſe Almighty wiſdom, and love everlaſting goodneſs, for the making one world of nothing when he did, would never find in his heart to do it, for his making more, or quicker, or ſooner or bigger: Boundleſs wiſdom, love and power brought about the firſt, and no more than boundleſs could the latter.

The worthy Doctor *More* has ſuprizingly eſſay'd the infinity or boundleſs manifoldneſs of worlds from the Head of lightſomneſs. For ſo he pleads, Either there muſt be infinite Suns and Worlds or elſe, (which is frightful to think), there muſt be infinite darkneſs, for nothing bounded could ever enlighten it?

To which we ſay firſt, that having taken away

away altogether that boundleſs waſtfulneſs beyond the world, we are no whit careful, about the light or darkneſs of it; that which is *nothing at all*, being neither *light* nor *dark at all*: let them ſay, which of the two it had beſt to be, who hold it. And again we cannot but mark here, how hard a thing 'tis for us, to lay aſide the things which befal bodies, while we are ſpeaking of things, which are not ſo. For the outworldiſh emptineſs before the income of lightſome worlds is owned to be no body, and yet it ſeems, muſt needs be dark, if unenlightned, body-like: according to which that Learned Gentleman might as well have proved the ſoul it ſelf to have been dark, no Sun ſhining into it, as that emptineſs, a thing as much *not body* (a *ſort* of which alone are enlightned with ſunbeams), would have been ſo: not to ſay that even God himſelf before the making of the Sun, muſt thus have been in ſtate of darkneſs too; for God, who, whilſt no body, is yet *ſomthing*, ſtands fairer for being an *enlightned ſomthing*, than that does, which, whilſt no body, is alſo *nothing at all*, and muſt therefore firſt become *ſomthing*, before it can get up to be an *enlightned ſomthing*.

Moreover, to ſay nothing how light may otherwiſe ariſe than from ſuns, (as may be

ſeen by Mr. *Clayton*'s Diamond, the *Bononian* Stone, ſtale Sprats, the ſouce drink of Mackrel, the off-ſcourings of an Oyſter-ſhell, &c,) 'tis clear that darkneſs or Sun-light, are ſuch narrow betiders of body, that they are too ſcant to cover all that are bound up under that name, unleſs any will be ſo uncouth as to ſay, that a Mill-ſtone is inwardly dark; which he that does, muſt ſee further into than I can, or any man elſe that I know; or that a ſhining piece of rotten wood, has leſs of its lightſomneſs in the dark than in the day.

As for the lights that have been ſeen in Mr. *Boyles* Air pump, When it once be made clear, as the lights we are ſpeaking of, that all body is indeed and indeed ſuckt out of it, that light cannot beam in that thinneſs where a breather can't live nor a bladder be blown, that the hollow ſide of the glaſs throws in no rayes or ſteams, nor the outſide of the ſhining body any at all or any but thoſe of light, or that none of thoſe rayes of other atoms that are ſhacking all over the worlds waſts come riding or drilling through both; it will behove us to bethink our ſelves of ſome kind of Anſwer for it: But until that be done, we ſhall think that the world cannot at all, or at leaſt by man, be crowded into a leſs room than God at firſt allow'd it,

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(and that it must be, if the empty Receiver has nothing of the world in it); and that all the light that we see is body in body, (the world, as we think, being all over glutted with body). So that he who at the selvedge of the world does but see light as far as he can see any thing, he needs not take thought for that darkness beyond which neither his eyes see, nor understanding kens. Which might be enough wherewith to close the last thing we laid down, that is, the moreness or more earlineſs of worlds.

Unless that we may put to the rest one Objection more for the plurality of worlds, or infinity of this, from such sayings in the English tongue, as seem to speak it a truth with us, time out of mind: Some whereof having room either in the daily offices of the Liturgy, or in the Creed it self, the overlooking of them without any remark, may seem so like a slight to that Book, or those things which holy and wise men have had both good thoughts of, and much love for, that I hope we may be forgiven, while we go on to shew, that their right meanings do as much befriend these our thinkings, as their mistaken ones may seem to lye cross to them.

The first is that which comes, as otherwhere, so oftenest in the *Gloria patri*,---*World without end*; which may seem to speak the

world everlasting or boundless. The other is most remarkably in the *Nicene* Creed--*Before all worlds*; which seems too to be well enough bottom'd upon Holy Writ it self; For so we read, *Heb.* 1. 2, *By whom also he made the worlds.* And 11. 3, *Through faith we understand the worlds were framed.* Whence one would think, that we do believe in good earnest, that there were worlds before this, or are besides it.

Answ. If we had but that insight into the happy speech of our fore-fathers that were to be wisht for, the words could never afford us the least of a stumbling-block. But so few men having thought good to meddle with it of late, and scarce any but Mr. *Somner* at this day, we shall take upon us, as shortly as we can, to give the meaning of those sayings, so as no man who has not so much as lookt back to old *English*, should at any time be misled by them.

We are then to understand, That the word [*World*] though we now take it for that bulk of bodily beings we see, yet of old it was as well, and oftner too, taken for ages and lastingness time out of mind. And the word with our *Saxon* Fore-fathers, for what we now call the *World*, was mostly **Middan eard**, *Middle earth.* The old word **Woꝛld** answering to the *Seculum* of the Latines, as the

the fore-named did to their *Mundus*. Which they have ſtuck ſo cloſely to in their Engliſhings of Latine, that not only *Ælfrick* in his *Gloſſary*, (ſet forth by the Learned and painful Mr. *Somner*,) turns *ſeculum*, *World*, (as he does *ævum* ylð & ece). But the word *ſeculum* being to be met with 70 times and upwards in the Pſalms, according to the vulgar Lat. the *Saxon* tranſlations, (printed by the Great *Spelman*,) have alwayes turn'd it *world*; and as often as it happens in the *Saxon* Goſpels 'tis the ſame too. And whereas *Mundus* comes in in the Goſpels about 20 times, 'tis alſo read Middan eard: As alſo Kosmos in *Ælfrick*'s *Gloſſary*. And though *Orbis terrarum* be the ſame in ſence with both, that is Engliſhed by neither word, but evermore, (if I miſtake not,) in the Pſalms and Goſpels by ymbhwyrft eorthena, or all the round-about of earthly beings. And laſtly, Though *in æternum*, *in perpetuum*, and *in ſempiternum*, mean the ſame with *in ſeculum*, yet are they ever turn'd on ecnyſſe, unto endleſneſs.

But how little they thought them to differ in ſence, will be ſhown by an Inſtance or two among many. *Pſal.* 135, His mercy endureth *for ever*; It being *in æternum*, 'tis made on ecnyſſe: But the very ſame thing, *Pſal.* 117, being ſpoken by *in ſeculum*, 'tis Engliſht on woruldе, to or for world. *Pſal.* 9. 5, *in æternum*,

num and *in ſeculum ſeculi* being together, 'tis **on ecnyſſe and on woꝛulde a woꝛulde**, for ever and ever. And *Pſal.* 27. the laſt--- lift them up for ever, being *in æternum*, the Trin. Coll. MSS. reads **oth on woꝛulde and on ecnyſſe**, for ever and ever as we ſay. Whence 'tis clear, that with our Fore-fathers, *World* and *Evermore* were often the ſame.

And they were ſo ready to make *World* ſpeak *ſeculum*, that where we give a much unlike meaning, they ſtill hold to it. So *Pſal.* 89, (90.) 8, where we read, *our ſecret ſins.* The Lat. having it *ſeculum noſtrum*, (and the 70 the ſame in Gr.) from the Heb. עלמנו, they have it **woꝛulde ure**, *our world.* So they hold it in the Adjective too: Whence in King *Æthelſtans* Laws, as we have them from Mr. *Lambert*, we find **ælfꝛ thegn**, and **weoꝛuld thegn**, turn'd in *Brampton*, as the Great *Selden* has it, *Presbyteri & Seculares.* And in K. *Edm.* Laws, Church-men and Secular men are ſhared into **Godcunda hada** and **woꝛuldcunda**, and **woꝛldmanna dome** is *judicium ſeculare.*

Beſides, We are to know that *World*, whether it be in the ſingular number or plural, may betoken plurally or indefinitely, and as much adverbially as nominally. So where we read, *Pſal.* 54. 21, Abideth of old, *ante ſecula*,

cula, plurally, 'tis **atforan worulde**, ſingularly. And in St. *Luke*, *in ſecula* is **on worulde**, as *in ſeculum* is ſometimes **on a worulda**, *Pſal.* 132. 4. and ſometimes one ſometimes the other, *Pſal.* 117. So that *world* needs not be one age only, but ages time out of mind, and hereafterward.

Again, If we compare a few Doxologies of the *Saxon* times, with the ſayings we before ſpake of, it will yet further be ſeen.

Thus in the *Saxon* Sermon in Mr. *Liſle* and Mr. *Fox*, we read **on ealra worulda worulb**, unto all ages of ages. And in the pieces of *Saxon* Homilies by Mr. *Wheelock*, **on ealra worulb**, unto all ages; **yeond ealra worulda worulb**, beyond all ages of ages, or times of times; **a butan ende**, aye without end; **on ealra worulde worulb a butan ende**, unto all ages of ages, aye without end; **a a on ecnyſſe**, for aye, to eternity; **a to worulb**, aye for ever, or for ever and for aye. And *K. Canute* ſhuts up his Church-Laws with **ſymble efre to worulb** Amen, alwayes, for ever, to endleſneſs; after our full way of ſpeaking over and over what is boundleſs, when we ſay, *for ever and ever*.

And ſince we were over-run by the *Normans*, this way of ſpeaking has been kept up. Thus in a MSS. now by me of the N. T. written (as I gheſs) about the time of *Ric.* 1.

where

where 'tis ſaid, *Rom.* 1. 25, *Benedictus in ſecula*, 'tis **that is bleſſd into worldis of worldis**, who is bleſſed for ever. 1 *Cor.* 2.7, *Ante ſecula*, **biforе worldis.** 2 *Cor.* 11. 31, *In ſecula*, **into worldis.** *Eph.* 2. 7. *In ſeculis ſupervenientibus*, **in the worldis above comyng**, in the ages to come. *Col.* 1. 26, *Hid from ages and generations*, **fro worldis and generacioums.** Laſtly, in the *Cordial*, one of the earlieſt printed Books coming forth *a.* 1478, quoting *Iſa.* 34, 'tis ſaid, *The ſinner ſhall be in deſolation* **time and world withouten ende.**

From all which 'tis as clear, that we meant in the dayes of yore by the word *World*, *time*, *ages*, all the while that has been heretofore or is to be hereafter boundleſly, as that we mean by it now adayes, that frame of bodies in which we live and ſpeak it.

And indeed 'tis eaſie enough to be aware, that we ſtill take *World* for that which is vaſt in bulk, boundleſs in tale or laſtingneſs, or any wayes elſe that we can think of. In thoſe Country ſayings of a *world* of water in the Sea, a *world* of Sea-ſtones on the ſhingle, or a *world* of moments ſince the world began; and when we ſay, this or that is nothing in the *world*, ſuch a thing is like another for all the *world*.

So then, to make an end, When we read in

in the Penman of the Hebr. of *Worlds* that were made or framed by God, we mean (if we know what we mean) as the Gr. and V. Lat. mean; that is, τὸς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν, *fecit ſecula*, and κατηρτίσθαι τὸς αἰῶνας, *aptata eſſe ſecula*; he made or there were framed, the ſundry ages or by-runnings and wheelings about of things in this world, or the whole gathering of them call'd world: Αἰὼν betokening rather a laſting than the thing that laſts; and yet may ſometimes be both, as the Heb. עולם is *Seculum* and *Mundus*. Likewiſe when we read in the *Nicene Creed*, or Mæſſe *Creda*, as in the *Saxon*, that Chriſt was begotten of the Father *ante omnia ſecula*; we have it æt ealle woruldа, *before all worlds*, that is, before all ages or wheelings about of times, and things in time. And *world without end*, in the Doxology, is ages, or evermore without end, or beyond all ages or ſet times. The keeping to which old ſayings in Holy Writ, or about holy things, (as we do elſewhere to thoſe of *two tenth deals of flower*, *reward thee in this plat*, *ſeek after leaſing*, *go with him twain*, &c.) while we have taken in ſo many new wayes of ſpeaking, and later meanings of the word *World*, has made thoſe more loneſome Speeches ſomewhat leſs underſtood, and more likely to be miſtaken.

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